Navigating Borders by van Liempt, Ilse
Navigating Borders
IMISCOE (International Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion)
IMISCOE is a European Commission-funded Network of Excellence of
more than 350 scientists from various research institutes that specialise
in migration and integration issues in Europe. These researchers, who
come from all branches of the economic and social sciences, the huma-
nities and law, implement an integrated, multidisciplinary and interna-
tionally comparative research program that focuses on Europe’s migra-
tion and integration challenges.
Within the program, existing research is integrated and new re-
search lines are developed that involve issues crucial to European-level
policy-making and provide a theory-based design to implement new re-
search.
The publication program of IMISCOE is based on five distinct publication
profiles, designed to make its research and results available to scien-
tists, policymakers and the public at large. High-quality manuscripts
written by IMISCOE members, or in cooperation with IMISCOE members,
are published in these five series. An Editorial Committee coordinates






More information on the network can be found at: www.imiscoe.org
IMISCOE Dissertations include dissertations of IMISCOE members. There
are more than 100 Ph.D. candidates in the various affiliated institu-
tions working on doctoral research within the IMISCOE framework.
Navigating Borders
Inside Perspectives on the Process of Human
Smuggling into the Netherlands
Ilse van Liempt
IMISCOE Dissertations
Cover design: Studio Jan de Boer BNO, Amsterdam
Layout: Fito Prepublishing, Almere
ISBN-13 978 90 5356 930 6
ISBN-10 90 5356 930 8
NUR 741 / 763
© Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam 2007
All rights reserved. Without limiting the rights under copyright re-
served above, no part of this book may be reproduced, stored in or in-
troduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any
means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise)
without the written permission of both the copyright owner and the




1 The Janus face of globalisation 19
1.1 Distinction between wanted and unwanted migration 20
1.2 A shift in migration regimes 22
1.3 Other measures to control migration 24
1.4 Unintended and undesirable effects of migration control 30
1.5 Migration theory and irregularity: towards a research question 32
2 New intermediate structures in response to restrictive
admission policies 37
2.1 Legal definitions of human smuggling 38
2.2 The difference between smuggling and trafficking 40
2.3 The discourse surrounding human smuggling and smugglers 42
2.4 The research on human smuggling 43
2.5 Towards a typology of different types of smuggling and
trafficking 47
3 Conducting research among smuggled migrants: an inside
perspective 53
3.1 Data available on human smuggling in the Netherlands and
its limitations 54
3.2 The biographical method as the main source of information 57
3.3 The research population 58
3.4 Gaining access to smuggled migrants 62
3.5 Reasons for participation and refusal 65
3.6 Biases in the interviews 67
3.7 Ethical considerations 69
4 Structural conditions and individual choices 73
4.1 Why people migrate and categorisations of migrants upon
arrival 73
4.2 Structural conditions for people coming from the Horn of
Africa 78
4.3 Structural conditions for people coming from Iraq 81
4.4 Structural conditions for people coming from the former
Soviet Union 86
4.5 Who migrates in an irregular way? 88
5 Crossing the border in various irregular ways 95
5.1 The story of Zhara from Somalia 95
5.2 The trouble with getting out of Iraq 100
5.3 The story of Oemar from Chechnya 109
5.4 How age, gender, and levels of insecurity shape border
crossing 111
5.5 How social, economic, and human capital shape border
crossing 115
6 Different types of smuggling and internal dynamics 123
6.1 Classifications of smuggling types 123
6.2 A look at who else is involved in the smuggling ‘business’ 126
6.3 How did migrants perceive their smuggler? 128
6.4 The internal dynamics of smuggling and the role of trust 131
6.5 Classifications of smuggling types along internal dynamics 135
7 Impact of smuggling and legal limits to integration 143
7.1 The Dutch asylum system 143
7.2 The new Aliens Act 146
7.3 The Netherlands as a destination of coincidence 147
7.4 26,000 rejected asylum seekers 149
7.5 How to survive without state support or a social network to
rely on 153
7.6 Health problems among refugees 157
7.7 Here and there: how people stay connected 158
7.8 Strategies to secure one’s status 160
8 Conclusion 165
8.1 The research method and its implications 166
8.2 Why do people need smugglers and who moves? 167
8.3 The journey to the Netherlands: three case studies 169
8.4 Context matters: most migration theory is de-contextualised 172
8.5 Different types of smugglers 173
8.6 The role of transit 175
8.7 How did smuggling affect the migration process? 176
8.8 Implications of this research for policy 177
6 NAVIGATING BORDERS
Appendix I Overview of expert interviews 179






TABLE OF CONTENTS 7

Acknowledgements
This dissertation is the product of a formulation of my own thoughts,
but writing it has provided the opportunity to meet and work with peo-
ple who inspired me enormously in my thoughts. First of all, I would
like to thank my research assistants. Without Khalil Shalmashi, Solo-
mon Afework and Elena Lommers it would have been impossible to
collect the data that grounds this book. Their presence also brought
matters to attention that would have otherwise escaped my own. My
deep gratitude goes out to all those people who shared their stories,
points-of-view, and opinions with my assistants and me. I still carry
with me the accounts of murdered sons, torture, rape, terror, and all
the smuggling adventures. Not only did these accounts provide the
data for this book, but they also changed me personally. In respect for
their privacy, I do not thank my respondents by name, yet it is the
hope that some will recognise themselves in the pages that follow. I
wanted this book to be about them. I wanted it to be a record of what
happened to them when their lives took a turn into horror and loss,
and they had to leave everything behind. I am convinced that this book
depicts a side of smuggling that is rarely told, though very much in
need of telling.
The scientific environment in which this book was produced was
very inspiring to me as well. Maria Berger was the first to introduce
me to the academic world and convinced me that writing a dissertation
was something I should do. My workplace at the Institute for Migra-
tion and Ethnic Studies turned out to be a very stimulating surround-
ing. All the discussions I had at IMES PhD meetings and with the
CERES transnationalism group were very helpful, as was the specific
feedback offered on my work. Sharing an office with Liza Nell gave me
the joy one needs while doing such serious work. The research visit I
made to the Centre for Global Ethics in Birmingham not only proved
very productive for my book it also resulted in valuable new friend-
ships. Here, I would also like to thank my European colleagues in the
smuggling project funded by the European Science Foundation (ESF).
Somehow all the discussions we had during workshops and at confer-
ences have found their way into this book. I thank the Dutch Science
Council (NWO) for funding this research so meaningful to me. And I
would also like to thank Aimee Rindoks and Karina Hof who helped
transform my writing into proper English.
Last, but not least, this book could not exist without the firm gui-
dance of my supervisors. I will never forget the meetings I had with Ri-
nus Penninx and Jeroen Doomernik. From them I learned so much,
both about scientific research and academic writing. Jeroen was always
at my side. I deeply appreciate his ongoing support, and I will never
forget the numerous trips we made together. As the initiator of the
European research project, he was very much involved in the whole
process, but I admire him for still giving me space to find my own way
in the world of smuggling.
10 NAVIGATING BORDERS
Introduction
Tarifa, a former fishing town in the south of Spain, is famous today for
two types of travellers who both depend on the wind: surf tourists and
‘illegal’ immigrants arriving by boat. Beginning in the 1980s, windsurf-
ing tourism became the city’s main industry, and around the same
time, the first immigrants started coming ashore by small boats, also
known as pateras. In June 2003, I went to this city of wind to see for
myself how Tarifa had changed, from a fishing town into a port of arri-
val for immigrants who cannot enter Europe any other way than via pa-
tera. A former fisherman in the harbour explained to me how, at first,
the inhabitants of Tarifa thought that these ‘poor Africans’ travelling
via patera could not afford the expensive ferry ride to Spain. Now Tari-
fa’s natives understand that these migrants are not necessarily poor:
but rather, they have no legal options for leaving and therefore choose
to cross in this dangerous way. Meanwhile, fishermen on the other
side, in Africa, have left the fishing for another ‘business’: the business
of bringing people across. But this new enterprise is not without risks.
Border control officers are known to intercept the boats, and the
water’s waves are high, making it difficult to navigate a secure course.
Human fatalities are the regular result of following a wrong course or
a journey that takes too long. Often the boats are also overloaded,
which may result in capsizing.
A Red Cross worker told me about the first large accident that hap-
pened in Tarifa, in 1989, which resulted in the eighteen bodies found
dead at Los Lances beach. Since the incident, Tarifa became renowned
for its arrivals of pateras. The former fisherman remembers a July day
in 2002 when five pateras arrived at the same moment – 200 immi-
grants stepped ashore and all were arrested. Those who could be sent
back were repatriated immediately; however, most of the immigrants
left Tarifa and travelled onto places where they thought they could find
work. At the time this book is being written, people continue to drown
on a daily basis at the southern border of ‘Fortress Europe’. Under
pressure from the European Union, the Strait of Gibraltar is now very
well controlled. As a result, the main migration route has shifted to-
wards the Canary Islands. On 29 May 2006, 732 Africans on eleven
boats arrived on several islands, including La Gomera, Fuerteventura,
and Gran Canaria. The EU responded by providing boats and helicop-
ters to help Spain better guard its borders (www.nrc.nl/anp/buiten-
land/article334818.ece). The question thus remains: where will future
clandestine immigrants set ashore, and how many more will die while
attempting to reach that spot?
In the Netherlands it was, first and foremost, the Dover accident of
2000 that brought smuggling onto the political agenda. Rotterdam
had served as a point of transit for 60 Chinese immigrants who were
all supposed to be smuggled to the United Kingdom. Some had been
en transit for months, already having passed through several countries.
While in Rotterdam, they were stored in small groups, above several
Chinese restaurants. The next day they departed in mini-busses for the
Rotterdam harbour. There, they all entered a container, which was sub-
sequently filled with tomatoes, then sealed, and put on a lorry. The
container was transported to Zeebrugge, Belgium, from which point it
made the crossing into Dover, England. Upon arrival, the tragedy be-
came apparent: 58 of the Chinese migrants had suffocated. The driver
had closed off the cargo’s air supply on one of the hottest days of sum-
mer (Meeus 2000). In 2002, another big case involving Chinese
smuggling was brought to light, this time involving a young Chinese
woman of Dutch nationality. Called by some the ‘godmother’ of human
smuggling, ‘Sister P.’ had a monopoly on a smuggling route from Chi-
na to England that passes via Rotterdam, and along which she trans-
ports approximately one hundred people per month. Sister P.’s pre-
sumed role in the Dover case, however, was never proven (Meeus
2002).
The framework in which smuggling incidents like the Dover acci-
dent are discussed is rather different from what I experienced in Tarifa.
Former fishermen talked about Africa as ‘the other side’, in terms of
its poverty, and when referring to their ‘colleagues’ who have started
bringing people across as a way to earn some extra money. By contrast,
the framework in which the smuggling of Chinese immigrants is dis-
cussed by policymakers and politicians is one of organised crime.
Terms, such as ‘gangs’ or ‘the mafia’, are often used without defining
exactly what is meant by them. The discourse, one-sided and of a crim-
inal language, seems to be dominant not only in the media, but also in
jurisdiction. Illustrative is the fact that, for a long time, smuggling was
not considered a crime, but rather, held in the same regard as helping
Jews or communists to escape ‘bad’ regimes. Shortly after human
smuggling entered the Dutch penal code in 1993, the penalties for
smuggling were raised. And in 2005, the humanitarian clause was re-
moved from the Dutch smuggling article, meaning all smuggling cases
were to be treated as criminal acts.
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Objective of this study
When it comes to academic theory, it could be said that the topic of hu-
man smuggling remains a neglected area. Most research in this field
consists of single case studies: few cross-comparisons are made vis-à-
vis types of smuggling or on a country-to-country basis, and there is a
fundamental lack of hard evidence to substantiate most aspects of the
smuggling process (Salt & Hogarth 2000). This study takes an internal
approach to compare various types of smuggling. The research method
used is biographical interviews. Talking to migrants about their smug-
gling experiences serves to fill some of the empirical gaps existing in
present-day knowledge about human smuggling processes. It also chal-
lenges assumptions that are commonly made about smuggling, both
in the media and by politicians. For example, certain elements of orga-
nised crime, such as the use of violence or debt-bondage, are often
linked to smuggling without clear empirical evidence. This research
emphasises the diversity of smuggling processes; no presumptions are
made about the involvement of organised crime in smuggling. How
smuggling is embedded more widely in society and the economy is
also taken into account. In order to move beyond legal and criminal
discourses, applied is a broad definition of smuggling that spans the
whole spectrum: from smuggling-as-altruism to smuggling-as-orga-
nised-crime. The definition of human smuggling employed in this re-
search is as follows:
Every act whereby an immigrant is assisted in crossing interna-
tional borders and this crossing is not endorsed by the govern-
ment of the receiving state, neither implicitly nor explicitly.
(Doomernik 2001: 10-11)
Another term that needs to be examined critically is ‘illegal’ migration.
When is somebody ‘illegal’? In actuality, this is not so easy to deter-
mine. A person may enter a country in a legal way but then, for exam-
ple, overstay a visa, thus becoming ‘illegal’ after a while. Migrants may
thus slide into and out of legality over time. ‘Irregular migration’ is a
broader and less normative term than ‘illegal’ migration, as it refers to
the far wider range of border crossings that may occur without stan-
dard authority (Jordan & Duvell 2002). Besides, when the term ‘illegal’
is used in reference to people, it implies that such people should not
be where they are. In this study, the word ‘illegal’ will be used when
speaking from the state’s perspective and accordingly placed between
single quotation marks.
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Migration and human smuggling
Beginning in the mid-1980s, with the rise of asylum seekers in the
Netherlands from places with which the country had few to no prior
links, a facile connection was made between smuggling and the in-
crease of migration. Smuggling was considered a ‘business’ – even a
global ‘business’ – that transported migrants over enormous distances,
and also offered possibilities to those who had no prior inclinations to
migrate. Smugglers were, to a large extent, held responsible for the
greater influx of immigrants to the Netherlands (Tweede Kamer 1995).
The general rhetoric is that smuggling has created migration possibili-
ties for those immigrants not allowed to immigrate, and whom receiv-
ing countries have classified as ‘aliens’, rather than ‘guests’ (Sassen
1999). This perception has compelled law enforcement agencies to re-
spond by stopping ‘criminals’ who break immigration laws upon enter-
ing a country. Criminal prosecutions of the facilitators and controls to
stop irregular movements have become essential to the management
of migration flows. A programme designed to this end by the European
Commission, which started in 1996 and lasted for four years, even
bore the striking name of STOP. The enormous amounts of money
paid to smugglers may have also fuelled the idea that those who break
immigration rules are not in need of protection. The perception that
‘wealthy’ refugees are not ‘real’ refugees is reinforced by this new phe-
nomenon, even though one’s level of welfare, in principle, does not say
anything about one’s possible needs for refugee protection. Not only
has smuggling created migration opportunities for those people who
were not officially ‘invited’ by receiving states, but it has also blurred
the distinctions among different categories for immigrants. This makes
it harder for immigration officers to evaluate asylum applications.
Some smugglers provide ‘good asylum stories’ as part of their service,
and most smugglers advise people to hide their true identity to avoid
deportation, which may undermine the efficiency and even the legiti-
macy of the asylum application system.
So far, not much research has been done on what migrating with
the use of a smuggler means for the migration process. Authors who
base their research on migrant interviews often use the social network
approach. For example, Staring (2001) showed in his studies among
the Turkish community in the Netherlands that relatives can be very
helpful in the process of ‘illegal’ migration to the country. By far, the
most common way is to enter on a valid visa and to remain after the
visa has expired. Data collected from interviews with over 2,200 people
who migrated from Morocco or Senegal to Spain, and from Egypt or
Ghana to Italy, also show that, among the migrants who admitted to
having migrated ‘illegally’, 58 per cent had used the overstaying meth-
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od (Schoorl et al. 2000). Studies like these are very useful to the decon-
struction of sensational reports on smuggling. Boat accidents, and the
public discussions subsequently spurred on by them, give the impres-
sion that this is the channel for ‘illegal’ migration. Research, however,
shows that there are many other ways to enter the European Union in
clandestine ways. Still, these studies do not reveal how travelling with
a smuggler may have an effect on migration processes, in light of how,
for example, travelling on an official visa with the intention to overstay
does not greatly diverge from the appearance of regularised travelling.
Studies that deal with smuggling, in the criminal sense of the word,
usually focus on the social organisation of human smuggling and are
based on analyses of police files or court cases (Neske 2006; Soudijn
2006). The main interest of these studies is to find out how smuggling
is organised and who is involved in the ‘business’. This perspective as-
sumes that smugglers all have the same motives for being involved,
and are the only active actors in ‘illegal’ migration processes. It does
not consider the agency of migrants themselves, nor the personal inter-
actions between smugglers and migrants. Rather than focusing on mi-
grant social networks or smuggler activities, this study presents an in-
tegrative approach towards analysing migration processes that utilise
smugglers. By comparing different smuggling cases, it is possible to
construct a more general analysis of the link between smuggling and
the migration process, and to better understand the overall dynamics
of human smuggling. Three different regions are included to better di-
versify border-crossing methods: Iraq, the Horn of Africa, and the for-
mer Soviet Union. From the literature (IAM 2002), it is known that
most people originating in Iraq need several smugglers to reach their
final destination as they travel in a step-by-step process. A question that
thus arises is: are there differences between how the first and the last
smugglers operate? Moreover, how do people decide with which smug-
gler to go or to continue the journey? In the Horn of Africa, smuggling
by air, on forged or borrowed documents, was the practice frequently
mentioned in the literature as well as in the media. By contrast, in the
former Soviet Union it seemed relatively easy to travel on a visa, an op-
portunity that was rarely possible for the other groups.
Migrants’ smuggling experiences can serve both to balance the popu-
lar image of irregular migrants and to fill the gaps in migration theory
as to the extent with which irregular migration processes differ from
regular migration processes. The central question raised in this study
is: what does it mean for the evolution of the migration process if peo-
ple with constrained mobility make use of the services of smugglers?
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Structure of the book
Chapter one lays out the migration map, to show how for some people
in the world, there are legal obstacles that make it hard to travel,
whereas for others, it has become easier to move around. A closer look
is given at what exact measures are taken in Europe to control migra-
tion from certain areas, consequently begging the question: what are
the underlying reasons for these forms of control? On a more abstract
level, raised is the question of how migration theory has dealt with con-
straints on mobility. For a long time, migration has been mainly stu-
died from an economic point of view, which works on the assumption
that people can move freely around the world. But once the myth of
free mobility is deconstructed, the next step in developing migration
theory is to incorporate constraints on mobility.
Chapter two discusses the development of an industry that assists
migrants in their migration process. The main questions posited are:
what different types of assistance exist and in what kind of discourse
are these different forms of assistance debated? The common assump-
tion seems to be that migrants completely lose control during the mi-
gration process, having surrendered to smugglers or traffickers; this is
an assumption that should be challenged. This research thus takes into
account the agency that migrants possess over themselves. The goal is
to better understand their decision-making processes, the possible ne-
gotiations made between smugglers and migrants, and also to produce
a fuller picture of what it really means to be smuggled into a country.
Chapter three gives detailed information about our interviewees and
how the interview process proceeded. General issues, such as gaining
access to the target population, and how to build up trust within it, are
discussed. Special attention is also given to difficulties and problems
encountered during fieldwork. For instance, it is not readily apparent
why people might be inclined to speak about a secretive, and some-
times dangerous, topic such as smuggling.
Chapter four is devoted to the root causes underlying migration. As
a way to understand why they may have decided to migrate to Western
Europe, there is discussion of the general pre-migration living condi-
tions of our respondents. The existing structural conditions in coun-
tries of origin will also be addressed to appreciate the context in which
respondents made the decision to travel with a smuggler. This is im-
portant in order to get an idea of who migrates with a smuggler, and
for what reason a smuggler is needed. Chapter five presents three con-
crete border crossings from the three regions up for discussion: Iraq,
the Horn of Africa, and the former Soviet Union. ‘Thick descriptions’
will be used to analyse decision-making processes of migrants as well
as the general course of smuggling processes.
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Chapter six addresses the issue of who is involved in the smuggling
business. An overview is given of the different types of service provi-
ders, drawing a link to how various types of smuggling can yield var-
ious outcomes. Chapter seven addresses the difficulties migrants en-
counter once they have reached the Netherlands. For example, once a
smuggled migrant has reached the Netherlands he or she might en-
counter difficulties lodging an asylum application or regularising his
or her position in some other way. Finally, in chapter eight the implica-
tions for theories on migration will be central.
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1 The Janus face of globalisation
‘Globalisation’ is a term often used without a clear definition. In the
simplest sense, it refers to growing interconnectedness over and across
national borders, as the result of revolutions in communication and
transportation technologies. People nowadays have easy access to infor-
mation and relatively cheap transportation, and therefore the distance
between places and peoples has been dramatically reduced. This phe-
nomenon is what Harvey (1989) has called ‘time-space compression’
and all sorts of expressions have followed, such as the ‘global village’ or
the ‘flat world’. To speak in Castles and Miller’s terms: ‘The global
character of international migration is the way it affects more and
more countries and regions, and its linkages with complex processes
affecting the entire world’ (1998: 283). Moreover, some borders have
been removed. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, it became possible to
migrate from countries previously blocked from the West, and within
the EU, border control has almost entirely disappeared. EU citizens
can move unrestrained between member states, and a free internal
market exists. This global ‘connectedness’ and the diminishment – if
not disappearance – of borders has its impact on labour markets. For
example, some companies have enjoyed a sense of being footloose as
they move to places where they can produce or operate at lower costs.
However, this is not a one-way process; there are also different oppor-
tunities in the types of jobs available in Western economies, attracting
people from the very places where the companies move to as well. Ac-
cording to Sassen (2001) an informal, flexible labour market forms an
inseparable part of the current official economy – and it is one of the
main pull factors for immigration.
But the other face to globalisation shows an oppositional outlook:
tighter controls for people from outside the EU. Workers migrating
Westward can rarely move as easily as the company employees transfer-
ring to points more east or south on the continent. In fact, for many
people in the world, borders are not disappearing, but are very much
present. Parallel to the increase of a global exchange in goods and in-
formation, processes meant to restrict migration are taking place.
There are many constraints on mobility, especially for people from
parts of the world that are associated with poverty or perceived as ‘back-
ward’. For individuals from certain parts of the world it is difficult – if
not impossible – to obtain a travel visa, and the criteria for granting
asylum have been tightened.
1.1 Distinction between wanted and unwanted migration
Globalisation’s so-called Janus face, simultaneously looking in two di-
rections of opposite dispositions, causes a dilemma for states. On the
one hand, economic and political imperatives call for more permeable
borders. Businesspeople, students, visiting professors, and tourists are
often welcome, as they are seen to foster and further economic growth.
Efforts are made to facilitate their migration because they bring into
the state both their skills and income. On the other hand, certain types
of migrants are not considered a contribution to society. Asylum see-
kers and immigrants with low levels of education, for example, are of-
ten seen as a ‘burden’. Asylum seekers do not fit into the category of
potential workers, while less educated immigrants are undesired be-
cause the demand for workers is always linked to the higher end of the
labour market. This dichotomous thinking has created a polarisation of
migration types. Today’s borders thus function as a filter, separating
out the ‘wanted’ from the ‘unwanted’ migrants, or as Sassen has
termed it, the ‘guests’ from the ‘aliens’ (1999).
State-defined categorisations of migrants
Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, citizenship has been
linked to territory, and states have had the power to determine who is
entitled to certain rights and who is not (Lucassen 1995; Torpey 2000).
For the Netherlands, large state-controlled immigration started with
guest worker programmes in the mid-1950s. War reconstruction had
led to labour shortages in various sectors, and bilateral agreements
were subsequently signed with Southern Europe, Morocco, and Turkey.
These foreign workers were seen as guest workers; the Netherlands did
not consider itself to be ‘an immigration country’; as a nation, it
neither comprised a high-immigrant population nor expected to be the
future host to one. The importation of labour on such a mass scale be-
gan on the assumption that these immigrants were supposed to return
home once the work was accomplished. This view of migration as
something temporary resulted in only minimal regulations. Residence
and labour permits were required in order to, respectively, live and
work in the Netherlands, though the enforcement of these provisions
was limited (Doomernik 2005).
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But with the economic recession that followed the first oil crisis in
1973, the Dutch state’s recruitment activities were terminated. Closing
down the labour migration channel was a simple way of managing mi-
gration. Officially, the Netherlands has been closed for labour migra-
tion since 1973. But by the end of the 1980s, persistent labour
shortages in particular economic sectors led the Dutch government to
manage temporary labour migration through so-called covenants (Bru-
quetas-Callejo et al. 2006: 3).
Invited guest workers, who were already residing in the Netherlands,
did not go home when the work was done. Rather, they started to settle
down and bring their families into the country, thus leading to an in-
crease in the total numbers of ‘unwanted’ immigrants. Because the
whole recruitment movement had been based on the assumption that
these migrants would not stay, family reunification can be seen as the
unexpected outcome of the guest worker period. Although the right to
bring over relatives has never been openly questioned in the Nether-
lands, the enormous increase in family migration during the 1980s led
the government to curtail family reunification and formation. These
measures introduced new requirements regarding housing, as well as
income of the family member already positioned in the Netherlands;
fixed a maximum time before which family reunification could take
place; and limited the rights of family reunification only to those with
permanent residence permits (Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 2006: 6). In
2002, even more restrictive requirements were introduced in matters
of income and age. But this time, the provisions were not only in-
tended to delimit immigrants as a whole. The family migration of non-
Western immigrants, in particular, was now increasingly being per-
ceived as problematic for the integration of migrants into Dutch society
(Van Walsum 2004). Measures restricting couples from continuing to
cohabit or provisions preventing families from living in union, how-
ever, may come up against international treaty obligations, particularly
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Funda-
mental Liberties (ECHR). As such, family migration policymaking, to a
certain extent, goes beyond the scope of national policymaking.
As for asylum, national states also have less autonomy in tightening
this channel than they do when it comes to labour migration; refugees
can claim the right to move on the basis of the Geneva Convention,
which goes beyond the scope of national policy. But before the Geneva
Convention was enacted, the situation was different. Many asylum see-
kers fleeing after disruptions in the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires,
or from the First World War, were refused entrance at the gates of Wes-
tern European states. Opinions on these kinds of measures were dif-
fuse. The Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, for example, was worried
about ‘damaging the image of the Netherlands as a tolerant country’
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(Leenders 1998). After the failure of the international community to
rescue European Jews from the Holocaust, all sorts of attempts were
made to reach international agreements for the protection of refugees.
In 1945 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was signed, and
one year later, the UN General Assembly established the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Gene-
va. By 1951, the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees was put
in place, thus providing a definition of the term ‘refugee’.
As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing
to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is
unable, or owing to such a fear, is unwilling to avail himself of
the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality
and being outside the country of his former habitual residence
as a result of such events, is unable, or, owing to such a fear, is
unwilling to return to it. (Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees, General Provisions, Article 1 (2))
The 1951 Convention, however, was Eurocentric in its scope, being
based on – and very much influenced by – the global political order of
that time: being pro-or anti-communist. Later, with the assignment of
the Additional Protocol in 1967, the Convention became universal by
removing its temporal restrictions (to events occurring before 1951),
and geographical limitations. Nevertheless, the treaty remained proble-
matic because the issue of individual persecution was still at its core,
thereby implying that many people whose lives are threatened by their
countries’ political situations or conflicts – but who may not fear indivi-
dual persecution – do not fit the definition of ‘refugee’. Moreover, the
Convention has not been updated since 1967, and people in more re-
cent history may very well be persecuted for reasons other than the five
criteria listed in 1951. Environmental refugees, for example, are not
covered in the provisions of the Convention. UNHCR fears that repla-
cing the treaty as it now stands would only undermine the refugee re-
gime to offer even less protection, because the majority of states would
try to reduce their current responsibility under the Convention.
1.2 A shift in migration regimes
There has been a clearly noticeable shift in Dutch history: from wel-
coming restricted numbers of guest workers and invited refugees, to
restricting access to those who arrive ‘spontaneously’. ‘Spontaneous ar-
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rivals’ are those who are not explicitly invited by a government, but
make an appeal to international treaties. As a way of managing these
quotas arrivals, annual quotas, from 1977 to 1987, were established to
determine the number of refugees invited to resettle in the Nether-
lands. These asylum seekers were sheltered in independent housing in
various municipalities and were entitled to social benefits. But the
growing number of spontaneously arriving asylum seekers led to hous-
ing shortages and increased costs for municipalities. This resulted in
less than luxurious situations. In 1987, the Regulation on the Recep-
tion of Asylum Seekers (ROA) was introduced, offering asylum seekers
central reception as well as some pocket money. But due to the grow-
ing numbers of newly arriving asylum seekers from 1989 onwards, the
ROA system also became overburdened. And in 1992, a new admis-
sion and reception policy for asylum seekers was introduced: the New
Regulation and Reception Model for asylum seekers (NTOM). One of
the most important differences of ROA was that asylum seekers were
no longer accommodated in decentralised ROA housing, but in recep-
tion centres. Limiting asylum seekers’ rights and benefits, as such, can
also be seen as a way to manage asylum migration (Muus 1997). Re-
cently, more measures endeavouring to reduce the number of asylum
requests have been introduced, such as the introduction of temporary
statuses, the emphasis on return, and new procedures to speed up asy-
lum applications. Chapter seven devotes more attention to the effects
that the new Aliens Act (2000) had on the rights of currently arriving
asylum seekers to the Netherlands.
A shift has also been underway as far as how the asylum issue is
perceived and subsequently talked about. In the past, refugees who
had fled the communist regime, for example, were identified as being
anti-communist, as being like ‘us’. This attitude changed when migra-
tion started to occur increasingly from places with which the Nether-
lands had seldom prior exchange or knew little about. The so-called
‘disruptive movements of people’ (Ghosh 2000: 221), enforced a new
suspicion with which immigration was handled. According to Beck,
the redefinition of migration as a ‘threat’ ‘reflected a growing tendency
to channel diffuse socioeconomic and cultural concerns into the migra-
tion problem (1992: 49). Moreover, the notion of ‘migration as a threat’
has also resulted in disproportionate notions about the numbers of im-
migrants coming to the West. The developing world is frequently be-
lieved to be packed with millions of desperate people who are all wait-
ing to come to improve their lot. Receiving countries, on the other
hand, are thought of as so attractive that a ‘wave’1 of Third World immi-
grants is just waiting outside the Western gates to benefit from the
wealth and social services contained therein. Although some migrants
do move because of the world’s unequal opportunities, it is more often
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development, as opposed to underdevelopment, that causes migration
(Massey et al. 2002, Castles & Miller 1998, De Haas 2003). Under the
new regime, it is also increasingly acknowledged that a threat may
come from people themselves, as states fear the arrival of potential ter-
rorists and other criminals. Since the end of the Cold War more atten-
tion has been placed on migration-specific insecurity. States have, in
general, responded to this new situation by tightening their admission
rules to better canalise migration flows. But it is also acknowledged
that restrictive admission rules, paradoxically, have caused a pressing
need on the side of the migrant to find loopholes and break these laws.
This paradoxical situation demands other measures to control migra-
tion.
1.3 Other measures to control migration
The growth of unsolicited forms of migration has resulted in more
measures to control and prevent exactly these forms of migration. In
the next section some such measures will be explained in detail.
Travel and identification document checks
Torpey (2000) demonstrates in his beautiful book, The Invention of the
Passport, how passports and visas, in one form or another, have existed
since medieval times. But the comprehensive system, as we know it to-
day, is inextricably linked to the evolution of modern nation-states. It
has played a crucial role in state-building activities as a mechanism to
define who is ‘in’ and who is ‘out’ vis-à-vis membership. Passports and
visas thus help to distinguish who may make legitimate claims to
rights and benefits,2 and the use of documents has no doubt become
an established way of confirming identity.
However, passports are no longer completely trustworthy testaments
to identity because people may use forged or borrowed ones. Moreover,
prejudices exist, and certain ethnic groups are suspected as being more
likely to lie about their identity than others. For example, Liberian asy-
lum seekers in the Netherlands are often asked whether they truly
come from Liberia due to the alleged tendency for Nigerians to claim
to be Liberians in hopes of receiving political asylum. So, apart from
the suspicion directed at individuals themselves, migrants’ passports
may also be mistrusted based on the fact that certain states and their
administrative system are mistrusted. As such, presumptions about
how certain states deal with passport issues may also impact the care
with which asylum claims are handled.
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An additional way to control asylum applicants without passports is
through the Eurodac central database. This is a joint EU database that
collects and centralises the fingerprints of all asylum seekers over age
fourteen, with the aim of preventing their cases from having to be
heard in several EU countries. However, this control can also be cir-
cumvented, for instance through self-mutilation. In Sweden, cases are
reported of refugees cutting or burning their fingertips to prevent
authorities from identifying them by fingerprint (BBC News 02/04/
2004: http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/europe/3593895.
stm). One wonders what the future will bring, now with biometric
measures being taken by governments as a way of ascertaining indivi-
dual identity with far greater precision and efficacy. There is even a
growing tendency to view biometrics as a panacea to prevent all forms
of ‘unwanted’ mobility (Thomas 2005).
Visas and the unequal access to foreign space
In addition to identification documents, visa requirements are another
opportunity states seize upon when selecting between ‘guests’ and
‘aliens’. Neumayer (2005) shows how nation-states employ bilateral
visa restrictions in an attempt to manage the complex trade-off be-
tween facilitating and promoting economic and political interests, on
the one hand, and maintaining immigration control and upholding se-
curity, on the other. He states that it is not passports as such, but rather
the visa restrictions imposed on passport holders from certain coun-
tries, that are one of the most important devices by which nation-states
control entry into their territories. The most striking aspect of the visa
restriction system is that it produces unequal access to foreign spaces.
Holders of some passports face fewer visa restrictions for travelling
abroad, and therefore have much easier access to foreign spaces, than
holders of other passports. Of the 25 countries facing the smallest
number of visa restrictions for their passport holders, all are Western,
high-income OECD countries – with the exception of Malaysia and Sin-
gapore, which are nevertheless relatively high-income countries. On
the other end of the scale, are passport holders from countries that
need a visa to travel to almost any foreign country. This group gener-
ally comprises countries with a history of violent political conflict, those
with a strictly autocratic regime, those that are very poor, or places with
any combination of these characteristics (Neumayer 2005: 10).
There are numerous examples of visa impositions by states after
(perceived) threats and subsequent state attempts to try to get a grip on
the situation. One of the major policy consequences of the increase in
asylum applications to Western European countries during the 1990s
was the establishment of a common policy of visa restrictions3. After
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9/11, the United States also imposed new visa restrictions. The fact that
all the terrorists identified as participating in the World Trade Center
attack entered the US on valid visas4 led to the American decision to
severely restrict visas issued since the event (Salter 2004). Meanwhile,
new member states to the EU are now also pressured to impose visa
restrictions on their neighbouring countries, including those among
which there previously had been frequent and relatively easy move-
ment. For example, citizens from Ukraine, Belarus, and the Russian
Federation now need visas to cross the Polish border; previously travel-
lers only needed to have their passports on hand (Freudenstein, 2000).
As with passports, a black market for visas has been built up in re-
sponse to a restrictive immigration system. A scandal in Germany ar-
ose when, between 2002 and 2003, visa requirements were loosened
for Ukraine, Russia, Albania, and Kosovo. This policy change un-
leashed a flood of visa applications, and has made it virtually impossi-
ble for consulate workers to perform adequate checks on the thousands
of cases they are required to process each month. Additionally, it was
believed that traffickers easily gained access to Germany and other EU
countries through this loophole. Young women being forced into pros-
titution became ‘tourists’, their traffickers became ‘business travellers’,
and those hoping to take advantage of the loophole swarmed German
consulates. Hundreds of thousands, mostly coming through consulates
in Kiev, Moscow, and Minsk, were able to enter this way into Germany
and the EU (Der Spiegel 22/02/2005: http://service.spiegel.de/cache/
international/0,1518,343108,00.html). Research from Portugal has re-
vealed how these migrants not only went to Germany, but also turned
up in Southern Europe. Ukrainians, after immigrants from Cape
Verde, are currently the largest immigrant group in Portugal; Ukrai-
nian research has made it clear that most of these immigrants, counted
at 59 per cent, had come through one specific German consulate (Ba-
ganha et al. 2004: 30).
Physical border control
Apart from document checks, there are also more draconian measures
taken to restrict people from entering a country. Probably the clearest
example is the wall currently being built around the Spanish enclaves
– or better put, exclaves – in Morocco: Ceuta and Mellila5. The situation
along the North African-European border can very well be compared
with the US-Mexican border. Both are zones where economic, political,
cultural, religious, and demographic differences divide two completely
different worlds. The year to decisively transform the practice of Span-
ish immigration control was 1991. When Spain signed the Schengen
Treaty it began to impose visa restrictions on North Africans6, and as
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soon as the visa restriction took effect, migrants turned to various clan-
destine methods for entry (Andreas 2000: 130-131).
Usually state responses to clandestine attempts at border crossing in-
volve measures to increase border control, which is precisely what hap-
pened in the aforementioned case. The EU decided to pressure Spain,
as well as Morocco, for more forceful border control. In 1995, the
Spanish government started building fences in Ceuta, as well as Melil-
la, to keep out ‘unwanted’ immigrants. In Ceuta, a double fence was
built: three metres high and eight kilometres long, including sensors
to detect ‘illegal’ crossings, 30 closed-circuit TV cameras, and high-in-
tensity floodlights. The fence was patrolled by the army, police, and ci-
vil guard, and unsurprisingly, dubbed ‘Europe’s new Berlin Wall’ (An-
dreas 2000: 135). However, people soon started climbing over it, as well
as through the fence (by cutting holes), underneath (via tunnels), and
around (by floating on inner tubes around the edge). In Mellila, on 27
August 2005, a group of some 300 immigrants tried to storm the bor-
der fences by using homemade ladders. In response to these attempts
to undermine boundaries, the wall was heightened from three to six
metres and an extra barrier of steel wires, a third fence, was built
around the already existing double-layered fence (BBC News 22/09/
2005: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4271536.stm).
Managing migration by ‘remote control’
In order to make it easier for ‘wanted’ immigrants to travel, while at
the same time trying to prevent the ‘unwanted’ from entering, it is
often thought necessary not only to place controls at immediate bor-
ders, but also at more distant locations. Many controls have shifted
from the outer borders of Europe to more distant countries (Boswell
2003). Zolberg (2003) uses the term ‘remote control’ to denote immi-
gration policies designed to deter immigration by regulating departure
at, or near, the point of origin. Since the 1980s, liaison officers have
been doing pre-boarding checks at ‘risky’ airports in countries from
which high amounts of undocumented or falsely documented immi-
grants originate.
When it comes to asylum seekers, all sorts of specific measures are
taken to keep them at a distance. Despite a quadrupling of the world’s
refugee population since the 1970s, there has been a significant drop
in the absolute number of UNHCR cases being resettled7. Although
many nations have agreed to accept refugees on a temporary basis,
only twenty nations worldwide participate in UNHCR resettlement pro-
grammes during the early phases of a crisis. Resettlement countries
have grown reluctant to continue open-ended resettlement of refugees.
Resettlement criteria have become more restrictive, making it an op-
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portunity only for the ‘lucky few’. In the late 1970s, there were over
200,000 resettlement cases a year; in 2003 only 41,000. After the 9/11
attacks in the US, the resettlement programme was particularly hard
hit. The US used to accept, by far, the largest number of refugees for
resettlement in the West, but from 2002 onwards, the state established
a quota of 70,000, though started accepting even fewer people than
the quota allows (26,300 in 2002) (UNHCR 2003).
Apart from refusing the resettlement of refugees on a large-scale ba-
sis, there are also measures taken to offer people protection within the
region. The general rhetoric is that it is better to find protection close
to home without having to travel far. Argumentations are currently di-
rected towards problems within the current political system that pro-
voke ‘illegal’ migration and human smuggling, making the journey un-
safe for the refugees. Another line of reasoning is that better screening
could be done in countries within the region, allowing people to know
prior to travel whether or not they will be granted refugee status. This
new approach, also advocated by UNHCR (Ogata 1995), emphasises
‘preventive protection’. This approach is more concerned with the root
causes of forced migration, and focuses on the right to remain, rather
than on the right to leave or the right to seek asylum (Hyndman
1999). The European Commission designed several measures to di-
minish the need for people seeking protection to come to Europe. ‘Re-
gional Protection Zones’ and ‘Transit Processing Centres’ are some ex-
amples of initiatives to try to keep people in need of protection within
their own region.
These ‘preventive’ policies are disputed and touch upon sensitive po-
litical considerations, such as the responsibility of the international
community to intervene in humanitarian crises in the world. Several
authors have raised criticism against these measurements. Noll (2003)
has critically analysed the regional protection zones and transit proces-
sing centres concluding that the refugee is, in these cases, located be-
yond the domain of justice, for there is a tendency of ‘opting out from
ordinary asylum processes’ by ‘outsourcing international legal obliga-
tion’. A notable parallel can be drawn to Europe’s temporary protection
measures taken during the early 1990s in response to the war in Yugo-
slavia. Temporary protection measures also allow states to opt out from
ordinary asylum processes and to make exceptions. However, such ex-
ceptions, with their diminished human rights, were later extended to
the majority of asylum seekers. Chapter seven discusses in more detail
how the asylum system in the Netherlands has changed over time.
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‘Burden’ sharing
Once asylum seekers have reached Europe an array of additional mea-
sures is taken to deny them further access to specific nation-states. The
Dublin II Regulation ensures that asylum seekers can make only one
application for asylum within the EU. The ‘safe third country’ rule
makes it possible to send asylum seekers back to the ‘safe’ countries
they have already passed through, in order to file their applications
there. Prior to these measures, there had been reported incidents of
‘asylum shopping’, a reference to those who applied for asylum in sev-
eral countries as a way to diversify their risks. It was deemed necessary
to share the ‘burden’. In practice, this means that many asylum claims
are now filed in EU candidate countries that are obliged to apply EU
standards of migration management, something one could also call
‘burden shifting’ rather than ‘burden sharing’ (Icduygu 2005: 22).
The list of ‘safe countries of origin’ is another measure to prevent
asylum seekers from applying in a specific country or to share the ‘bur-
den’. This list will allow EU countries to send asylum seekers back to
countries that have commonly been defined as ‘safe’, or even to regions
of the country defined as such. Which countries should be included on
the list, however, has yet to be agreed upon.
Readmission agreements are another example of trying to limit ac-
cess by immigrants and asylum seekers. For example, Italy is giving fi-
nancial and material support to Libya to enforce border control. In re-
turn, Italy can send people back who have set ashore. In theory, these
readmission agreements are designed with the human rights perspec-
tive in mind, meaning that people still need to have the opportunity to
ask for protection. However, in practice, Italy has deported people to Li-
bya without first allowing them to make asylum claims. Moreover, Libya
has not signed the Geneva Convention and there are no asylum proce-
dures in place, thus denying people overall access to protection. The de-
clared and expressed intention to return people, without examining
their asylum claims or structural violations of the non-refoulement prin-
ciple8, is one of the latest developments in Europe (Schuster 2005).
Privatising border control
There is not only a deterritorialisation of control taking place, but also
an expansion of the range of actors targeted in the whole apparatus of
immigration control. Actors that are involved in transporting people,
for example, are deemed responsible through ‘carrier sanctions’. Car-
rier sanctions are penalties that can be given to airline and transport
companies for transporting ‘illegal’ aliens. As a result, private actors
now also have the responsibility to make sure their passengers possess
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the right documents. This is not entirely new; Torpey, for example,
notes that European governments of the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries already required steamship companies to check whether indi-
viduals had the right to travel to their chosen destinations (1998: 243).
Today this happens on a larger scale. For example, Dutch embassies
are instructed to cooperate only with a small portion of trustworthy tra-
vel agencies (Tweede Kamer 2003: 22), and after 9/11, visa-issuing in-
stitutions are instructed to be even more cautious than before about
whom they work with (Tweede Kamer 2003: 33).
When external control is no longer perceived as effective, states in-
creasingly turn their attention to internal control (Brochman 1998). In
the past two decades, a vast body of laws have come into being in the
Netherlands to exclude undocumented migrants from facilities of the
welfare state. Chapter seven gives more attention to the general effects
of the implementations of these laws. The Benefit Entitlement Act
(1998) is a good example of a law that disperses control over different
actors. This law states that by linking different administrative systems,
state support for ‘illegal immigrants’ can be denied. If someone applies
for state benefits but has no legal status, there is the risk of being re-
ported to the alien police.9 The Benefit Entitlement Act has resulted in
private actors, such as teachers, medical doctors, and housing corpora-
tion employees, becoming indirectly involved in the control apparatus.
However, the implementation of these controls is not always straight-
forward. On the local level, people may boycott existing policies if they
do not consider it their task to report undocumented migrants to the
police. In a way, a reverse NIMBY (‘not in my back yard’) mechanism
is at work when it comes to ‘illegal’ immigrants and even more so for
rejected asylum seekers (Van der Leun 2003). The general public tends
to support the tough measures taken against immigration, though peo-
ple often seem willing to offer support when faced with a case that hits
closer to home – for example, if a neighbour is refused asylum and is
about to be deported to a war zone area. Moreover, priorities may be
diffuse, as people do also benefit from the labour performed by the
very rejected asylum seeker or ‘illegal’ immigrant (Anderson & O’Con-
nell Davidson 2003).
1.4 Unintended and undesirable effects of migration control
Sometimes measures taken by governments create unintended or even
undesirable effects. This does not necessarily mean that the assump-
tions on which the policy measures are based are false, but rather, that
they are fragmented and fail to grasp the full range of relevant vari-
ables (Van Amersfoort 1998). As already stated, an unintended effect
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of stricter migration control is that it has reinforced the state’s selection
regarding who is allowed to migrate and who is denied access. This
system favours immigrants with good educations, specific working
skills, or people with familiar cultural backgrounds. Those who do not
meet these criteria are apt to find loopholes in the laws, confusing the
legal channels through which they ought to enter. This mixing up of
categories by migrants may fuel xenophobic arguments and reinforce
the idea of migration as a ‘threat’.
Cornelius et al. (1994) note that the gap between the aim for total
control and its actual results – more irregular migration – adds pres-
sure to adopt even more restrictive policies. The unintended effect of
this is that more restrictions posed on the receiving end might push
migrants into the hands of smugglers or even traffickers10. As Ko-
slowski has noted: ‘Just as states cooperate to control unwanted migra-
tion, unwanted migrants can cooperate as well to form social networks
or employ non-state actors, smugglers, to foil restrictions imposed by
states’ (2000: 205).
Migrating with help from smugglers or traffickers has all sorts of
perverse effects. First of all, it has created a pre-selection of who can
migrate because travelling with smugglers and traffickers is costly.
Those who have the means to buy their way across borders do not ne-
cessarily have the most urgent reasons to flee (Morrison 1998, Van
Hear 2004, Doomernik 2004). Second, travelling has become more
dangerous. The most recent Report of the Third Meeting of the Com-
mission on Human Security states that international migration, parti-
cularly forced migration and irregular movements of persons, creates
new insecurities, which are of concern from a human rights perspec-
tive (Commission on Human Security Report 2002: 7). No doubt one
of the clearest illustrations of the undesirable effect of increased border
control is that on, an almost daily basis, immigrants die on Europe’s
outer borders. UNITED, a network against racism comprising more
than 550 European organisations to support refugees and migrants,
has put together a document that lists 6,336 officially recorded victims
of Europe’s restrictive immigration policy11, from January 1993 until
April 2005 (http://www.united.nonprofit.nl/pdfs/deathlist2005.pdf). In
fact, the figure is likely far higher because many incidents go unrec-
orded. And third, when smugglers determine a final destination they
do not necessarily do so in the interest of the migrants; this leads to
unfortunate outcomes, such as the isolation that results when families
are scattered.
Another effect of stricter border control is that it can impact how
smuggling and trafficking is organised. However, some disagreement
exists over the effects of border control, and what has possibly resulted
in a professionalisation of the smuggling business. Some scholars
THE JANUS FACE OF GLOBALISATION 31
think that small-scale organisations will increasingly be taken over by
the bigger and better-organised. This means that migration processes
would, more and more, fall under control of criminal gangs and take
on a more organised nature. Others state that small-scale organisations
will co-exist with large-scale organisations, the smaller ones being
likely embedded in local culture. Chapter two gives a more detailed
overview of different viewpoints by academic researchers on human
smuggling.
1.5 Migration theory and irregularity: towards a research
question
In practice, migration may thus evolve very differently from what it is,
in theory, officially aimed at accomplishing. How is this discrepancy
between practice and theory incorporated into migration studies? Eco-
nomic explanations of migration still dominate popular and scholarly
thinking on migration. The neoclassical economists conceptualise mi-
gration as a cost-benefit decision, with wage level differences cited as
crucial explanatory factors. Migrants, in their view, estimate the costs
and benefits of moving to various locations before finally settling in a
place where they can be more productive and earn more money (Borjas
1989). In 1885, Ravenstein was the first to theorise this economic train
of thought in his famous ‘laws of migration’. He saw migration as inse-
parable from development, arguing that the most important cause for
migration was economic differences. In his classification, time and dis-
tance dimensions were of high importance, seeing as most migration
tended to be across short distance and from agricultural to industrial
areas (rural-urban migration).
Lee (1966) has expressed these ideas into the classical push and pull
theory. He argues that migration is the result of the interplay of eco-
nomic factors of attraction in potential destination areas and negative
factors in the area of origin. Central to this understanding is the mi-
grant who has self-agency and is assumed to be capable of making sim-
ple cost-benefit calculations. However, if we only look at migration
from this economic perspective some paradoxes come to light. One is
that most people in the world are immobile. Given the huge income
differences between the South and the North, this is puzzling; one
would expect to see far more people on the move. Another paradox is
that migration should not occur in the absence of a wage differential,
yet such flows are frequently observed. Additionally, widely occurring
patterns of circular migration are hard to explain from this perspective.
Why would people return if they could enjoy higher wages in the place
they migrate to? (Massey et al. 2002: 11). These paradoxes show that
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maximisation of expected income or securing one’s job is neither the
only, nor necessarily the most important, motivation for individuals to
migrate. Such approaches, therefore, fail to recognise that more than
just economic motivations may play a role in migration. Someone may
be pulled by economic factors while being pushed by other, non-eco-
nomic factors. Moreover, this approach ignores the fact that there may
also be structural constraints that impact someone’s mobility. It is sim-
plistically assumed that people have a thorough knowledge of the costs
and benefits of migration, and that they can move freely without any
restrictions. Lee (1996) discusses intervening factors, such as distance,
physical barriers, and immigration laws, that all influence the evolu-
tion of the migration process. Yet, the way he theorises intermediary
structures only produces the conclusion that migration will not occur,
or it will be more difficult if migration laws are restrictive. Such con-
straints are mainly dealt with as distortions in the market. In this re-
search, a more detailed look is given at how migration processes are af-
fected by these distortions and what this means, concretely, for how
migration processes evolve.
At a macro-level, the ‘historical structural approach’ focuses on the
structural political economy that has produced global inequalities. In
this approach, with intellectual roots in Marxist political economy, indi-
vidual decisions are bypassed for a focus instead on larger social and
historical forces that have led to the unequal distribution of resources
and power worldwide. The theory pivots around the political hierarchy
of global markets. Wallerstein (1974) used the terms ‘core’ and ‘periph-
ery’ in his ‘world systems theory’. He argues that migration is foremost
produced by unequal spatial development between the ‘core’ and the
‘periphery’. Castells (1996) and Sassen (1998), among other theorists
inspired by Wallerstein’s work, claim that decisions to migrate cannot
only be explained by economic wage differences, but also must be un-
derstood around the political origins of these differences. Based on a
study among refugees, Zolberg et al. (1989) specifically noted how in-
equalities in resources and power between different countries, com-
bined with the entry policies of potential immigration countries, put
great constraints on the choices migrants have. International migration
is therefore a political, not an economic, process arising from the orga-
nisation of the world into mutually exclusive sovereign states.
Apart from a division between political and economic ways of view-
ing migration, there is also heated debate in migration theory about
structure and agency. The neoclassical economists are criticised for
being overly focused on the micro-level, failing to take into account that
individual decisions are influenced by their contexts. Structural the-
ories of migration, on the other hand, usually describe migrants as ac-
tors propelled around the world. Giddens (1984) argues in his ‘duality
THE JANUS FACE OF GLOBALISATION 33
of structure’ that the ‘traditional’ division between structure and agency
is not a satisfactory way of understanding social life and social change.
Agency and structure cannot be viewed as two independently given sets
of phenomena (Giddens 1984): structure does not operate above or out-
side the individual, but rather, through the individual.
In migration theory, the ‘new economics approach’ tries to overcome
the structure-agency impasse and the dominant economic perspective
by integrating different levels of analysis. Scholars taking this approach
argue that migrant networks are important to the process of interna-
tional migration because immigrants do not make their decisions in
isolation. An individual’s position within a social structure very much
influences his or her taste and preferences, which impacts the deci-
sions that are made. The social network approach, therefore, expands
the decision-making scope to larger social units; migrants, potential
migrants, return migrants, and non-migrants are all connected
through ties of kinship, ethnicity, and friendship. These networks may
facilitate or encourage further migration by providing concrete infor-
mation and assistance to potential migrants (Massey & Espinosa 1997;
Portes 1995; Pric 1963). The first migrants who leave may not have so-
cial ties to their destination area, but they are the ones who can set in
motion a chain effect. They are inevitably linked to non-migrants who
may draw upon the obligations implicit in relationships such as kin-
ship, friendship, and community ties to gain access to employment
and other forms of assistance. Massey (1994) argues, based on Myr-
dal’s idea of cumulative causation (1957) that, over time, individual de-
cisions and actions have a cumulative effect that can alter a whole deci-
sion-making context. Images of prosperity in the West may, for exam-
ple, increase incentives to move, especially when individuals are faced
with economic hardship or violence. The so-called ‘dream’ to move
abroad may even become all-consuming. Some authors have referred
to this dreaming as a sort of ‘disease’. Horst, for example, speaks about
buufis: the dream of resettlement among Somalis in a refugee camp
(2003). Mabrouk (2003) uses the expression ‘Italian Dream’ as some-
thing many Tunisian youngsters are ‘infected’ with. This explains why
the same set of push or pull factors in different countries can lead to
very different migration patterns, and why there are clear migration
systems between specific countries (Kritz et al. 1992).
However, currently there is an emergence of ‘new geographies of mi-
gration’ (Koser & Pinkerton 2002): the arrival of migrants to places
with which they or their countries of origin have no previous links.
This new migration pattern may indeed be a reflection of the fact that
these migrants are merely newcomers, but it may also give insight as
to why smugglers, as well as migrants, could have other considerations
for choosing a specific destination. Moreover, policy measures may
34 NAVIGATING BORDERS
have an impact on the decisions smugglers and migrants make. There-
fore, the social network approach is not a completely satisfactory expla-
nation, for this theory only focuses on the enabling characteristics of so-
cial networks; it ignores the fact that people may be constrained in their
mobility.
This present research questions the free movement assumption un-
derlying the social network approach. Migrants, who for all sorts of rea-
sons cannot rely on contacts abroad, may contact recruitment agencies
or smugglers that help migrants overcome border restrictions. In the
next chapter, these service providers will be further analysed. The cen-
tral question of the research then is: what does it mean for the evolu-
tion of the migration process if people’s mobility is so constrained, and
they need to utilise the services of intermediaries, such as smugglers?
Sub-questions include: why do people need smugglers in the first
place? What does the decision-making process look like, and how do
smuggled migrants exert power in negotiations with their smugglers?
After having examined this duality in structure, I hope to be able to
present different types of smuggling based on different outcomes of
the smuggling process.
Conclusion
In principle, the creation of nation-states has given countries the ability
to import migrants according to their own whims: when, from where,
in what quantity and even for how long a duration. There are several
channels through which states accept immigrants. However, the per-
ception of a state’s ability to control migration diminished when immi-
grants started to come from places with which no prior links existed. A
view of state control became further blurred when immigrants tried to
find ways to ‘accommodate’ to the system, thus making it harder to
judge who was entering the country for what reason.
This breakdown of a regime in which there was a strong belief in
the state’s capacity to control migration has created a paradoxical situa-
tion, the Janus face of migration. On the one hand, there is still a firm
belief in the free mobility of people, information, and capital goods; yet
on the other hand, immigration from Third World countries is per-
ceived as an uncontrollable threat. In contrast with the deregulation of
trade and finance, migration processes are thus becoming increasingly
selective and restrictive. The entrance channel of asylum is an excep-
tion in the sense that states have an obligation under international law
to protect and accept refugees so they cannot manage asylum in the
same way as they try to manage other forms of migration. Restrictions
on other entrance options, however, have increased pressure on the
asylum system, making it hard to manage anyway.
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Another clear consequence of this hammering down on admission
channels is the recent development of a vast market of intermediaries
who arrange migration opportunities for those who cannot travel
through legal means. The next chapter devotes more attention to these
new intermediaries in the field of migration.
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2 New intermediate structures in response to
restrictive admission policies
Chapter one described the mismatch between, on the one hand, in-
creasing mobility, and on the other hand, a tightening of the rules of
admission. In migration literature, links between countries of origin
and countries of destination are usually called the ‘intermediate struc-
ture’. Van Amersfoort (1998) distinguishes three separate elements of
the intermediate structure. First of all, there are technical means for
transport and connection, such as airlines, airport, shipping lines, and
harbours. In the globalised world, distance has lost much of its mean-
ing seeing as transportation’s infrastructure has improved, and almost
all places in the world are linked to one other. The second element re-
fers to those resources needed for individuals to effectively utilise trans-
port links, such as information and/or money. The third element of
the intermediate structure is put in place by political or legal authori-
ties: travel and residency regulations and requirements such as pass-
ports, visas, etc. According to the general discourse, no migration
should exist between countries that have implemented strong restric-
tions. However, in reality, the discrepancy between an increased desire
to migrate and the restrictions of receiving countries has given free
play to smugglers and all sorts of institutions providing alternatives for
people who want to cross the border, without regard for legal limita-
tions. More mobility combined with greater restrictions has meant
more breaches of law.
Goss & Lindquist (1995) have called these intermediate structures
‘migrant institutions’. These are a complex articulation of rules and re-
sources that present constraints and opportunities to individual action
(Goss & Lindquist 1995: 345). Asia is especially renowned for a large
infrastructure of recruitment agencies that send people abroad
(Kuptsch 2006). Depending on the individual country’s perspective,
they are referred to in various terms, such as ‘migrant exporting
schemes’12 or ‘slave- importing schemes’13 (Kyle & Dale 2001). Sassen
(2003) uses the more general expression of ‘counter geographies of
globalization’. ‘Counter geographies of globalization’ include the illegal
trafficking of people for the sex industry and other types of formal and
informal labour, which have become an important source of hard cur-
rency for governments in receiving countries (Sassen 2003: 5)
Apart from arranging labour migration, these brokers and institutions
also make it possible for all sorts of other migrants, including asylum
seekers, to cross borders. These institutions can be seen as structural
complements to migrant networks, indicating that interpersonal ties
(social networks) are not the only means to perpetuate international
movement. One could say that smugglers, as well as the institutions
that facilitate smuggling and trafficking, are the new intermediate
structures that help transcend state-drawn boundaries. In this line of
reasoning, these institutions serve as another form of social capital that
people can draw upon. Studying this mid-level concept beyond the
sum of individual relations is useful for understanding the emergence
of new ‘geographies of migration.’ It also allows for a better under-
standing of how structure and agency interact.
This chapter presents the theoretical framework for building a typol-
ogy of different forms of smuggling. In chapter six, the final typology
will be presented, after having linked the initial framework to the col-
lected empirical material. Questions that underlie the typology are:
what different organisational forms can be distinguished? What does it
mean for the migration outcome to travel with a specific type of smug-
gler? And are migrants in a position to exert power over the decisions
made? The discourse surrounding human smuggling and the term
‘human smuggling’ itself will also be critically examined. Should we al-
ways define helping someone across a border as ‘human smuggling’,
even when there is no request for money involved? And what exactly is
the difference between smuggling and trafficking?
2.1 Legal definitions of human smuggling
Assistance for migrants who are officially prohibited from migrating
through legal channels is not new. For example, parts of guest worker
migration to Northern European countries in the 1960s occurred out-
side the regulatory system (Berger & Mohr 1975). A clear difference,
however, is that these immigrants usually could regularise their status
once they had arrived and found a job. Such forms of migration thus
took the same form, more or less, as legal migration processes. The
context in which assistance occurs today is different. Most immigrants
who enter through ‘illegal’ channels do not have the opportunity to reg-
ularise their situation, which also makes their entrance all the more
problematic. Many of the ‘spontaneous’ immigrants who enter through
unofficial channels today are classified as ‘illegal’ immigrants, with lit-
tle prospect of lifting this label and remedying situation. Since the
early 1990s, the term ‘smuggling’ has been used in reference to ‘ille-
gal’ forms of assistance, with growing resources being devoted to ‘com-
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bat’ the phenomenon. Human smuggling became part of many Eur-
opean countries’ penal systems after a provision in the Schengen
Agreement harmonised smuggling penalties at the European level. In
the Netherlands, since 31 December 1993, human smuggling has been
considered a crime in Dutch penal code. Article 197a states:
A person who, for motives of pecuniary gain, assists another per-
son in gaining entry to the Netherlands or in remaining in the
Netherlands or in gaining entry to or in remaining in any state
whose obligation it is to exercise border control also on behalf of
the Netherlands, or who, for motives of pecuniary gain, supplies
that person with the opportunity, means or information for that
purpose, where he knows or has serious reason to suspect that
that person’s gaining entry or remaining is unlawful, is liable to
a term of imprisonment of no more than four years or a fine of
the fifth category.
In 1996, the minimum penalty for human smuggling was raised from
one to four years. For an act that is committed by someone in a profes-
sional capacity the maximum penalty has been raised to six years of
imprisonment and/or dismissal from office. If someone makes a pro-
fession of smuggling, or does it in some organised way, the maximum
penalty is doubled to eight years of imprisonment. This increase in
punishment also widens the possibilities for the police to detect smug-
glers. In practice, however, it remains difficult to prove that a profit has
been made on the act of smuggling, not least because it is difficult to
find witnesses ready to testify against their smuggler (Slobbe & Kuipers
1999).
In 2000, strengthening the penal framework of smuggling was put
high on the European Council’s agenda. Its delegations, however, had
very different views on what constitutes ‘humanitarian’ grounds for the
smuggling of asylum seekers. The definition of ‘help’ in the Council
Directive does not specify doing so for ‘financial gain’, meaning that
any ‘helper’ can fall under the classification, regardless of their perso-
nal, non-profitable motivations. The adopted humanitarian clause says
that member states shall not be obliged to impose such penalties if
they are not in keeping with national legislation (ECRE 2001). Member
states may thus decide not to sanction individuals acting for humani-
tarian reasons, though they may also decide to do so if they wish. This
EU decision made it easier for the Dutch government to remove the
profit-making element from the smuggling definition. Initially, pecuni-
ary gain was included in the Dutch definition of smuggling in order to
prevent those who help people exit a country for humanitarian reasons
from falling within the definition of human smuggling.
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On 1 January 2005, the Netherlands enforced a new rule, listed as
Article 197a, in which the profit-making element was completely re-
moved from the definition of smuggling (it remained intact, however,
for assisting ‘illegal’ stay). Smuggling for non-profit goals now also be-
came punishable, meaning that smugglers with political or religious
motivations could also be sentenced under this new article pertaining
to the transportation of people across borders.
2.2 The difference between smuggling and trafficking
When the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime was
adopted, two separate Protocols – one on smuggling and one on traf-
ficking – made a clear distinction between the two phenomena. The
definition of smuggling comprises three important elements. First, it
requires a smuggler or intermediary who undertakes the job of facili-
tating the cross-border movement. Second, it involves a payment to the
smuggler by the migrant or someone paying on his/her behalf. Third,
the migrant’s choice to participate in the transaction is voluntary. The
Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Air and Sea
(2000) defines smuggling as follows:
Smuggling of migrants shall mean the intentional procurement
for profit for ‘illegal’ entry of a person into and/or ‘illegal’ resi-
dence in a state of which the person is not a national or perma-
nent resident.
The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking Persons de-
fines trafficking as follows:
Trafficking in persons means the recruitment, transportation,
transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, either by the threat or
use of abduction, force, fraud, deception or coercion, or by the
giving or receiving of unlawful payments or benefits to achieve
the consent of a person having the control over another person,
for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a
minimum, the exploitation of prostitution of others or other
forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or
practices similar to slavery, servitude14 or the removal of organs.
Three separate elements are key to the definition of trafficking. The
first is the criminal act: recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbour-
ing, or reception of persons. The second is the means used to commit
such acts: threat or use of force, coercion, abduction, fraud, deception,
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abuse of power or vulnerability, or giving payments or benefits to a per-
son in control of the victim. Finally, the third element refers to motives
for trafficking: sexual exploitation, forced labour, slavery or similar
practices, and even the removal of organs (Aronowitz 2001). For a long
time, trafficking was only related to prostitution, but since the UN Pro-
tocol came into being, the definition has been extended to incorporate
exploitation in all sectors of the economy. In fact, expanding the defini-
tion of trafficking was required in order for Dutch national legislation
to meet international obligations. Entering into force on 1 January
2005, Article 273a in the Penal code replaced Article 250. According to
this new article, all forms of labour exploitation – sexual as well as so-
cio-economic – are criminalised under one provision and labelled as
the trafficking of human beings.
Smuggling and trafficking are mostly distinguished by the fact that
the latter implies the involvement of victims, but smuggling does not.
In terms of smuggling, emphasis is placed on the ‘illegal’ movements
of migrants across international borders. For trafficking, border cross-
ing is not, by definition, necessary; the focus falls instead on coercion
and exploitation. Smuggled migrants are considered more or less free
to enter the process, while trafficked migrants are not. As such, defini-
tions of smuggling and trafficking are based on the assumption that
there is a clear-cut demarcation between voluntary and involuntary pro-
cesses of migration.
In practice, however, the distinction between smuggling and traffick-
ing is not always easy to make. There are clear cases of smuggling in
which a fee has been mutually agreed upon, and there are clear cases
of trafficking in which someone is kidnapped and trafficked completely
unwillingly. But the majority of migration strategies, being much more
complex, defy easy categorisations. For example, it is very probable that
some trafficked prostitutes leave their country of origin in full self-con-
sent, as a strategic action to improve their situation (Andrijasevic
2004). It is therefore not helpful to view trafficked migrants exclusively
as having migrated against their own wills and smuggled migrants as
the opposite. Migrants, in general, often face few choices when fleeing
persecution and/or social and economic insecurity. Smuggled migrants
may be punished, tortured, or taken hostage by their smugglers while
in transit, thus defying the demarcation of what would otherwise be
considered voluntary in this category (Gallagher 2002).
A problem with the UN’s trafficking definition is that no explicit de-
finition of exploitation or ‘slavery-like’ conditions is given, thus leaving
these terms open for interpretation (Van der Leun & Vervoorn 2004,
Van Liempt 2006a). This lack of clear criteria also hinders the identifi-
cation of nuances between different types of trafficked persons. This is
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needed especially when the definition is broadened to sectors other
than prostitution.
2.3 The discourse surrounding human smuggling and
smugglers
Apart from the fact that smuggling is criminalised by law, the official
state perspective is also spurred on by images of smuggling as por-
trayed and discussed in the media. The image of the modern-day
smuggler often conjures images of ‘the mafia’, without actually defin-
ing what is meant by it. Smuggling is usually seen as a criminal activ-
ity pursued by triadic organisations that may also be involved in crim-
inal businesses other than just smuggling people. Moreover, smugglers
are often referred to as merciless criminals who charge exorbitant
prices, send people off on their own in faulty ships, abandon them at
open sea, and may even be prepared to throw children overboard as a
threat to the coast guard.
This last image of throwing children overboard is sometimes also
used for reverse reasons, to criminalise smuggled migrants. After the
2001 Tampa Boat Incident in Australia, in which asylum seekers on
board were accused of having thrown their own children overboard,
Prime Minister John Howard reacted with the following words: ‘I can’t
comprehend how genuine refugees would throw their children over-
board.’ After the election, it became clear that no child was thrown
overboard and that this story had been expressly used by the media to
feed the image of ‘bogus’ asylum seekers and ‘economic’, rather than
political, asylum seekers (www.truthoverboard.com/story1.html).
Mountz (2003) describes a similar shift in the discourse on immigra-
tion in Canada that occurred after several boat arrivals in 1999. She cri-
ticises the process of identity construction by the state. Apart from
using words such as ‘bogus’ or ‘economic’ in reference to immigrants,
she points to the fact that there was even a separate category created:
‘boat migrants’. The category distinguished these specific smuggled
migrants from those who entered Canada by other means. Entrance
via boat was assumed to signal not having legitimate reasons for enter-
ing the country, and ‘boat migrants’ were identified, along with their
smugglers, as criminals. Research confirms that asylum seekers discov-
ered in connection with smuggling are sometimes labelled ‘bogus’,
only because they have entered the country through ‘illegal’ channels
(see also Koser 2000). Smuggling is for the same reason often con-
flated with, or put on the same plane as, trafficking. What’s more, the
word ’trafficking’ arouses a more emotive response from the media
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and the public, thereby justifying the tougher measures to combat and
criminalise it.
2.4 The research on human smuggling
It is not only policymakers and journalists who are caught up in stereo-
types and rigid categorical thinking. Research on human smuggling of-
ten adopts a strong focus on criminal and economic perspective (Salt &
Hogarth 2000), even though human smuggling is a phenomenon that
spans many more fields and can be looked at from various angles.
Smuggling as a ‘business’
The British geographers Salt &Stein (1997) were the first to frame mi-
gration as a ‘business’. A valuable contribution of their model comes
through viewing smuggling15 from the perspective of the country of
origin, the process in transit, and the country of destination. The differ-
ent services offered in the smuggling process are also divided into
three phases that offer an inside perspective to the various services of-
fered by smugglers: mobilisation, en route, and insertion. Mobilising
people for the business of smuggling characterises the first phase.
Some who work in the smuggling business have the only responsibility
of bringing migrants in contact with smugglers. These so-called ‘re-
cruiters’ have contact with the actual transporters, such as sailors or
lorry drivers who, in the next phase, actually conduct the business
transaction. Recruiters try to persuade migrants to come along with a
specific smuggler. In the second phase, the actual movement takes
place. If smugglers do not provide documents themselves, they usually
know border-crossing points where they can point their clients to in a
clandestine way. Recruiters might, in such a scenario, advise people on
what to bring or – often more importantly – what not to bring. The
amount of luggage must be as minimal as possible. En route, there are
other people whose business is to offer shelter, sell new documents, or
keep a close eye on the border passages. In the final phase of the
smuggling process, the migrant may not only be assisted in entering
the country of destination, but also advised on the asylum procedure,
guided as to where to find housing, or introduced into the labour
market.
The acknowledgement that smuggling comprises different stages is
furthered by Salt & Stein’s (1997) statement that countries of origin,
transit, and destination all try to find different ways to control migra-
tion within their own economic structures. That is, national govern-
ments are at work to control business as a means of investing in valu-
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able returns. ‘Illegal migration’ is defined as ‘a system of institutiona-
lised networks with complex profit and loss accountants, including a
set of institutions, agents and individuals each of which stands to make
commercial gain (Salt & Stein 1997: 468). Chapter one raised the criti-
cism that most migration theory is only based on economic perspec-
tives and does not consider migrants’ self-agency. The same critique
can be made of this ‘business’ model; it does not provide for the possi-
bility that migrants may have other motives for contacting smugglers,
and that involvement in smuggling does not necessarily mean ‘busi-
ness’. For example, family members, political parties, and churches
may be involved in helping people cross borders as an alternative to le-
gal travel options. In some studies, smugglers are seen as being part
of, or as extensions and substitutes to, migrants’ social networks (Koser
1997; Staring 2001). Moreover, from the ‘business’ point-of-view,
smuggled migrants are seen as actively choosing to follow ‘illegal’ prac-
tices, and are, for this reason, often classified as ‘criminal’ too. This
may have a severe impact on the way human smuggling is portrayed,
understood, and discussed.
Smuggling as a ‘crime’
From the moment smuggling was punishable and perceived as a
threat, criminological studies appeared more and more on the topic of
smuggling. These studies are usually based on police files and criminal
court proceedings, primarily focusing on discovering who the smug-
glers are, how they operate, and whether or not organised crime is in-
volved (Aronowitz 2001; Kleemans et al. 1998; Kleemans & Brienen
2001; Kleemans & Van de Bunt 2003; Neske 2006, Schloenhardt
2001, 2003; Soudijn 2006; Staring et al. 2005). Opinions are divided
on the exact involvement of organised crime in human smuggling. A
problem with measuring organised crime is that it is difficult to come
up with completely exclusive criteria. As a result, the definition of orga-
nised crime is still a source of controversy among researchers and in-
ternational organisations as there is no consensus on what criteria to
use. The Expert Group on Organised Crime of the European Commis-
sion, for example, calls collaboration of three or more people ‘orga-
nised’, while Europol cites two or more. Whatever the case, any colla-
boration of people together doing something ‘illegal’ – and profiting
from it – can be referred to as organised crime.
Based on interviews with smugglers and smuggled migrants, Chin
(1999) and Zhang & Gaylord (1996) state that even for Chinese smug-
gling, which is often associated with organised crime, there are hardly
any ‘gangs’ that control or implement the entire migration journey,
from country of origin to that of destination. According to their re-
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search, smuggling is performed by loose coalitions of local organisa-
tions with specific expertise, working together on an ad hoc and bilat-
eral basis. But seeing as the research is based on interviews with
smuggled migrants and smugglers themselves, there may be a bias in
the findings; it is possible that people belonging to – or having been
smuggled by – large criminal networks may not be willing to speak
openly about it. However, authors of a publication based on the 1998
Dutch Monitor on Organized Crime16 also come to the conclusion that
organisations involved in human smuggling are less hierarchical, per-
manent, or clear-cut than usually assumed. Most smugglers work to-
gether in several loose organisations, without one person serving as
leader, and these organisations are dynamic in the sense that people
easily work together with others (Kleemans et al. 1998). Smugglers are
thus not necessarily dependent on one central figure, but, more infor-
mally, ‘know someone who knows someone’ they can work with.
The ethnic background of smugglers usually interests researchers in
the criminological field, for it is suggested that particular ethnic groups
are better at certain criminal acts. Ethnicity as such is used to explain
the differentials in crime rates and types of crime. Exotic features, such
as initiation rites with the use of voodoo by Nigerian traffickers (Van
Dijk et al. 2000) or specific use of violence among Chinese criminal
gangs, are cited as expressions of a natural cultural habitus. In this re-
gard, smugglers are seen as static categories. Critical criminologists are
of the opinion, however, that instead of studying opportunity structures
for crime, most criminologists operate as though ethnicity represents
an independently compelling force affecting crime patterns (Bovenkerk
et al. 2003: 36). Research shows that different ethnic groups also work
together. Most of the time, the ethnicity of the smugglers simply re-
flects the countries through which smuggling operations pass. A study
based on an analysis of 88 Chinese smuggling court cases in the Neth-
erlands affirms this finding. That many Western smugglers are in-
volved in transporting Chinese migrants is explained by Soudijn
(2006) as being due to the fact that different stages of the smuggling
process are taken care of by different smugglers, not necessarily all
linked to each other. Chinese smugglers often lack the contacts, skills,
and knowledge, and therefore have to rely on ‘outsiders’. Western
transporters are ideal because they attract less attention.
Smuggling as an ‘illegal’, yet licit, activity
The literature on smuggling greatly lacks the voice of the migrant, as
well as the voice of the smuggler. As we have already seen, smuggled
migrants are usually seen as passive migrants who are recruited by
their smugglers and have nothing to say within the process. And
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smugglers are seen as ‘criminals’, usually acting consistent with their
ethnic backgrounds. In general, there is little space for a broader, more
socially embedded understanding of the phenomenon of human smug-
gling, even in spite of the sociological studies that have been conducted
on interviews with smuggled migrants and smugglers. These studies
provide a larger and more socially contextualised picture of who the
smugglers are and why the migrants need them.
In another example, Zhang & Chin (2002) interviewed 129 indivi-
duals working in the human smuggling business in New York, Los An-
geles, and Fuzhou. They found that most smugglers were men,17 in
their thirties and forties, with a high school education, and the majority
were self-employed or unemployed. They represented ordinary citizens
(such as restaurant owners, car salesmen, barbers, and waiters) and
most were desperate for some extra money. This is consistent with Spe-
ner’s conclusion (2004) drawn on interviews with smugglers at the
Mexican-US border. He found that nearly all smugglers were working-
class Mexicans. Something that is often forgotten in discussions on the
subject is that smuggling may very well be part of a local culture. For
example, most of the Moroccan and Tunisian fishermen who now work
in smuggling are doing so only after having lost their jobs, in part due
to European regulations, and in part, because their governments al-
ready sold their fish quotas to Spain and Italy (Mabrouk, 2003). The
former fishermen now exploit their expertise by bringing people across
in their pateras. And although they take their chances in the smuggling
business, they are not necessarily connected to other smugglers or to
serious criminals. In this regard, smugglers may even be seen as a dis-
crete form of resistance to the dominant mode of globalisation (Mittel-
man 2000: 210).
As Zhang and Chin (2003) argue, it is not necessary to have large-
scale criminal organisations involved in smuggling; the practice is a
consensual affair and migrants are willing to let themselves be
smuggled, simply because there are no alternatives. For the smugglers,
it is important that people are transported successfully not only to earn
money, but also to preserve their good reputation (Bilger et al. 2006,
Van Liempt 2006b). Smugglers depend on stories of their successes to
keep the business going. Another interesting point is that a link to the
mafia or involvement in organised crime is not necessarily an advan-
tage; it is even better for smugglers to have the reputation of ‘helper’,
not criminal. Who would deliberately want to migrate through a violent
criminal organisation? Usually people try to avoid smugglers who are
only in the business for money; they deliberately look for smugglers
who have other reasons for being involved, or at least make it seem so.
Chapter six devotes more attention to how smugglers and migrants re-
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late to each other and how migrants perceive and talk about their
smugglers.
To better understand who the smugglers are, it is necessary to go be-
yond state-defined categories of who and what is defined to be criminal
or non-criminal. Some literature, for example, views the smuggling
and trafficking of refugees as a response to humanitarian needs (Mor-
rison & Crosland 2000).The distinction between licit and illicit also
seems very helpful in this case. These terms do not refer to the state,
but to social perceptions of activities that are defined as criminal by the
state (Van Schendel & Itty 2005). This broader look will be central to
the whole study, and the definitions used will go beyond legal and
criminal discourses. The introduction of this book already explained
the broader definition of human smuggling that will be further em-
ployed in this research. It is easier to understand how people have tra-
velled, under what circumstances, and with what intentions, without
specifically labelling them or their voyages as legal or ‘illegal’. Many
people nowadays travel under categorical headings, but with other in-
tentions, thus complicating the separation of legal versus ‘illegal’ forms
of migration. For example, if an individual travels as the musician of a
famous folk group, but knows beforehand that he will ‘abandon’ his
group to stay abroad, then it is his intention that would come under
critical view.
2.5 Towards a typology of different types of smuggling and
trafficking
In IOM’s first study on trafficking dating from 1994, a first attempt
was made to come up with a typology of trafficking organisations
(IOM 1994). At that time, no legal distinction was made between
smuggling and trafficking. Based on the geographical area covered by
smugglers (measured according to the number of borders crossed) and
how they work together with others, three different organisational
forms were identified. The first type was called the occasional traffick-
er. Van Dijk (2002) calls this the freelance criminal or the soloist. He
or she is an amateur who usually works in a regional context, provides
services at specific border crossing points, is not part of a larger organi-
sation, and has no overview of the rest of the process. The second type
is the small-scale network, a well-organised group that focuses on two
or more countries, and often uses similar routes, or is specialised in a
specific part of the process. Examples of these specialisations involve
recruiting people, arranging documents, or in the case of trafficking,
bringing people into specific segments of the labour market.
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The third type, the large-scale network, is an organised international
network that consists of many people providing wide-ranging services
along the whole route; it is flexible, and might be part of a broader
criminal network involved in activities other than just smuggling (IOM
1994). The difference between the second and the third types is that
the latter has a manager on top and that all phases of the smuggling
process are connected to each other. Chin (1999), in his book Smuggled
Chinese, makes a distinction between ‘Big Snakeheads’ and ‘Little Sna-
keheads’. Big Snakeheads are organisers, who are often Chinese immi-
grants living abroad. They are usually not known by those being
smuggled and hold a position at the top. Little Snakeheads (recruiters,
guides, transporters, corrupt officials, and debt collectors) work as mid-
dlemen between Big Snakeheads and their clients. In his research on
Polish smuggling, Okólski (2000) uses the ‘The Brain’. ‘The Brain’
looks at the entire route and its security. Complications in classification
arise when it is acknowledged that alliances between organisers and
those actually performing the job may be fluid, and that people may
work for several organisations simultaneously.
Adding the perspective of the migrant
When the migrant, as an actor, is incorporated, the classification of dif-
ferent types of smuggling becomes even more complicated. Migrants
may suddenly decide, en route, to contact another smuggler, or leave
one they deem untrustworthy. Migrants may also cover one part of the
trajectory on their own, without smugglers, if they are sufficiently in-
formed about the route. As such, it is not only how smugglers work to-
gether, but also the decision-making process of migrants that matters.
The role of information seems crucial in this regard. Because smug-
gling is a covert activity, migrants often have very little information to
decide with whom they will travel best. Some people know smugglers
personally, others have to ask around, and others are forced to seek out
places where smugglers offer their services. The amount of time avail-
able to become familiarised with the smuggling market is also of im-
portance. For example, asylum seekers leaving a country in a hurry
have fewer opportunities to choose a smuggler they trust than those
who have more time to prepare their travel.
A good illustration of how smugglers profit from migrants who did
not have time to familiarise themselves with their migrational options
is the so-called ‘Izmir trick’. In the Turkish coastal city of Antalya
smugglers approach new migrants, or transfer clients who were appre-
hended, sent back and want to try again. When evening falls, the
smugglers board the migrants on a ship and after a night of crossing,
by early morning, instruct them to jump off the boat in what they are
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told is Italy. After reaching land, they are told, they will find a police of-
fice some kilometres down the road where they can ask for asylum.
However, after some walking, the migrants observe people speaking
Turkish or hear the call for prayer and realise they are back in Izmir,
Turkey. By this time, the smugglers have already begun their way to-
wards Antalya (Godfroid & Vinckx 1999: 82-83). Hence, it is not only
size and composition of the network, but also its quality – defined by
trust – that impacts the smuggling process. Migrants who are betrayed
by certain smugglers can pass this information onto other migrants
who, in turn, can then decide not to contact such a smuggler. This rela-
tive power that migrants hold within the smuggling and trafficking
process seems of most importance when we look at smuggling purely
from a migrant’s point of view. It is crucial to answer, therefore, the
question of whether the migrant is in position to exert such power in
smuggling and trafficking processes (Van Liempt 2006b).
In order to answer this question, account must be taken of the de-
grees of dependency on the smuggler and the level of agency that may
differ throughout. What can start as a legal migration process may very
well end up as smuggling or trafficking. Such is the case when some-
one travels on a temporary visa, but, upon arrival, is taken hostage and
forced to work to pay back his or her debts. A smuggling process may
also turn into a trafficking process when migrants are exploited or mal-
treated by their smuggler during their travel or while in transit. This
could push them across the fine line separating smuggling from traf-
ficking. Figure one shows the dynamics in smuggling and trafficking
processes in terms of degrees of dependency.
En route  Insertion 
Legal Migration 
No degree of dependency 
Smuggling            
Low degree of dependency
Trafficking
High degree of dependency 
Figure 1: The dynamics of degrees of dependency in smuggling and trafficking
processes
Apart from the fact that the distinction between smuggling and traf-
ficking is, in practice, sometimes difficult to make, within the classifi-
cation of smuggling there are also discrepancies. Various types of
smuggling seem to be characterised by different degrees of autonomy.
Related to this is the question of reputation and trust. If someone is
helped through one’s network, or is smuggled by the aid of ‘a friend of
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a friend’, the process will probably evolve differently than if someone is
smuggled by an anonymous professional smuggler.
In the US there is a longer tradition of research on what is referred
to as ‘undocumented’ migration (Nevins 2002; Cornelius et al. 1994;
Singer & Massey 1998; Hagan 1994; Durand & Massey 2004; Andreas
2000; Eschbach et al. 2001). The Mexican Migration Project is one ex-
ample of the tradition of rich research on undocumented migration on
the Mexican/US border. This multidisciplinary research project by in-
vestigators in Mexico and the US comprises a unique database of 107
communities, with surveys of more than 17,000 households in Mexico
and over 800 in the US. In contrast to studies that only focus on the
activities of border control authorities, or solely take into account the
considerations of migrants, Singer & Massey (1998) explain how the
interaction between migrants, the border police, and the ‘coyotes’18
takes place. They view clandestine border crossing as a well-defined so-
cial process whereby migrants draw upon various sources of human
and social capital to overcome barriers erected by the authorities. A si-
milar, integrative approach that acknowledges migrants’ agency, possi-
ble governmental interventions in the migration process, and interac-
tions between the two will also be central to this study on migrants
smuggled into the Netherlands.
Conclusion
Human smuggling is a complex phenomenon and understanding it is
very much dominated by external projections. The context in which
smuggling is framed has changed rapidly since the beginning of the
1990s, when immigration control became more of a pressing issue. In
chapter one, it was shown that a high numbers of asylum seekers,
mainly from unexpected places in the world, has led to tougher border
controls and presumptions that smuggling has created possibilities for
the ‘uninvited’. Later, the focus was placed on huge profits made by
smugglers. And after some serious high-profile accidents fed the image
of smugglers as unscrupulous mafia types, the paradigm shifted to
smuggling as an act of transnational crime. The UN Protocol against
the Smuggling of Migrants is a supplement to the UN Convention
Against Transnational Organised Crime, focusing on repressive mea-
sures against ‘illegal migration’ and ‘organised crime’ while doing
relatively little to secure migrant rights. Shifts in the paradigm are ex-
emplified by this convention, as well as rising penalties and the re-
moval of the humanitarian clause in the Dutch penal code’s smuggling
article.
Some research on smuggling is also driven by the interest of law en-
forcement, and specifically aims at understanding how the ‘criminal
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business’ works. Others view it more as an economic affair. But in both
approaches, migrants are seen as passive actors. The present research
includes the possible strategic actions taken by migrants themselves, as
well as their interactions with smugglers. Furthermore, most migration
theories are one-sided: they either focus on motives for migration in
the country of origin, or on integration in countries of destination.
There is a frequent failure to link what happens in between to what
happened before or after migration. This research seeks to develop
tools to study migration in a more dynamic way. It incorporates differ-
ent phases of the migration process and focuses on the decision-mak-
ing process of migrants along its many phases. This research will go
beyond legal and criminal discourses to use a broader definition of
smuggling that covers a whole spectrum, from smuggling-as-altruism
to smuggling-as–organised-crime. When a legal framework alone is
used as a starting point for research, it becomes impossible to include
those cases of smuggling in which a migrant’s status drifts in and out
of legality. In order to sketch the broader picture, a comprehensive ap-
proach has been taken with a focus on three different regions where
smuggling methods differ substantially. The next chapter explains this
study’s research methodology in more detail.
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3 Conducting research among smuggled
migrants: an inside perspective
In this research, smuggling will be looked at from an inside perspec-
tive. Even though smuggling has received strong attention from the
media, policymakers, and scholars, migrant accounts are rarely fea-
tured as the primary source of information about smuggling. Personal
stories will reveal what it is like to be smuggled, something hardly ever
heard about. The starting point of this research is a migrant’s self-
agency, as also specified in the approach of Giddens (1984), who
claims that people are not ruled by society, but have agency even when
their options are limited. The central question of the research is: what
does it mean for the evolution of the migration process if people are
constrained in their mobility, and therefore need to make use of the
services of intermediaries, such as smugglers? Sub-questions are: why
do people need smugglers? What does the decision-making process
look like? How do smuggled migrants exert power in negotiations with
their smuggler? And what different types of smuggling can be identi-
fied in relation to the migrant’s role in deciding the final destination?
Spending time with individuals and showing interest in their experi-
ences makes it easier to collect sensitive data. Adopting the agency per-
spective also shows that migrants do not only suffer from the obstacles
they face, but that they can also proactively exploit these constraints.
As such, smuggled migrants, especially asylum seekers, may deliber-
ately align themselves with certain preconceived notions. For example,
during their asylum hearings they may allude to wars that have been
made known in the West, or to simplistic views of being a minority in
a certain country. In every qualitative research study, self-presentation
is an issue, but when self-presentation is part of strategic behaviour, it
puts extra pressure on the story people tell and may therefore affect
the data-collecting process. This chapter will first examine official data
on human smuggling in the Netherlands. It will then move onto the is-
sue of self-presentation, as well as other methodological issues encoun-
tered during fieldwork with vulnerable people speaking about ‘illegal’
activities.
3.1 Data available on human smuggling in the Netherlands
and its limitations
Salt & Hogarth (2000) have evaluated several studies to estimate the
amount of irregular migrants and the role of smugglers within irregu-
lar migration. They come to the conclusion that most data on this topic
are unreliable, and there is plenty of sensational reporting. Just as in
other countries, the Netherlands has a clear lack of data on smuggling.
The most obvious reason has to do with the ‘illegal’ character of smug-
gling; it is not talked about openly and in most cases, is not even ‘regis-
tered’. Another reason is that smuggling into Europe is a relatively new
phenomenon, which also means data has only recently become avail-
able.
Data from the police and the public prosecutor
The Royal Marechaussee (KMAR) is responsible for guarding the
Dutch border and, as such, may reveal incidents of human smuggling
in the Netherlands. They carry out gate-controls at airports where im-
migrants are refused, often due to missing documents. A large propor-
tion of those refused at the gates of Schiphol Airport, in Amsterdam,
ask for asylum on the spot. In 2000, there were controls of 4,659
flights at the gates of Schiphol: 1,122 people were refused and 866 im-
mediately applied for asylum. In 2001, out of 4,205 controls, 572 were
refused and 374 asked for asylum at the gate (IAM 2002: 80). But, of
course, these numbers do not cover all smuggling cases. It is unknown
how many smuggled migrants pass through without being caught.
Furthermore, not all smuggled migrants who arrive by plane come di-
rectly to Schiphol; some fly into Brussels or Frankfurt to be picked up
by someone with a car, thus technically entering the Netherlands via
land.
The fact that Schiphol is a better controlled facility than the Nether-
lands’ various border crossing points on land may also cause biases in
the data on smuggling. For example, very little is known about the role
Dutch harbours play in smuggling processes. A representative of the
Dutch Unit Human Smuggling (UMS) claimed in an interview that
the Rotterdam harbour is not significant for human smuggling to the
Netherlands (expert interview 17/12/2002; see appendix I). However, it
is not clear exactly how many smuggled migrants enter via Dutch har-
bours. In 2001, the Immigration and Naturalisation Service published
a report stating that 91 per cent of Guinean asylum seekers claim to
have entered the Netherlands by boat. Claims to also have travelled this
way are recorded at 35 per cent for Liberia and 34 per cent for Sierra
Leone (IND 2001). The Immigration and Naturalisation Service doubts
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these findings, deeming it implausible that so many people sneak
through the well-secured ports of the Netherlands. They suggest that
immigrants use this story to prevent their being sent back to the origi-
nal EU country they first arrived to, as the Dublin Regulation would
otherwise stipulate (see also Van Wijk 2003). Yet, there is high-density
traffic between West Africa and Europe. Chelpi (2005) found that ship-
ping lines between West Africa and the Netherlands are frequently
used and have even increased over time. For the Amsterdam port
alone, there are five shipping agents that operate in West Africa. One
shipping agent has fourteen boats that travel between West Africa and
the Netherlands on a regular basis, making between four and eight
connections a month (Chelpi 2005: 55). It is a known fact that Dutch
harbours are used for smuggling migrants out, making it seem plausi-
ble that they would also be used for smuggling migrants in. Figures
from the Royal Marechaussee confirm that ‘illegal’ immigrants are
caught in Dutch harbours on a frequent basis. In 2001, 564 people
were found hiding in trailers and apprehended in the Rotterdam har-
bour (Expertise Centrum Haven 2002). In 2004, 447 ‘illegal aliens’
were detected in trailers in the smaller harbours of Vlissingen, Hoek
van Holland, and Schevingen, where ships were destined for the UK.
Apart from collecting quantitative data on apprehensions, the Royal
Marechaussee also conducts criminal investigations, which are led by
the public prosecutor and give insight into how smugglers operate.
The first official report on human smuggling in the Netherlands dates
from 1996. It was written by the Special Prosecutor against Human
Smuggling, who was appointed the year before, to help coordinate in-
formation on human smuggling gathered by several institutions. The
report, ‘Plan Van Aanpak Mensensmokkel’ [‘Approach to Human Smug-
gling’] is mainly based on the annual ‘Criminaliteitsbeeldanalyse’ [‘Crim-
inality Analysis’] in which 867 smuggling incidents were registered
during the period between November 1994 and April 1995. In 1997,
the Taskforce on Human Smuggling was set up to coordinate informa-
tion exchange between different institutions and to increase the law’
enforcement capacity to control smuggling. The Information and Ana-
lysis center on Human smuggling (IAM) was part of this taskforce,
having been established to collect, analyse, and provide data on smug-
gling. The information derived from these sources is clearly aimed at
the offenders. Recent works have been published based on data derived
from these smuggling cases (Soudijn 2006; Staring et al. 2005).
Data from the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND)
Since the beginning of the 1990s, it became increasingly apparent that
asylum seekers were, on a large scale, using human smugglers to enter
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the Netherlands. Hesseling and Taselaar (2001) have come to estimate
that, of all asylum seekers to the Netherlands, between 10 per cent and
60 per cent, varying according to ethnic group, have used smugglers.
Only 10 per cent of West African asylum seekers, for example, claimed
to have been smuggled. The definition of human smuggling employed
is ‘someone who has entered the Netherlands without valid travel docu-
ments, is assisted by a travel agent, and has paid a sum of money for
this assistance (Hesseling & Taselaar 2001: 15). When the definition of
smuggling is widened to include all types of third-party assistance, in-
cluding that of a non-profit nature, the statistics increase significantly.
The table produced by Immigration and Naturalization Service is mis-
leading in its apparent preciseness as the percentages are not rounded,
with numbers even given in the tenth’s place. Nevertheless, what re-
mains clear is that most asylum seekers in the Netherlands – on aver-
age, 95 per cent of asylum applicants – claim to have been smuggled
at some stage during their migration process.








Afghanistan 69.1% 61.4% 1.6% 12.5% 98.2%
Angola 96.2% 16.0% 8.0% 3.3% 98.1%
Azerbaijan 38.8% 85.1% 6.0% 3.0% 97.5%
Iraq 82.7% 73.6% 6.5% 3.9% 97.2%
Iran 81.8% 61.6% 18.7% 4.5% 88.2%
Yugoslavia 58.7% 53.8% 8.7% 1.6% 84.3%
Sierra Leone 74.0% 30.2% 3.1% 1.6% 93.8%
Somalia 61.3% 50.4% 5.6% 2.7% 97.9%
Sudan 87.0% 27.5% 5.7% 3.2% 93.2%
Turkey 82.4% 22.0% 20.3% 7.7% 91.8%
Total 70.6% 54.1% 7.1% 5.0% 94.9%
(Source: IND 2000: 31)
Efinoyai-Mäder et al. (2001) come to the same conclusion in a study
among asylum seekers in Switzerland. Almost all their respondents
claimed to have used the services of a smuggler to enter Switzerland
for at least one stage in their migration process (Efionayi-Mäder et al.
2001). Research in the Netherlands also shows that asylum seekers are
more frequently smuggled than traditional immigrant groups (Engber-
sen, Staring et al. 2002). In 2002, the number of people smuggled
into the Netherlands had increased by 400 per cent from figures
quoted in an earlier research project called the Unknown City (Burgers
& Engbersen 1999 and Engbersen et al. 1999). This latter research
spanned the period of 1994 to 1995, with a focus on the more tradi-
tional immigrant groups.
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Since asylum seekers are registered and interviewed upon arrival,
alongside information on motives for asylum, there is also information
on the modes of travel, the routes taken, and the prices migrants pay
to smugglers. A first glance at this database, however, already shows
that the information is qualitatively weak, being compiled of standard
stories with few details, such as: ‘I travelled via unknown countries,
stayed a while in an unknown place, and from there, was brought
here.’
Asylum seekers are usually well informed of the fact that their story
to immigration officers will be used in deciding the eligibility for their
asylum. Hence, these stories determine their future, and news goes
around of what should be revealed versus what should be concealed.
The Dublin II Regulation (which replaced the original Dublin Conven-
tion of 1990) is a clear example of how a certain law may lead to adap-
tations in the autobiography migrants share. Without some modifica-
tion or discreteness when it comes to describing the route taken, a per-
son who has transited through other European countries will not be
allowed to stay in the current country of destination. According to the
guidelines of the Dublin II Regulation, the person will be sent back to
the first European country he or she passed through. As a result, im-
migration authorities receive little to no detailed information on the fi-
nal phase of the migration trajectory. Qualitative research seems the
only proper tool to describe the complex and secret phenomenon that
is human smuggling; it is the only way to reveal discrepancies between
the official and the more unofficial stories (see also Cornelius 1982).
To better understand the discourse surrounding human smug-
gling,19 the present research conducted expert interviews with police-
men, immigration officers, border control authorities, and several indi-
viduals working for NGOs. However, the main source of information
that sustains this research is migrant interviews.
3.2 The biographical method as the main source of information
Even though we could readily rely on previous research that used the
same biographical method (such as Chin (1999) who managed to in-
terview no less than 300 Chinese immigrants smuggled into the US),
there was scepticism surrounding our interviewing method, especially
from potential funders. It was assumed that people involved would
never speak openly about such a sensitive topic and consequently, our
research would not provide accurate information on the detailed char-
acteristics of an ‘illegal’ business such as smuggling. In general, field
studies are less attractive to funding agencies than quantitative studies
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because the latter can produce – at least the illusion of – precise, mea-
surable data (Ferrell 1998: 5).
Statistics and research methods intertwined with law enforcement
objectives, usually standing outside the lived experience of smuggled
migrants or smugglers, can never capture a wider understanding of
the phenomenon. Another methodology altogether is needed in order
to know more about how people travel and the effects this type of bor-
der crossing has on human lives. Actually going into the field to do re-
search makes it possible to reveal parts of the social world that would
otherwise remain hidden. Moreover, a strict conformity to legal codes
can limit a researcher’s scope, thus making it more difficult to study
the internal logic of phenomena such as human smuggling.
A real advantage to the biographical method is that it offers space
for respondents to tell their own story, presenting the issues that are of
importance to them. For the researcher, this can lead to new insights,
thereby encouraging movement beyond the rigid and static assump-
tions made on something that very little is known about. This method,
however, asks for the researcher to play an active role. The researchers’
own identities should be made transparent, for researchers cannot to-
tally distance themselves from the situations in which the subjects re-
side. A degree of sympathetic understanding between a social research-
er and his or her subjects is needed so the researcher can also come to
share, in part, the situated meanings and experience of those under
scrutiny (Ferell 1998: 27). This research method therefore moves be-
yond objectivity and asks for openness to the subjective experience.
This makes it possible to study the way people talk about smuggling
and may reveal discrepancies when juxtaposed with the ‘official’ pic-
tures (Cornelius 1982). Another advantage is that respondents can de-
termine the order in which topics are discussed, which might make
them feel more at ease, often turning the interview into a ‘normal con-
versation’. For us, a conversational tone turned out to be of vital impor-
tance, for it was something people had missed during their official in-
terview with immigration authorities.
3.3 The research population
The decision was made to concentrate on three groups in particular, so
as to analyse regional differences in smuggling as demonstrated in
Iraq, the Horn of Africa, and the former Soviet Union. Reasons for
choosing only three groups were both practical and financial. Inter-
viewers who speak the language needed to be trained, and there was a
one-year limit to the fieldwork period. As many asylum seekers turned
out to be smuggled, it seemed apt to focus on nationalities within the
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top ten of asylum requests. When this research began, the amount of
requests for asylum in the Netherlands was as follows:














Special attention was paid to the feasibility of interviewing each group.
The size of the group and differences in migration patterns were
looked at in order to create grounds for comparison and contrast. From
the literature, it was known that ways of border crossing into the Neth-
erlands differ region wide (IND 2000a). From Africa (Angola, Sierra
Leone, Guinea) there were many unaccompanied minors coming to
the Netherlands; we decided not to focus on this group because inter-
viewing minors would involve both ethical and practical difficulties in-
cluding the permission that would first be needed from the intervie-
wees’ guardians. As such, the Horn of Africa was chosen, a group ex-
pected to have come by plane or boat and often on forged documents.
At the moment the research began, there were many newspaper arti-
cles about Somalis travelling on someone else’s passports, using the
so-called ‘look-alike method’. Through a Dutch agency helping highly
educated refugees in the labour market, we recruited an Ethiopian
man to assist us in carrying out the interviews. In total, nineteen re-
spondents from this area were interviewed: 17 by the research assistant
and two by myself. In total, we spoke to seven Somali asylum seekers
(four males, three females), six Ethiopians (all male), five Eritreans
(one male, four females) and one Kenyan (male).
Afghans, Iranians, and Iraqis often travel over land, step by step and
via Turkey (Icduygu & Toktas 2002, Akinbingöl 2003). We decided to
focus on Iraqis because their migratory statistics were expected to con-
tinue rising due to current political instability in Iraq. Our research as-
sistant was a male Kurd from northern Iraq. Together we interviewed
nineteen males and three females from Iraq, one male from Iran, and
one couple from Syria. I conducted six out of these 24 interviews. We
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had sought to interview Iraqis, but as it turned out, all respondents
were Kurdish. While the interview assistant’s own Kurdish background
may have influenced this skewing in our respondent pool, a closer look
at the Iraqi community in the Netherlands also shows that 64 per cent
of the population is Kurdish (Choenni 2002: 24). Within Iraq, Kurds
comprise only 20 per cent of the country’s overall population (Choenni
2002: 8).
The countries of the former Soviet Union were selected for research,
not only because they have prominent asylum statistics, but also be-
cause of their recent increase as an immigrant group in the Nether-
lands. The case of the former Soviet Union countries illustrates the fact
that many people nowadays travel under certain categorical headings,
though with other intentions. Most of the immigrants from this region
entered the Netherlands on a tourist visa but then overstayed, thus
blurring the boundary between legal and ‘illegal’ migration. For this re-
search, a Georgian student who spoke fluent Russian interviewed se-
ven Russians (five females and two males), three Ukrainians, and two
families from Azerbaijan and one Chechen family. I myself did not do
any interviews with people from the former Soviet Union.
In total, the research team managed to collect 56 life stories in a
one-year period, spanning May 2003 until May 2004, from the Horn
of Africa, Iraq, and the former Soviet Union20. I myself did additional
interviews with seven West Africans (Guinea, Togo, Cameroon, Nigeria,
Liberia) and five North Africans (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia). These life
stories with people who were not part of the original focus groups con-
tributed to a general understanding of smuggling, but were not incor-
porated as part of the data analysis. The same holds true for two inter-
views with women from Sierra Leone. These interviews were too short
to even be called life stories, and the circumstances in which they were
conducted far from ideal, but their message still proved important for a
general understanding of the issue. Most of the interviews lasted for
two to three hours.
It would have been interesting to also interview smugglers, but gain-
ing access to this group would have been challenging and the fact that
we performed the interviews in a country of destination made it still
more difficult to get into contact with smugglers (Doornbos & Shalma-
shi 2001). Such inaccessibility no doubt has much to do with the crim-
inal connotation smuggling carries in the West.
How is trust built up in a context of mistrust?
Immigration officers are trained to find inconsistencies in the stories
people tell, and it is their job to determine whether someone really is
who he or she claims to be. As one immigration officer we interviewed
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said, ‘How can I trust somebody if I am not even sure if I know who is
sitting in front of me?’ (Interview with IND officer 19/12/05). Mi-
grants, most of the time, experience these official interviews as a lack
of respect. One Jewish family from Grozny, Chechnya, was not believed
to be Jewish and, as such, were asked why – if they were ‘real Jews’ –
they did not migrate to Israel. It is not hard to imagine that the family
was sceptical about how their case would be handled after this remark.
Many of our respondents talked about their interviews with Immigra-
tion Service as though they were ‘interrogations’. A female respondent
from Iraq explained the following:
I had the feeling they wanted me to make the story simpler than
it was. I constantly had the feeling I was forgetting important
details. And the most horrible thing was when I talked about
painful events – they did not want to know how it must have
been for me. They said they had enough information now. They
did not even comfort me.
These examples show that asylum application interviews especially fa-
vour those able to express themselves in a clear way. They also show
that interviewees often fear the lack of having substantial ground for
asylum, and that immigration officers hardly put themselves in the in-
terviewee’s position, which may encourage mistrust on both sides. The
fact that, for refugees, trust is often overwhelmed by mistrust is not al-
ways taken into account while doing research among this group.
Although it is important to know why and how refugees have devel-
oped mistrust towards specific groups of people or situations, these
facts are usually unaccounted for in research among this specific group
(Hynes 2003). Some of the people interviewed still feared those related
to the situations they escaped from in their country of origin or, more
generally, had bad experiences with people in uniform or officials. As a
result, anyone asking questions might be a government agent with
whom asylum seekers are very reluctant to share certain crucial infor-
mation. More specifically, Thompson (1988) acknowledges that people
who have experienced persecution might fear being tape-recorded by
researchers, questioning whether the information may end up in the
hands of the police or other authorities to be used against them. We al-
ways asked if respondents were uncomfortable being tape-recorded. Ac-
cordingly, it was sometimes simply not possible to tape-record because
respondents refused. On other occasions, people requested to have the
tape recorder turned off when relaying information on the routes taken
or about participation in certain political parties.
Another reason for mistrust encountered in this research was the ne-
gative experience migrants had with translators. Some people told us
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that, after having learned some Dutch, they were really shocked by
how their interviews had been translated. Issues that were of real im-
portance to them were translated as though they were minor details,
while other things were blown out of proportion21. Soon after hearing
this complaint, I decided that my research assistants could not solely
function as translators anymore; instead, they should do the interviews
on their own, in the respondents’ own language. Therefore, I myself
conducted interviews only with those who could speak Dutch, English,
or French. In general, the research team tried to create a setting delib-
erately opposite to the formal interview setting at Immigration Ser-
vices. Most of the interviews were done in cafes, in the offices of
NGOs, or at people’s own homes. These settings helped distance our-
selves as researchers from possible associations with ‘officials’, thereby
making it easier to build up trust. Of course it was also helpful that
most of the people we spoke with had either been granted a status or
were already rejected asylum seekers, thus leaving them unafraid to
talk to us openly.
3.4 Gaining access to smuggled migrants
In the absence of a sampling frame, it was necessary to adopt alterna-
tive strategies for locating respondents. We tried to avoid one-sidedness
by using different access points. As the target population focuses pri-
marily on asylum seekers, those still in procedure were of course easy
to locate, but interviewing people whose status was not yet secure
would probably have had a strong impact on the interview. People in
these situations would most likely be more concerned with day-to-day
survival than with the interview. They might also fear that the story
they provided us could impact the outcome of their status, making it
more plausible if they had an official version of the story to tell the re-
searcher, too. Refugees who already had obtained refugee status, re-
jected asylum seekers, and other smuggled migrants living in ‘illegal-
ity’ were assumed to be more at liberty to tell their own stories, but
they were also more difficult to find.
Snowballing is a method usually used when the target population re-
presents a comparatively small part of the total population, or where
some specific degree of trust is required to initiate contact among re-
spondents. Various studies indicate that snowball sampling can prove
economical, efficient, and effective in this respect. Respondents are ob-
tained through referrals among people who share the same characteris-
tics (Bloch 1999), and trust is developed because referrals are made by
acquaintances or peers, rather than through more formal methods of
gaining access (Cornelius 1982). However, there are also authors who
62 NAVIGATING BORDERS
say that people in vulnerable situations are often reluctant to give the
names and addresses of migrants in the same precarious situations
(Staring 2001; Efionayi-Mäder et al. 2001). Furthermore, the snowball
method entails the danger of limiting research to a biased sample,
since contacts will mainly pertain to individuals belonging to the same
group or having the same background. To minimise this risk, we uti-
lised diverse access points.
Moreover, our research assistants shared the linguistic, national,
and/or ethnic background of the respondents. This was crucial in order
to gain access to these networks in the first place. Ellis & MacGaffey
(1996) point out that research into areas where there is a high degree
of suspicion cannot do without ‘insiders’. It is not enough to simply
share the same ethnicity; a researcher must also be part of the network
and in possession of extended personal The research assistants I
worked with all had such an extensive personal network to draw upon.
One of the three assistants had previous experience in researching re-
fugees in the Netherlands and still maintained contacts from that re-
search. Another assistant had been an interpreter for refugees and also
had, apart from personal contacts, more professional contacts whom
he invited to participate. The Georgian assistant had few contacts with
asylum seekers, yet more with Russian women married to Dutch men
as she too was married to a Dutch man.
Working with research assistants
It was assumed that the respondents would probably not speak Dutch
or English, and that the research assistants would be able to gain their
trust more easily, since respondents would more easily identify with
them. When I, as a white Dutch woman, did the interview the situation
proved different than when the research assistants did the interviews.
It was more difficult for me to establish contact and build trust among
the respondents. On the other hand, this ‘outside’ position sometimes
allowed the informants to speak more freely about topics that they
would usually avoid discussing among their own community. And
sometimes I was deliberately provoked on certain topics to see what
the possible prototypical reactions of a Dutch person might be. In one
instance, a Liberian man played with his ‘fake’ identity by showing a
forged identity card and asking, ‘Don’t you believe me? Don’t you think
I am a British citizen? Why not? It can be possible, no?’
Using co-ethnics to do research, however, also raises issues of objec-
tivity and bias (Bloch 1999). I was well aware that working with co-eth-
nics is not recommended in view of the risk of ‘going native’: over-so-
cialising with the group and therefore losing the necessary distance
and objectivity. Yet, I remained convinced by its advantages in terms of
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access and openness. In order to maximise the quality of the data col-
lected, the research assistants were carefully informed of the possibility
of bias and confidentiality problems that might emerge, and together
my assistants and I critically discussed and evaluated the interviews in
order to avoid misinterpretations. Sometimes things were taken for
granted by the research assistants; they may have thought certain infor-
mation was common sense, and therefore did not require further prob-
ing. Fortunately, for most cases there was the chance to bring up such
issues in subsequent interviews to clarify the matter at hand. Neverthe-
less, in some instances, respondents had already left the country before
we could arrange a follow-up interview. One Somali respondent left for
the UK after the first meeting, so the research assistant never had the
chance to really interview him. The same happened with an Iraqi man
who left for Denmark. One of my research assistants also left the Neth-
erlands after the research’s fieldwork period. However, we were able to
keep in touch via email, and I could always ask him for advice while
analysing the data.
Contact points other than personal networks
When it comes to accessing respondents through personal networks
there is the risk of interviewing individuals within only one friendship
network. We therefore tried to use as many different networks as possi-
ble. Diversifying access points is one way to reduce bias when it comes
to selecting information. In order to gain access to people other than
those she knew personally, my Georgian research assistant placed an
advertisement on an Internet news portal for Russian-speaking people
in the Benelux region, to which several people responded. I myself
mainly contacted respondents through gatekeepers who worked at
NGOs, churches, shelters, health and advocacy groups, and political ac-
tivist groups. Gatekeepers typically include those with roles in political,
economic, or social lives that put them in close contact with the target
group, on a regular enough basis to thereby enjoy certain respect
among the people. Interestingly enough, these different access points
sometimes also led to contrasting cases. There were NGOs that only
helped rejected asylum seekers who still had what they called a ‘legal
perspective’. People to likely never gain asylum status were not helped
(expert interview 05/11/2002). And one priest I interviewed explained
that his endeavours were specifically aimed at African boys who were
not helped by NGOs (expert interview 27/11/2002, see appendix I).
Gatekeepers facilitate access, not only by arranging contacts between
the interviewer and the potential interviewee, but also because they
themselves are trusted, and reduce the amount of mistrust directed to-
wards the researcher. Gatekeepers sometimes even encourage the parti-
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cipation of potential respondents who would otherwise have been un-
willing to be interviewed without their recommendation (Bloch 1999).
A negative side effect of this situation is that people may sometimes
feel obligated to talk and therefore communicate in a forced way. A
couple from Togo, for example, asked after one hour: ‘Can we go now,
do you have enough information?’ Gatekeepers may also choose inter-
view partners they think would fit best, either because they provide in-
formation they think the researcher would like to hear or because they
have a certain experience in interview situations with journalists, re-
searchers, etc. And, of course, if a gatekeeper keeps the gate closed it is
difficult to gain access. We were only faced with problems from one
NGO that was unwilling to cooperate because of scepticism of the re-
search overall. According to the NGO, the results of the research would
only benefit the police and help the Immigration and Naturalisation
Service in detecting people.
3.5 Reasons for participation and refusal
In contrast to what was expected, no one refused to participate in the
research because they did not want to, or from fear of speaking about
smuggling. There were some people who did not want to address cer-
tain aspects of their biographies, but this often had to do with the fact
that officials had questioned them so much on the topic already.
Others were experiencing ‘interview fatigue’, since this had been the
third or fourth time they were approached to participate in research on
refugees. Reduced to research subjects, they were just too tired to have
to speak about their migration history over and over again. Another
reason for not participating was that, at the time of our fieldwork (May
2003 through May 2004), the asylum issue was extremely politicised.
This discouraged some people to participate because they thought re-
search would not change that situation anyway. For others, the political
climate was in fact a reason to participate in the research. Some re-
spondents tried to use the interviews as a means to draw attention to
their case. They expressed a desire to make their story public – through
academia or journalism – so that people would know about what was
happening in the Netherlands.
For most people, the interview was a form of social contact; they felt
lonely and simply wanted to chat. Many respondents expressed feelings
of surprise that we were interested in their situation. Simply showing
an interest was the characteristic that most contrasted from the official
interviews that the migrants had already experienced. Respondents
may also have hoped for some kind of benefits from participating. In
these cases, their responses could have been part of a survival strategy.
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Depending on the type of survival strategy at work, this might have af-
fected the interview. For example, a respondent’s answers could have
been coloured by the hope that becoming good friends with the Dutch
interviewer could lead to ascertaining legal papers. The implicit aim of
the respondent’s interview could be self-promotion, often either as a
marriage partner or a friend worth doing a favour for. Another reason
to participate might be the respondent’s belief that the researcher could
offer legal advice. When this was the case, the interview revolved
around a political asylum story. I did some interviews with people who
presented tons of paperwork and the correspondence they had ex-
changed with authorities because they wanted to hear my opinion on
their case and expected help from me.
Smuggling: a secret topic?
As already described, people did not always see ‘smuggling’ to be a pro-
blem. Consequently, many were willing to state that they had broken
the rules, because they thought the rules were unreasonable. As a re-
sult, they talked quite openly about most aspects of their ‘illegal’ jour-
ney. An advantage of the biographical method is that special attention
can be devoted to the expressions people use while talking about a par-
ticular subject. It is therefore possible to research the difference be-
tween the official discourse on smuggling and the migrants’ real ex-
periences. Migrants usually bring particular words into play while talk-
ing about smuggling, the smuggler, or the wish to go abroad. Chapter
six elaborates more on how people refer to their ‘smuggler’.
Still, smuggled migrants may have good reasons for hiding certain
details of their journey from researchers as well. While interviewing
people, we found that some respondents did not want us to know who
their smuggler was or which exact route they had taken. Sometimes
people openly stated that they preferred not to give the names of cities
or mountains they passed through, for there were more migrants plan-
ning to come via the same route. As an Eritrean woman said, sharing
her fears with us:
I won’t tell you the exact name of the mountain where we were hid-
ing; it is a famous place. You might want to know about it, but there
are more people to follow, and I do not want to betray them.
It is thus possible that people leave certain details out of their route de-
scriptions. However, most of the stories we heard were very detailed, at
least indicating that respondents were more open to us than they had
been with the immigration authorities upon arrival.
66 NAVIGATING BORDERS
3.6 Biases in the interviews
Despite the fact that difficulties faced during fieldwork and methodolo-
gical failures often provide fruitful research material, they are rarely
written up and analysed. This analysis of the interviewing process with
smuggled migrants in the Netherlands tends to go beyond the short
confessionals usually found in methodology sections of reports. While
carrying out fieldwork it was acknowledged that people sometimes pre-
sented themselves in a certain way as a strategic action. Almost all of
our respondents had undergone several prior interviews and held con-
versations with all kind of administrative bodies – the police, the asy-
lum authority, medical doctors, etc. They had built up a certain exper-
tise in presenting who they are, even though this did not always turn
out to be successful.
The story of a Kenyan man illustrates how people may be instructed
on how to present themselves and how this can affect their future lives.
Immediately after arrival in the Netherlands, the Kenyan man met
someone at Amsterdam’s central train station who told him that, in the
eyes of the Dutch, Kenya is a ‘safe’ country. He advised him therefore
not to tell the immigration officer that he was from Kenya, although
the man had a very strong case for asylum. In Nairobi, he had worked
as the national coordinator for an environmental NGO known for its
criticism of the government. One day he was consequently appre-
hended by a government employee and tortured. He could prove that
he was tortured (his vocal cord very noticeably cut). He also had various
documents proving his case and almost all his former colleagues were
living scattered around Europe for the same reason. The stranger ad-
vised the Kenyan man to give a story that focused on the war in Rwan-
da. The man decided to follow his advice, but when he told the authori-
ties he was from Rwanda but could not even tell them the simplest de-
tails about the country, such as its capital, his application for asylum
was rejected. He recounts:
The problem was that I really had to convince people that I was
from that place. The interview was about small things, street
names, and so on. I didn’t know what to say. It is stupid. I
mean, imagine if you say that you are from the Netherlands and
you don’t even know where Dam Square [Amsterdam’s central
plaza] is, that is stupid… I am not the kind of person that nor-
mally lies.
The Kenyan man now lives in ‘illegality’. Ironically, advice given by
others regarding what to tell authorities may thus impede asylum-seek-
ing procedures and even work against migrants’ interests. Inventing
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parts of a flight story or destroying identity documents may result in a
less credible claim. And sometimes the real reasons and circumstances
for flight may be considered valid grounds for granting asylum status.
Most of the respondents we spoke to who lied about the exact reason
for an asylum claim or their age22 did not have a sufficiently detailed
story and were thus rejected asylum (see also Staring et al. 2005: 177).
This illustrates how some people were more honest with us, telling us
another version of the story they told to immigration officers.
But sometimes people withheld the full truth from us as well. It was
obvious some interviewees were hiding information or relayed incon-
sistent stories. Therefore it seemed useful to understand more about
the occasions when respondents might be altering the truth and seek
possible explanations for this. The inside perspective makes it possible
to gain a deeper understanding by not only analysing what people say,
but also how they present themselves. Before looking into these iden-
tity constructions, I must acknowledge that lying can be a way of
managing information and that I do not have the illusion that ‘the’
truth exists, let alone that I can reveal it. Still, I think it is important to
understand why certain facts may be constructed because they do in-
deed impact the interview and its subsequent data analysis (see also
Bilger & Van Liempt 2006).
‘Constructing a productive other’
There are many studies done on how refugees are labelled and the con-
sequences of such labelling. Extensive empirical evidence shows that
refugees conceive an identity which is very different from that which is
ascribed to them23. Surprisingly little is known, however, on how refu-
gees present themselves within this context. Zetter (1991) raises an inter-
esting point when he says that refugees may have an interest in the la-
bel they are given by others. Although it often categorises them nega-
tively or incorrectly, it also entitles them to certain rights. Migrants
therefore might try to present themselves in what they deem to be the
most ‘correct’ way possible. Barsky (1994) introduced the concept of
‘constructing a productive other’ vis-à-vis asylum seekers. Accordingly,
asylum seekers are highly invested in suitable self-presentation because
any ‘wrong’ answers in official interviews can have severe conse-
quences for their present as well as future situation.
The constructed other stands in the place of original claimant as a
doormat would stand in the place of a house, it bears little semblance
to the interior space in which lived experience occurs, but rather fits
into too-easily accepted bureaucratic procedure that requires a façade of
self-justification rather than veritable representation (Barsky 1994: 4).
Adaptations to the stories we came across were related to motives for
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asylum, one’s country of origin, or ethnicity. Age also turned out to be
a vital variable in the asylum procedure: unaccompanied minors, for
example, get special protection. Another important factor was fear of
deportation: without proof of identity, it is hard to deport people back
to their countries of origin. Sometimes migrants said they had an offi-
cial story that they used for asylum application, but when talking to us
admitted that the official and the unofficial stories had gotten confused
in their heads. In other cases, it was more difficult to judge the veracity
of the story told. When a story does not seem totally reliable it is chal-
lenging to know how to take the reported information into considera-
tion. Of course there is no clear-cut solution to this, but when analys-
ing data, a researcher can take into consideration the context in which
information was provided, as well as the interview’s circumstances and
the interviewee’s surrounding intentions or expectations.
3.7 Ethical considerations
The complexities of researching private lives and publicising the results
of such research raises ethical issues which cannot be easily solved by
applying a rigid set of rules and guidelines (Bilger & Van Liempt
2006). Standard interview rules like guaranteeing anonymity, confi-
dentiality, and honesty were upheld throughout the entire interview
process – from the moment a person was contacted until the time the
details of a case were made public. No real names were used, and
when life stories were so idiosyncratic that revealing certain details
could reveal the identity of the person involved, circumstances were
changed. Special ethical issues must be contended with when inter-
viewing asylum seekers whose aim is to publicly conceal their identity,
either because details do not match the asylum proceedings, or because
they have made use of ‘illegal’ methods to secure their status.
First of all, the ethical code of ‘minimising harm’ and ‘maximising
benefits’ vis-à-vis subjects was crucial in our research of smuggled mi-
grants. It was acknowledged that conducting an interview with a
smuggled migrant could automatically turn the researcher into a ‘se-
cret holder’, in possession of information that could be harmful for the
respondent, sometimes without even being aware of it. This type of re-
search therefore demands active involvement from the researchers’
side. However, it must be acknowledged that being overprotective can
also be interpreted as a lack of respect for dignity. We tried to avoid si-
tuations that made people felt obliged to talk to us, instead endeavour-
ing to create an open atmosphere that allowed people to refuse partici-
pation if they did not feel comfortable.
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Secondly, in cases where we deemed the story untrue – because the
details provided were too bogus – we had to be very careful in present-
ing such a story to the public. Revealing ‘lies’ could not only harm the
individual, but more generally, it could also affect a whole group and
reinforce stereotypes. Researchers working in the field of marginalised
people should be careful not to misuse their power. Nevertheless, ac-
cepting constructed identities as ‘real’ without critically analysing them
does not do justice to ‘reality’. When it comes to analysing data, it is
very important to be aware of the specific political arena in which
smuggled migrants, and especially asylum seekers, operate, and to ask
why people sometimes present themselves in a certain way.
Thirdly, there was the question of whether it was ethical to request a
person to recall painful events, seeing as this could touch upon or
reopen psychological wounds24. Sometimes painful memories were
triggered during the interview. The open and flexible nature of our in-
terviews was helpful in this regard, and generally made for very effec-
tive methodology. Some migrants wanted to talk, while others clearly
wished to avoid certain topics. Malkki (1995) argues that building trust
may be related to the researcher’s willingness to leave some stones
unturned, at first, thereby learning not to ask further when probing is
a technique we used was starting the interview with more neutral ques-
tions, so as to avoid immediately addressing potentially traumatic
experiences. When people wanted to talk on their own accord, or when
they were sometimes prompted to talk by others, the researcher’s role
ran the risk of being interfered with. An interview can have a profound
effect on the respondent, who perhaps has never relayed some such
accounts before. During the 20 interviews that I myself conducted, I
also questioned my own motives: why further bother these people who
have so much trouble on their mind? Another ethical dilemma I faced
was what to do when confronted with injustice and/or exploitation.
People sometimes told me stories about how they were cheated by law-
yers, exploited by their employers, or as in one case, betrayed by a so-
cial worker. In turn, I tried to advise migrants on how to best handle
their situations, even though I myself could have reported the wrong-
doers to the police – though at the risk of also putting my respondents
in danger.
Conclusion
Interviews within a difficult context, such as among smuggled immi-
grants, raises a specific set of methodological issues. Smuggled mi-
grants often experience difficult travel and unpleasant confrontations
with authorities, all of which can have a very concrete impact on the
stories they later tell to researchers. An understanding of these pre-
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vious experiences can help interpret the collected data. The biographi-
cal method is useful in the effort to understand the underlying reasons
people may provide a certain story. Collecting people’s lifestories makes
it possible to better grasp the context in which life’s decisions are
made. This was a vital tool for comprehending such a complex phe-
nomenon as human smuggling. Working with research assistants who
have had their own migration experiences and come from the same re-
gions as the research subjects meant that I could discuss the interviews
with them, and therefore actively involve them in the process of data
analysis.
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4 Structural conditions and individual choices
This chapter will focus on the underlying causes of human smuggling.
A lot of work has already been done on people’s reasons for migrating,
but when it comes to irregular migration and human smuggling, over-
emphasised is the side of the receiving country and the consequences
of migration, rather than its causes. However, individual stories show
how a knowledge of the circumstances prompting people to leave
everything behind is essential in understanding the decisions migrants
make and the situations they end up in. To better understand the con-
text in which our respondents made their decision to migrate, this
chapter presents a brief description of the histories and political situa-
tions of the countries where they originated. This chapter asks: what
structural conditions in the Horn of Africa, in Iraq, and in the former
Soviet Union make people decide to leave? For this description, I rely
on information provided by the respondents themselves, as well as on
secondary literature. For more in-depth background knowledge on the
selected countries, references are made in the text to relevant literature.
Towards the chapter’s conclusion more attention is devoted to indivi-
dual choices and different forms of capital that shape migrants’ deci-
sion-making processes.
4.1 Why people migrate and categorisations of migrants upon
arrival
Early studies of migration often discussed migration in macro terms,
in which the masses were represented as being guided by clear-cut mo-
tivations. The distinction usually made between voluntary and involun-
tary migration (Kunz 1973) follows migration theory’s general econom-
ic-political division. Voluntary, economic migrants are considered free
to make decisions, whereas forced migrants are seen as being pro-
pelled around the world by external forces. Involuntary types of move-
ment are understood to be more about minimising risks, rather than
maximising utility. Kunz (1973) defined voluntary migrants as those
who are attracted by pull factors and involuntary migrants as those
who are pushed away: It is the reluctance to uproot oneself, and the ab-
sence of positive original motivations to settle elsewhere, which charac-
terizes all refugee decisions and distinguishes the refugee from the vo-
luntary migrants (Kunz 1973: 130).
Economic hardship, poverty, and the lack of work opportunities are
believed to produce economic migrants, while political violence, hu-
man rights violations, and war produce refugees. In reality, it is more
often a combination of motives that finally leads to the decision to mi-
grate. The degree of choice people have differs. No doubt the decision
to migrate is harder to make under conditions of extreme stress, but
‘forced’ migrants also actively make choices regarding migration. As
Van Hear observes, almost all migration involves some compulsion, as
well as some choices, so that forced migrants make choices, albeit
within a narrower range of possibilities (1998: 42). Thus, the same de-
cision-making process is at hand for economic migrants as for political
asylum seekers. In reality, there exists a continuum that is anchored
on one side by those who have some freedom of choice – whether,
when, and where to move – and on the other, by those who see no
other option than to migrate and have little to say in the process. Invo-
luntary migration is therefore an extreme situation in which the deci-
sion to leave is more self-evident, but the need to decide when and
where to move nonetheless exists.
Richmond (1993) looks in more detail at the category of forced mi-
grants and proposes a multivariate model that includes the wider social
context in which decisions are made. He emphasises a distinction be-
tween proactive and reactive migrants. Proactive migrants are suffi-
ciently tied to the political arena and are able to anticipate political dis-
asters. They have the resources to flee their country of origin before
the outbreak of large-scale political violence, and they can collect infor-
mation before they move. By contrast, reactive migrants merely re-
spond to political violence once it erupts. They make decisions in a
state of panic, during a crisis that leaves few alternatives but to escape.
Ironically, reactive migrants most often flee at a time when mobility is
restricted, which further constrains their decisions. Zolberg et al.
(1989) also identify different categories of refugees by looking at the
cause of their departures in a wider context. The first classification is
that of ‘the refugee as an activist’. Refugees are usually part of the con-
flict that compels them to flee. The second classification is ‘the refugee
as a target’. Such a migrant belongs to a certain ethnic minority that
has been identified as a political target. The third classification is ‘the
refugee as a mere victim’, which covers people displaced by societal or
international violence that is not personally aimed at them, but still
challenges their lives. All such categorisations show that there are dif-
ferent types, perceptions, and capacities with which to respond to these
(perceptions of) conflicts.
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Individual capacities for responding to conflicts also can change dur-
ing the process of migration. Migrants might have a limited degree of
choice regarding where to go and when to move, because they may, for
example, only have access to one specific smuggler who can only bring
them to one specific place. Or, other migrants may find themselves in
a better position once they are in a neighbouring country where they
can more peaceably rethink their migration decision. This dynamic
character of the process of migration will be central throughout this re-
search.
The ‘real’ refugee
The legal discourse surrounding refugees may, much like the static ca-
tegorisations set up by researchers, limit an understanding of what mo-
tivates people to migrate. As explained in chapter one, the legal defini-
tion of who exactly a refugee is was established in the Geneva Conven-
tion in 1951. If one can demonstrate a ‘well-founded fear’ based upon
one of the Convention’s five grounds – race, religion, nationality, mem-
bership of a particular social group, or political opinion – one can ac-
quire refugee status. Other forms of violence are not reflected in the
‘refugee’ definition. The emphasis on ‘well-founded fear’ paradoxically
implies that one must prove individual persecution. But, in practice,
there is rarely enough time to ascertain and classify individual stories.
Moreover, there is a tendency to treat individual asylum cases as be-
longing to groups. As Tuitt argues, the general consensus on the sub-
jective notion of ‘well-founded fear’ has gradually transformed, in prac-
tice, into a group-wide determination based upon an assessment of the
country from which the refugee claims asylum (1996: 83). If an asy-
lum seeker does not fit the Geneva Convention criteria, he or she can
try to rely upon the state’s humanitarian considerations and/or other
forms of exception, such as protection against refoulement. But the out-
come usually depends on the state’s good will.
Thinking in rigid categorisation schemes neglects the possibility that
people may fit several categories at the same time. Without overlooking
the fact that refugees are in need of special protection, it ought to be
stressed that the distinction between forced and voluntary migration is,
in reality, not so easily made. Take the story of Shiela, who comes from
Sierra Leone. At the time of our interview, she had just arrived in the
Netherlands. Her asylum application was processed in the accelerated
48-hour procedure and had resulted in a negative answer. Shiela was
very concerned about her future while I talked to her. In Sierra Leone,
rebels had kidnapped her after having killed her brother and her father.
She was taken into the bush and forced to have sex with several men.
She also had a miscarriage because of this brute violence. One day, she
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managed to escape from the bush. When Sheila came back to her vil-
lage, however, nobody wanted to speak to her because she had been af-
filiated with the rebels. She then decided to go to the country’s capital
city of Freetown, where her aunt lived. In a hotel25, she met a Dutch
man offering her a ‘safe and prosperous future’ and a trip to Europe.
Together they flew to the Netherlands. He had documents for her and
negotiated with the customs workers, thereby making the journey rela-
tively comfortable. However, upon arrival in the Netherlands he locked
Shiela up in his house and forced her to have sex with him. For thir-
teen days, Sheila could not leave the house. When she found out that
this man wanted to ‘put her behind the window’ (that is, to work in
prostitution), she escaped. Sheila went to the police and asked for poli-
tical asylum.
The interview I had at Rijsbergen [reception centre] was horri-
ble, because they didn’t listen to me; they did not even want to
know my story. They told me: ‘That is not interesting, that is not
interesting for us...’ I didn’t understand, they wanted to know
why I was here, but they did not even listen. Then they asked
me if I wanted to testify against this man, but I did not want
that – he helped me to escape from a terrible place, Sierra
Leone. What happened to me in the bush was worse than what
happened to me here. And I was lucky. I escaped at the right
moment. So I did not want to turn him in.
The violence Shiela faced in the bush and the subsequent rejection
from her family was not sufficient grounds for political asylum. More-
over, because Sheila refused to testify against her trafficker – since she
did not perceive this man as a criminal – she could not fit into the cate-
gorical box of trafficking ‘victim’. Sheila wanted to be recognised for
the cruelties that had happened to her in Sierra Leone, but her case
was only evaluated from the perspective at receiving end. Now Sheila
lives in ‘illegality’ in the Netherlands, without any social or legal protec-
tions at all.
Indeed, a simplistic view of who is a refugee and who is not can
have severe consequences. First and foremost, it is dehumanising to re-
duce refugees to categorisations labelled ‘real’ or ‘bogus’, all the while
ignoring specific and individual circumstances. And secondly, simplis-
tic views do not contribute to further understanding of how processes
of migration evolve. Migrants can be pushed by certain motives while
being pulled by others. Or they may be labelled – or present them-
selves – as belonging to another category. Such complexities are over-
looked when only a rigid legal distinction is adopted.
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The ‘tourist’
Examples of self-presentation as a certain type of immigrant are clearly
apparent in the interviews conducted in this study, particularly stories
from the former Soviet Union. Most respondents revealed that they
had migrated to work abroad, but entered the country as ‘tourists’. For
example, Anna, a Russian woman from Donetsk, Ukraine, entered the
Netherlands as a tourist, but she was actually meeting up with her boy-
friend Boris for their joint intention of finding work. Because neither
had relatives abroad who could help them along in their migration pro-
cess, they decided to travel as ‘tourists’. The process of finding the right
details for a story to get a tourist visa can demand a lot of effort, time,
and money. When Anna wanted to join Boris, she tried to obtain a visa
through an agency, but things did not work out as planned.
I decided to go to the same agency as Boris had. It was in Kiev.
One day I went there with my suitcase, ready to leave. I had al-
ready made a reservation for the bus to Germany, for the next
day. But when I went to the agency to pick up my passport with
the visa in it (hoping it wouldn’t be a problem, just as it had not
been for Boris) I found out that my visa was rejected! This was a
real shock for me. I really did not expect this could happen. I
had already quit my job and told everybody that I was leaving
for the Netherlands. The lady at the agency promised me I could
try again, but she needed time for that, and I did not want to
stay in Kiev waiting. I had to cancel my reservation for the bus
and go back home, to Donetsk. The same evening I saw an ad-
vertisement in the newspaper of an agency in my own city that
offered a Schengen visa through Germany. I then decided to try
it again. The next morning I called the agency in Kiev to send
all my paperwork back. They sent it via someone travelling by
train and I brought the papers to the agency in Donetsk. I was
just on time because they were going to bring the applications
to the German consulate in Kiev that same day.
In order to apply for a Schengen visa26 Anna needed a short autobio-
graphy stating her marital status, the reason for travel, and her salary.
A woman working at the agency asked Anna whether she had a docu-
ment proving where she worked and indicating her income. The rule
was that a prospective traveller had to earn at least US $ 450 a month.
Upon applying the first time (in Kiev), Anna had brought a false docu-
ment stating that she worked as a secretary at a firm, because her ac-
tual income did not meet the minimum requirement to obtain the visa.
She thought she would use that document again, but the woman from
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the travel agency in Donetsk told her that such certificates were not
good enough. The woman said could make better, more believable
ones, but they would cost US $ 10 each. Anna agreed, and the docu-
ment was made in front of her as she waited. The woman typed some-
thing into her computer and printed out a document with the firm’s
logo and details. She then signed and stamped it. But the woman then
looked at Anna doubtfully, noting that she was too young, not to men-
tion unmarried, which would make it more difficult to get a visa. She
checked the records of the people she was processing visa applications
for, to find an older couple in the group whom she believed Anna was
young enough to pass as the daughter of. Thus, the story emerged:
Anna was travelling with her parents, the older couple on whose appli-
cation form the woman cross-referenced as having a daughter. She
then made a copy of Anna’s national passport and drew a stamp on it,
stating she was married. On another page she wrote down that Anna
had a baby of several months old. Being married and having a baby
would guarantee her return, she told Anna. The visa itself cost Anna
about US $ 250, plus she had to pay approximately US $ 30 for the ex-
tra papers. She could pick up her visa within two weeks. All she had
left to do was buy her ticket to Cologne (which cost US $ 270 includ-
ing the cost of a return ticket purchased to prevent any suspicion of
overstaying by immigration) and finally she could go. From Germany,
she travelled on her own to the Netherlands. Anna and Boris both have
overstayed their visas, now working and living ‘illegally’ in the Nether-
lands.
4.2 Structural conditions for people coming from the Horn of
Africa
In 1869, when Italy acquired territory in the Horn of Africa27 it devel-
oped what was to become the colony of Eritrea. In 1885, the French
moved into the area around the port of Djibouti (later called French So-
maliland), and Britain took a slice of Somaliland (it already held Ye-
men’s nearby port of Aden). In Ethiopia, Emperor Menelik was able to
resist all colonial violence, meaning that Ethiopia was just one of the
two African states (the other being Liberia) that did not fall under Eur-
opean imperial control. The way the colonial map of Africa was drawn
had severe repercussions for Somalia. After the drawing of the new
map, the largest Somali-inhabited area was ruled by Italy, while Soma-
lis to the extreme south now lived in Kenya, and those in the west in-
habited parts of Ethiopia. When President Siyaad Barre came to power
in Somalia, in 1969, he encouraged pan-Somali aspirations to unite
the country’s nationals living throughout the five different countries
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comprising the Horn of Africa. In the beginning, there was no opposi-
tion to his ideas, but as growing corruption and the uneven distribu-
tion of national resources took a toll on the economy, opposition grew.
Siyaad Barre’s repressive regime and how the Somali nation fell apart
After Somalia’s war with Ethiopia over the legitimacy of their border
(from 1977 to 1978), President Siyaad Barre lost the support of his peo-
ple. This war is also called the Ogaden War, because it generated an in-
flux into Somalia of hundreds of thousands of Ogadeni people (ethnic
Somalis who were Ethiopian nationals). After the Ogaden war Siyaad
Barre’s regime turned into a true dictatorship. Conditions in Somalia
worsened and tensions among ethnic groups28 increased. The first ten
Somali asylum seekers in the Netherlands arrived in 1984 because of
Siyaad Barre’s repressive regime (Van den Reek & Hussein 2003). One
of our respondents was among this first group of asylum seekers in
the Netherlands and he explained his situation:
Because we lived in Mogadishu and belonged to the Haviye clan
– as did almost 75 per cent [of the population] around Moga-
dishu – we had a problem. The government, including Siyaad
Barre himself, belonged to the Darod clan and there was a con-
flict between these two clans. So basically, we had to decide
whether we wanted to participate in this war or leave the coun-
try. We choose the second option, even though it was not easy
for us at all to leave our country.
In 1988, the Somali and Ethiopian governments signed a peace accord
that recognised Ethiopian control over the Haud areas, forcing a large
number of Somali refugees to go back to Somalia. When the Somali
National Movement (a clan-based resistance movement founded in
London in 1981) attacked the biggest cities in the north-west of Soma-
lia, the government countered with assaults on the local population. A
civil war broke out (Lewis 1994: 177-219 in Kleist 2004) and many peo-
ple fled to Ethiopia. For a long time, the conflict in Somalia was con-
sidered an internal matter. Though relief agencies were alarmed by the
situation in Somalia in 1990 and 1991, the international community
turned a deaf ear. When the longstanding President Barre was over-
thrown in 1991, the Somali nation-state fell apart, divided along ethnic
lines. This resulted in two more civil wars: one in 1992, the other last-
ing from 1994 until 1996. Many Somalis were killed in these wars;
others were able to flee the country. Currently, a quarter of Somalis are
believed to be living outside their country of origin (Al-Sharmani
2004).
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The Somali community in the Netherlands grew rapidly after the So-
mali nation fell apart in 1991. Most of the Somalis we interviewed had
left their country between 1990 and 1995, when the violence erupted.
Consequences of the war, such as lack of education and employment
opportunities and, more generally, the impossibility of building a fu-
ture in Somalia, also played a role in migrational decision-making pro-
cesses. Usually after a stay in a refugee camp in Kenya, Djibouti, or
Ethiopia, our respondents managed to continue their journey to Eur-
ope. The Somalis we interviewed did not come through official chan-
nels, such as resettlement through UNHCR. Small, carefully identified
groups who are perceived as being most vulnerable can officially apply
for resettlement. Women and children, for example, can opt for reset-
tlement more easily than single men. Horst (2003) points to the fact
that resettlement is only a possibility for the lucky few, and most peo-
ple must use means other than the UNHCR procedure. Apart from
not falling under the category of the most vulnerable, sometimes mi-
grants do not want to contact UNHCR. They may not be willing to wait
for official procedures because they feel unsafe in the camps. Some
may fear having their claim rejected only to be deported back to their
country of origin where they are not safe. Others may believe that
UNHCR shares case information with the authorities in their country
of origin. Still others do not want to register with UNHCR because
their aim is rather to reach a specific settlement country. They plan to
seek asylum directly, after arriving through irregular channels (Chate-
lard 2002:12). These spontaneous asylum seekers very often need
smugglers to reach their destination.
The Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict
Eritrea has had a long colonial history with Italy, which formed a basis
for Eritrean separatism from Ethiopia. Ethiopia referred to its repeated
attempts to gain territory in Eritrea as a recolonisation. In 1958, a hand-
ful of Muslim exiles in Cairo, committed to armed struggle, launched
the Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELF) (Zolberg 1989). Later, from
ELF, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) was formed. During
the war for independence, many Ethiopians and Eritreans were driven
into Sudan. When a famine struck the area in 1984, there was an even
larger influx of Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees into Sudan. It was then
that the Horn of Africa began to be recognised as a region of famine,
not least because the 1984 and 1985 famines of northern Ethiopia and
northern Sudan were put on the agenda of Bob Geldof’s Save the Chil-
dren campaign29.
EPLF led the 30-year war for Eritrean independence, and in 1991,
Ethiopian armed forces were defeated, and Eritrea gained its indepen-
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dence. One of our female Eritrean respondents was an EPLF front
fighter, and according to her, there were more women in positions like
her own30. Today, the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ)
– the core of an earlier EPLF that had split off from the government in
1994 – is the country’s sole political party. But the war between Ethio-
pia and Eritrea was not solved in 1991, and the struggle for power con-
tinues. In 1998, Eritrea again plunged into a disastrous new conflict
with Ethiopia over their 1,000-kilometre border.
One of our respondents was living testament to the situation. Ema-
nuel was born and raised in Ethiopia, with parents who came from Eri-
trea. In 1998, the Ethiopian government, with its newly defined bor-
ders, forced Emanuel’s entire family to return to Eritrea. They could
not bring anything with them, as their Ethiopian bank account was un-
der state control and the government confiscated their house, car, and
garage, among other property. At this point, Emanuel decided to leave
the country. He explained:
My parents and my brother are now in Eritrea. They live in a
smaller place and are supported by friends and by one of my
brothers, who lives in the United States now. When I think
about it, it makes me sick. I consider myself as an Ethiopian liv-
ing in exile. I don’t know any street or square in Eritrea. I don’t
even know what Asmara, the capital, looks like. I do not want to
be a victim of a struggle over power. It is a dirty game they are
playing and, on top of that, there are only few people in the
world who know about the existence of this game.
Arbitration by a boundary commission in The Hague was appointed to
settle the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict, but the symbolically significant Ti-
grinya village of Badme has obstructed the decision-making process
when it comes to defining exact borders. War seems likely again (Jac-
quin-Berdal & Plaut 2005).
For further literature on the history of the Horn of Africa see for exam-
ple Lewis (1988), Gebreyesus (1993), Marcus (1994), Woodward (1996).
4.3 Structural conditions for people coming from Iraq
Most of the Iraqi refugees we interviewed in the Netherlands were
Kurds. Kurds are scattered over Iran, Syria, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and
Iraq. Their total population is estimated to be around 30 million and
the majority, estimated at approximately fifteen million, lives in Turkey
(Cornillie & Declercq 2003). Until the end of the First World War, most
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Kurds were part of the Ottoman Turkish Empire, which ruled large
parts of the Middle East. During the First World War, however, the Brit-
ish made plans to divide the Turkish Ottoman Empire with their allies,
France and Russia. The Arab provinces would be allotted to France and
Britain, and Armenian and Kurdish areas to Russia. Russia, however,
retracted their involvement due to concerns over their own country’s
state of affairs vis-à-vis the Bolshevik Revolution. After the First World
War, the British decided to take over three Ottoman provinces: Mosul,
Baghdad, and Basra. These provinces would later come to form Iraq.
Largely against their own will, the Kurds found themselves now living
in a state with a predominantly Arab population. In Iraq most Kurds
live in the northern mountainous area and are Sunni Muslims (Cornil-
lie & Declercq 2003).
The Treaty of Sèvres (signed in 1920) theoretically allowed for the
foundation of a Kurdish state, but when in 1923, Mustafa Kemal ‘Ata-
türk’ and his nationalists replaced the Ottoman sultan to gain power in
Turkey, the Treaty of Sèvres was updated with a new version. This
Treaty of Lausanne made no provisions for Kurdish independency.
With the new Republic of Turkey at hand, Kurdish rights diminished,
and the Kurdish language was officially banned. International emigra-
tion among Kurds started just before the Second World War. At first,
this still small number of Kurds was mainly active in Kurdish cultural
and political activities, therefore being directly threatened by bans on
the Kurdish tradition. In 1946, the Kurds declared an autonomic Kurd-
ish republic, Mahabad with the support of the Soviet Union. But the re-
public only existed for one year, because the British and the Americans
saw Iraq as a pawn in their own struggle against the Soviet Union and
supported Iraq’s fight against the Kurds. Between 1945 and 1965, the
first Iraqi Kurds came to study in Western and Eastern Europe. Then
in 1968, a faction within the Ba’ath Party, with Saddam Hussein at its
top, conducted a coup. The party’s main goal was to create a new Iraqi
society by spreading the so-called ‘eternal message’ of pan-Arabism. At
this time, the international emigration of Kurds increased.
The 1974 war and the Black Day in Kurdish resistance
When war broke out in 1974 between Iraq and the Shah of Iran, the
Kurdish Peshmerga (resistance army) gained considerable support
from Iran in their fight against the Iraqi government. In 1975, Iran
suddenly withdrew its support. Beginning in 1973, Iraq had nationa-
lised its oil with consequently high profits, thus deciding to hand over
an oil-rich part of the Arab Gulf to Iran. This day is often referred to as
the ‘Black Day’ in Kurdish resistance because, from that moment on,
all previous resistance seemed futile. The first hundred Iraqi refugees
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in the Netherlands came as a result of this war between Iraq and Iran.
The Western media, however, largely ignored the Kurdish side of the
war, because Iraq was seen as an ally to the West rather than as a refu-
gee-producing country.31
After this Black Day, the Kurdish political movement split into two
parties: the conservative, more traditional Kurds supported the KDP
(Kurdistan Democracy Party) with Massoud Barzani as its leader, while
modern left-wing intellectuals, mainly coming from urban areas, sup-
ported the PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) with Jalal Talabani as its
leader. This internal division led to problematic relations between the
two parties. On top of that, the Ba’ath Party’s ambitious Saddam Hus-
sein ousted President Ahmad Hasan Al Bakr and rose to power in
1979. With this move, the nation was suddenly under the absolute rule
of a dictator. The Ba’ath regime practised different forms of brutal poli-
cies against people who did not join or support the Party, and surveil-
lance became a crucial factor of control. The Mukhabarat and the
Amen (the intelligence service) monitored citizens. Torture, disappear-
ance, and murder of political dissidents became a daily reality. During
this period, many Kurdish villages were destroyed and numerous peo-
ple murdered.
The First and Second Gulf Wars
When Iraq invaded Iran in 1980, Kurdish people deserted the army en
masse, seeing as the chances were high that they would have to fight
against their own people. The Iraqi army attacked not only Iran in this
First Gulf War, but also Kurdish soil. The Iraqis used chemical weap-
ons and many Kurdish villages were destroyed. The villagers were de-
ported to concentration camps, where the men were executed and wo-
men and children deported to other parts of Iraq (McDowall 1996). At
this time, many Kurds from Iraq left for Turkey or Iran, or went even
farther away, to the West. The refugee stream increased, reaching its
highest point in 1988 when in March, the city of Halabja was comple-
tely destroyed. In August, the Ba’th regime announced the Anfal cam-
paign32, also referred to as the Kurdish Guernica, which led to thou-
sands of deaths (Cornillie & Declercq 2003).
After this war, rather than focusing on alleviating the hardship of
the Iraqi citizens, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait and the Second
Gulf War began (from 1990 until 1991). His short-term agenda was to
solve economic problems by confiscating Kuwaiti oil, but there was an-
other long-term agenda behind this invasion, namely to change the
landlocked position of Iraq by annexing Kuwait as Iraq’s nineteenth
province. Iraqis have had to suffer two major wars in less than ten
years. Additionally, many nationals have had close relations to people
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in the countries with which Iraq has been at war. The American sup-
port of Kuwait and Operation Desert Storm finally led to the defeat of
Iraq in 1991. However, the US left the Ba’ath regime and Saddam Hus-
sein to stay in power. Immediately after the Second Gulf War, refugees
started to flee the country as failed uprisings against Saddam Hussein
by the Kurds and Shiites33 were met by repression and ongoing human
rights violations. The majority of Iraqis living abroad as refugees or (re-
jected) asylum seekers had fled their country during the Second Gulf
War or in the following decade.
In 1991, the international community installed a safe haven in the
north of Iraq. Its aim was to give humanitarian aid and provide secur-
ity for the Kurdish people. It was thought that the refugee flows would
soon thereafter decrease, but contrary to what was expected, the situa-
tion did not improve and the Kurdish region was isolated. The area
could now only be reached over land via Syria, Iran, or Turkey. More-
over, the UN sanctions against Iraq, combined with the fact that Sad-
dam Hussein had stopped all trade with the Kurdish area, worsened
the conditions. Poverty hit the area. Many people had no assurance,
either of physical security or ways to sustain their livelihoods. An addi-
tional factor propelling people to leave Iraq was the KDP’s and the
PUK’s total failure in stabilising the region. They had instead started to
fight amongst themselves. Moreover, Islamic parties and organisations
still tried to persuade Kurdish people to join them; many of our re-
spondents reported having been threatened by such parties.
One tragic example of these threats comes from an Armenian family
who lived in Northern Iraq, along the border with Turkey. To get to
their new home in the Netherlands where I interviewed them, I had to
pass through the fence of a large Catholic church before coming to
their tiny tree-surrounded house in the backyard. The Armenian family
had found a place to live through the help of an NGO that helps re-
jected asylum seekers or those still in the application process but with-
out governmental support34. When I entered the house, I saw only one
room and a very small kitchen for four people. Despite the poor condi-
tions, the table was laid out with food, the atmosphere warm and wel-
coming. The father of the family started to tell me about their situation
back in Iraq, and a friend, who was there with us, translated his words
for me.
We had to leave our country because an Islamic group wanted
our oldest son to join them. They approached him in a shop. But
he refused. Three days later, they approached him again. But this
time they took him with them in a car. And outside the city, in an
open field, they shot him. The boy was only twenty-one.
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The mother, crying while her husband relayed the horrible incident,
held her hands in front of her eyes and placed a wet napkin around
her head. She told me she suffered from terrible headaches; she then
retched, and told me that she felt sick. After a couple of minutes she
recovered; apparently such occurrences were not unusual because her
husband and children explained to me that her recovery process does
not take long, as though they knew what to expect. When the mother
started talking again, she explained to me that she knew exactly what
had happened to her son. Even though, according to the police, there
was no evidence, she knew who had done this to her son. She had even
written a letter to the government; however, after the letter was sent,
the situation only worsened. The Islamic group then came to visit their
home and started to threaten the other children (a nine-year-old boy
and his seven-year-old sister). A family friend helped them escape the
country. Now they live in the Netherlands, yet their future is again very
uncertain.
The war on terror
The attacks in New York, Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania on 9/11
have put Iraq back on the international agenda. In January 2002, US
President George W. Bush declared his intention to attack Iraq and the
other countries that he referred to as an ‘axis of evil’. Convinced that
Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction, the American president
invaded Iraq. Saddam Hussein was captured on 14 December 2003. It
was expected that more refugees would come to Europe after this inva-
sion, but asylum requests from Iraq have only increased slightly. Ac-
cording to Dutch authorities, this increase was not caused by newco-
mers, but by the repeated requests of those already in the country who,
as a result of the war, had new motives and therefore renewed chances
for gaining refugee status (DNRI 2005: 12). The great majority of those
who have left Iraq appear to have remained in neighbouring countries
such as Jordan and Syria, and to a lesser extent, Lebanon (www.global-
policy.org/security/issues/iraq/attack/consequences/2005/0927new-
guidelines.htm).
For further literature on Kurdish history see for example: Van Bruines-
sen (1992), Cornillie & Declercq (2003), Kreyenbroek & Stefan (1992),
McDowall (1996), and Wahlbeck (1999).
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4.4 Structural conditions for people coming from the former
Soviet Union
In the Soviet period, movement outside the Eastern Bloc was assumed
to be for purposes of trade or profession, rather than personal or hu-
manitarian motivations. This selection limited travel to people with
diplomatic, business, or cultural interests, leading to strict control over
the departure of most citizens. Borders were sealed and there was an
absence in the granting of entitlements for international passports35.
Those citizens who managed to travel abroad were normally issued a
temporary foreign passport. The first group of international emigrants
from the Soviet Union were asylum seekers who faced persecution be-
fore and after the Russian Revolution of 1917. The second period of in-
ternational migration began after the collapse of the Nazi regime at the
end of the Second World War, predominantly involving ethnic Ger-
mans. The third wave started in the 1970s, in a period of relative calm
between the Soviet Union and Europe; it consisted mostly of ethnic
Jews who left for Israel, the US, Canada, Australia, and Western Eur-
ope (Doomernik 1997). In the early to mid-1980s, a few hundred Rus-
sian Jews joined the Amsterdam Jewish community (Snel et al. 2000).
Perestroika and the opening of borders
It was not until Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the late 1980s
that emigration gained ground for new possibilities. The severe pass-
port restrictions were openly criticised under the new regime, and in
1986, the first agreements to simplify border procedures were started
with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Hungary. Day-passes were
given and more crossing points were opened (Matthews 1993). Finally,
the end of the Cold War in 1989 further opened the border for many
people wishing to leave despair back in their home country.
Economic and cultural motives for migration
After the collapse of the communist regime, the Russian economy was
completely devastated. Most of the Soviet successor states were charac-
terised by serious economic problems. Even people with relatively good
educations were confronted by economic hardship. Alex from Ukraine,
for instance, had a good position in a well-known hospital, but still
faced financial difficulties. He decided to migrate to the Netherlands to
earn extra income, and at the time of the interview, he was a worker in
the flower bulb fields. Apart from economic strife, Alex also cited the
Russian mentality as something that restricted him in many ways. His
hardships, he explained, were not only the result of a low-paying salary,
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but because he refused to take bribes, a commonplace practice in the
hospital where he worked. For Alex, economic motivations for migra-
tion were thus combined with frustrations about corruption. Another
respondent from Ukraine also touched upon economic and cultural
reasons to explain why he came to the Netherlands.
I just didn’t see any future for me there. I could never save
money, as I had to spend everything I earned. Besides, I knew
some people who graduated from the same university as I did
and had no perspective for a good job or whatsoever. They were
doing the same job for years without seeing any changes. I be-
came very depressed when I thought about that… I also felt op-
pressed by the government: everybody tells you what to do, how
to live, how to work, how to raise your children. That was mak-
ing me sick. I had the feeling there was no space for me in Uk-
rainian society.
A general lack of hope for the future was something most of our re-
spondents from the former Soviet Union mentioned. The new eco-
nomic structure after the collapse of the Soviet Union had an especially
profound effect on women. Socialist ideology always had proclaimed
the equality of men and women. Consequently, most women were full
participants in the economy, and care for their children was always
guaranteed. The collapse of the communist regime, however, led to
mass unemployment, particularly among women, who were often the
first at work to be fired. In this context, then, it is unsurprising that
the majority of the migrants in the Netherlands originating from the
former Soviet Union are women. For women, it is relatively easy to mi-
grate if they should choose to marry Western men. Such women usual-
ly refer to cultural, rather than economic, reasons when asked about
their decision to migrate. They might make statements such as: ‘Wes-
tern men are faithful, kind to their wives, and good-looking.’
Gender discrimination, in the form of limiting women’s rights, sti-
pulating their working conditions, and perpetuating patriarchal tradi-
tions does not only lead to more female migration, it also places wo-
men at a higher risk of being vulnerable to trafficking. After the col-
lapse of the communist regime, sexually exploitative trafficking from
the former Soviet states became a booming business. The countries of
the former Soviet Union are presently the main source to provide the
Dutch sex industry with women (Bruinsma & Meershoek 1999; NRM,
2002; 2004; Vocks & Nijboer 1999).
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Political and ecological reasons for migration
Apart from economic and cultural reasons for migration, political and
ecological aspects of society also played a role in our respondents’ deci-
sions to migrate. In 1991, when the Soviet Union dissolved36, it be-
came clearly visible that communism had always held many different
people together, even if artificially. Many of the newly created states
were now torn apart by internal struggles. As Brubaker (1992) formu-
lates:
The break-up of the Soviet Union has transformed yesterday’s
internal migrants, secure in their Soviet citizenship, into today’s
international migrants of contested legitimacy and uncertain
membership. (269)
Nationalism and inter-ethnic conflicts generally exploded across many
former Soviet states. As a consequence of these internal struggles, with
their increasingly anti-Semitic tendencies (Doomernik 1997: 1), many
people emigrated. In the beginning of the 1990s, the Netherlands was
confronted with asylum seekers from Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia,
and the Russian Federation (IND 2000b). Another typical problem for
people from Ukraine was the radioactive pollution caused by the Cher-
nobyl disaster of 1986. A woman we interviewed said that she did not
want to give birth in her own country, as fears of related health pro-
blems were still prevalent there.
For further literature on the history of the former Soviet Union see for
example Doomernik (1997), Matthews (1993), Shelley (2003), Kopnina
(2005).
4.5 Who migrates in an irregular way?
According to Lee (1966), the decision to migrate is determined by fac-
tors associated with the area of origin, the destination, intervening ob-
stacles (such as distance, physical barriers, immigration laws), as well
as by personal factors. It is common knowledge that there are people
who will not easily move. They do not like the idea of going abroad.
Sentimental considerations bind them to their trusted environments,
where they are provided a certain sense of security and belonging.
Most people throughout the world need compelling reasons to leave
their homes. Because we conducted our research in the Netherlands,
we could not investigate the reasons people had for not migrating. A
story of an Ethiopian man we interviewed, however, illustrates how dif-
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ficult it was for him to make the decision to migrate, to leave every-
thing behind.
I had obtained a visa that was valid for 30 days, but I only
decided to really leave when the visa had only for three more
days left of being valid. You can’t imagine how hard it was for
me to make this decision. It was so difficult to leave my family
and my Ethiopia. I had been hesitating all the time, but in the
end, there was no alternative. I just had to go.
The picture is more complex for reactive migrants because migration
is not, as it is for proactive migrants, a premeditated option. Reactive
migrants are not in charge of their migratory process in the same way
as proactive migrants. One day they may just come to the conclusion
that they have reached a limit. In this light, a Kurdish man explained
how people with political problems do not have options other than to
leave. He said he would never advise other people to leave home. He il-
lustrated this with the Kurdish proverb Bard la jegai goi sangina, which
can be translated to mean something close to ‘the stone is strongest
where it is’.
On the other hand, there are also people who are more inclined to
migrate because they are enterprising and more willing to see the
world. As Mahler & Pessar (2001) note, agency is not only affected by
extra-personal facts, but also by quintessentially individual characteris-
tics, such as initiative. They also note that agency must include the role
of imagination. Imaging, planning, and strategising influences much
of what people do. Those who already think a lot about migrating and
those who can imagine themselves in a Western country in the near fu-
ture are more likely to eventually migrate.
Moving away from the ‘young single man’ as the stereotypical irregular
migrant
In 1885, Ravenstein was first to note that young, single male adults
characterised the predominate profile of migrants. These people mi-
grated to improve themselves in material respects, though women did
not have the same need to do so. Many studies on migration still focus
solely on the experience of men. The lack of gender-differentiated sta-
tistics reinforces the lack of scholarly interest in the relation between
gender and migration (Kofman et al. 2005). Besides, when women are
brought into the picture, it is implicitly assumed that they migrate for
the same reasons as men. There are, however, gender-specific triggers,
such as patriarchal norms and gender-linked power differences, that si-
multaneously constrain migration and push women away (Cerrutti &
STRUCTURAL CONDITIONS AND INDIVIDUAL CHOICES 89
Massey 2001; Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994; Kofman et al. 2000; Morokva-
sic 1983). For a long time, the labour market structure mainly bene-
fited male migrants. Nowadays, however, there has been an increase in
demand for female labour, mostly in precarious sectors of the economy
including domestic work and sex work. The existence of gender-specific
economic niches for immigrants has produced overwhelmingly gender-
based linkages between certain pairs of countries. In Italy, for instance,
women constitute 85 per cent of the Cape Verdean immigrants, while
men constitute 96 per cent of the Senegalese. Cape Verdean women al-
most always work as domestic workers, while Senegalese men work as
street vendors (Andall 2000, King et al. 1997 in Carling 2005: 2).
When we take a look at refugee flows, the dominance of males is less
obvious. Women and families also escape war-like situations. The as-
sumption that certain risks are more likely to be taken by young and sin-
gle persons (Goss & Paul 1986), therefore, is not entirely true. When it
comes to migrants’ personal activism, a common stereotype is that fe-
male asylum seekers are merely migration’s passive followers; not taken
into account is the possibility that they have been politically active them-
selves or may arrive on their own accord (Spijkerboer 2000).
Who migrates from the Horn of Africa, Iraq, and the former Soviet Union
to the Netherlands?
The Statistics Netherlands (CBS) registers how many immigrants re-
side in the Netherlands. The following statistics reflect those legally re-
siding in the country and includes first and second generations. In
200337, 27,587 Somalis were legally residing in the Netherlands (14,781
males; 12,786 females). In the same year, there were 10,120 Ethiopians
(5,538 males; 4,582 females) and 655 Eritrean (327 males; 328 females)
(CBS 2003). Contradicting general assumptions that men are usually
the pioneers and that families are immobile, we interviewed a number
of families from the Horn of Africa, and sometimes women, alone,
who came with their children. Most of these women saw migration as
an opportunity to secure or improve theirs and their children’s pro-
spects. They explained to us that men were not very involved in this fa-
mily-based decision-making process. A similar pattern of scattered fa-
milies was found among Somali communities in the UK and Denmark
(Kleist 2004).
The Iraqi population in the Netherlands has increased since the
1990s. In 2003, there were 41,959 Iraqis legally residing in the Nether-
lands (24,950 males; 17,009 females) (CBS 2003). This group shows
an overrepresentation of men. When we wanted to interview Iraqi wo-
men, we also found that it was very difficult to locate women who were
smuggled. This was most likely due to the fact that Iraqi refugee wo-
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men do not arrive first, but only follow their husbands later, through
legal channels. A study done on Iraqis in the Netherlands supports this
idea: it states that three quarters of the first arrivals are men initially
travelling by themselves, and are later joined by their wives (Choenni
2002). Women we spoke to from Iraq had all been accompanied by
men along their travel, or at least pretended to have a man awaiting
them, such as in the case of our interviewee who told border authori-
ties that her uncle was waiting for her on other side of the border.
From Iraq, fourteen out of our 24 respondents were single. This con-
trasts with the results of another study done among Iraqis in the Nether-
lands which concludes that 78 per cent of newly arriving asylum seekers
from Iraq are married (Choenni 2002). During fieldwork we heard that
this difference may be the result of some Iraqi refugees having pre-
tended to be married during their asylum interview in order to make
way for the possibility of bringing a prospective wife to the Netherlands.
But these days, the rules have changed; if an individual is married, he or
she must bring his or her spouse to the Netherlands within three
months. Therefore, it is not useful to falsely claim marriage, because
there is no longer the prospect of bringing over someone as a spouse.
More Russian women than men are legally residing in the Nether-
lands. As such, a reverse stereotypical image may be created. In 2003,
39,375 migrants from former Soviet Union38 countries were residing in
the Netherlands:16,677 males and 22,698 females (CBS 2003). As
mentioned before, after the collapse of the Soviet regime, the feminisa-
tion of poverty and a revival in patriarchal traditions took place to con-
strain the freedom of women, especially. This led not only to an in-
crease in Russia’s divorce rate, but also to the organised migration of
women as future wives for men abroad.
The socioeconomic background of migrants
Apart from individual characteristics, such as age, gender, and family
status, the socio-economic background of migrants also plays a role in
selecting who migrates and who does not. Social ties abroad may act as
magnets and produce ‘chain migration’ (Boyd 1989). As a result, those
who have such strong social ties abroad may experience migration in a
very different way than those who do not, as the former group has re-
duced risks and costs in migration. Social ties also increase the antici-
pated net returns of migration because contacts are likely to help mi-
grants find jobs upon arrival.
Half of our respondents had, at the time of the interview, social ties
abroad. But as we will see in the next chapter, not everybody could take
advantage of these connections in their migration process. A distinc-
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tion will be made between general social capital and migration-specific
social capital.
Table 3: Social ties39 of respondents
Social ties abroad No social ties abroad Total
Horn of Africa 13 6 19
Iraq 10 14 24
Former Soviet Union 3 10 13
An important characteristic of social capital is its convertibility: it can
be translated into other social and economic benefits (Bourdieu 1984).
If contacts do not facilitate in the migration process by providing mi-
grants with a social framework, these contacts can still be useful as
sources to lend money for paying smugglers. Most of our respondents
borrowed money from family members to finance their trips, thus con-
verting their social capital into economic capital. Transnational rela-
tions played an important role in this regard. As a Somali respondent
explained to us:
My brother in Italy financially supported me. And I also owned
a lot of gold myself. I had sold everything I possessed, and with
this money I arranged my trip to Europe.
Table 4: Financial help from social ties abroad
Financial help No financial help
Horn of Africa 13 6
Iraq 9 15
Former Soviet Union 1 12
From the Horn of Africa, two-thirds of our respondents were given
money by family members or friends abroad in order to pay their
smuggler. It is interesting to note regional differences in attitudes to-
ward money. Respondents from the former Soviet Union explicitly said
that they did not like incurring debts. Such a statement would indicate
that they were in the position to make decisions about borrowing
money for themselves, that they had less pressing reasons to leave, and
that they were in a financially better position. People relied on different
standards to express their wealth; some measured it according to the
education they attained. One common characteristic of our research po-
pulation is that the majority had a relatively good education. Van den
Tillaart et al. (2000) found that education differs between groups,
though one can generally say that ethnic groups newer to the Nether-
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lands are better educated than groups with longer emigration traditions
(such as Turks and Moroccans).
Table 5: Education level of respondents
Higher education40 No higher education
Horn Africa 11 8
Iraq 15 9
Former Soviet Union 12 1
Apart from education, people also used the ownership of a business as
a standard to express their wealth. Another status marker was the own-
ership of personal property, such as a car or a house. One Iraqi man
from the countryside referred to the large amount of land he pos-
sessed. Most people had to use all their savings, sell their house, car,
land, or family jewellery to finance a trip to Europe, but still, they were
the ones who could afford to go to the West in the first place; they were
definitely not among the poorest. This image of asylum seekers who
are, at least compared to the average population of their country, highly
educated and relatively rich is also supported by the literature on asy-
lum seekers (Hulshof et al.1992). Meanwhile, the image sharply con-
trasts with the media’s image of asylum seekers being uneducated and
poor.
Conclusion
Central to this chapter is the apparent correlation between understand-
ing the fundamental reasons migrants use smugglers and understand-
ing the smuggling issue as a whole. Most attempts to divide migrants
into categories solely concentrate on political or economic motives
(Kunz 1973; Lee 1966; Ravenstein 1885; Richmond 1993). However, in-
dividual migration stories clearly indicate that motives for migration –
other than the economic or the political – may be pertinent, including
explanations of a social, cultural, and ecological nature. These stories
also reveal just how interconnected different motives are. For example,
finding a job or uniting with a future husband, was often cited in con-
junction with social and cultural reasons for migrating, such as the
country of origin’s general ethos (undemocratic, racist, sexist, corrupt,
etc). This multiplicity of reasons for migration illustrates that the divi-
sion between forced and voluntary migrants, in practice, is not so easy
to make. Furthermore, as Anna’s story made clear, migration channels
can be used in creative ways by adapting one’s profile presentation to
the preferred profiles the various channels of admission propagate.
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This chapter opened by describing the general background of our re-
spondents: where they came from, what their life was like before they
arrived in the Netherlands. Their stories made it clear that, for many
people, the state they left was unable or unwilling to meet their basic
needs or to provide protection. Indeed, states may also be unwilling to
protect or persecute individuals perceived as a threat, for example
Kurds in Iraq, or Jews in Chechnya. However, international migration
is not solely an effect of such difficult conditions. People respond dif-
ferently to the general conditions of poverty, war, torture, and discrimi-
nation, and leaving one’s country requires plenty of courage, money,
and contacts. Drawing on our own material, we again ask: who mi-
grates? First of all, this research has shown that irregular migrants in-
clude the young and the middle-aged, males and females, singles and
couples, those with children and without, the highly skilled and the
less skilled. It is therefore difficult to generalise. Still, some broad pat-
terns can be found for each region. An overrepresentation of men was
found in Iraq, whereas the former Soviet Union demonstrated an over-
representation of women. Most of our respondents were relatively
highly-educated, middle-class people, or they came from wealthy fa-
milies. This affirms the fact that the poorest of the poor are usually not
in the position to migrate internationally, let alone through ‘illegal’, of-
ten expensive channels. The next chapter offers a closer look at how
country-specific circumstances, as well as migrants’ social, human, and
economic capitals impact the specific way borders are crossed.
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5 Crossing the border in various irregular ways
There are many ways to cross a border without permission. In this
chapter the various methods and means of border crossing experienced
by our research population will be described and analysed. To under-
stand how specific borders work, one must first be familiar with the
borders’ geography. This chapter will therefore present three concrete
examples of border crossings from the Horn of Africa, Iraq, and the
former Soviet Union. Specific opportunities or obstacles faced along
these borders will be discussed. Migrants’ social, economic, and hu-
man capitals also affect how borders are crossed. Border crossings may
even vary along age, gender, and personal circumstances, such as the
level of insecurity people face and its resulting limitations. Chapter
four discussed the general decision-making process concerning migra-
tion. In this chapter, decisions surrounding the smuggling process will
be central, addressing questions like: how do people find a ‘good’
smuggler? What routes or ways of travelling does one prefer, given the
available opportunities? Is there room for negotiation when it comes to
price and destination agreements, or do migrants face complete loss of
control? The answers to these questions will first be explored through
specific narratives from selected respondents from each of the three re-
search regions, and then examined in light of more general personal
characteristics, such as age, gender, social, and economic capital.
5.1 The story of Zhara from Somalia
Zhara was born in 1954 in Mogadishu, Somalia. Her father was a colo-
nel in the army, and her mother stayed at home to care for their ten
children, one who was handicapped. By the time Zhara was in second-
ary school, she was already married with her first child. Although she
had to quit school for a while, she was able to continue later on. After
secondary school, Zhara started working as an accountant at ENECO
(the country’s state energy company. After working there for four years,
she attended accounting and management school, from which she
graduated in 1989.
Travelling to a neighbouring country first
Zhara left Somalia in 1991 when Siyaad Barre’s regime fell. Her father
and her husband both had been in the army, and her family belonged
to the ‘wrong’ clan. However, initially nobody had thought about mi-
grating to the West. In her words:
You know, in the beginning we thought the war would be over
soon, and therefore we weren’t really scared. We thought things
would change with the new government. I stayed on a farm for
three weeks, but then I thought: “Well, we have to go further
away, we have to leave the country.” So I went back home to get
some clothes for my children. Now I regret this – clothes were
all I could think of! Really, I don’t understand why I did not take
documents or certificates, because that would have helped me a
lot here. But, you know, you simply don’t think about these
things when you are in a war situation. And we were not think-
ing about migrating to the West either.
In total, thirteen of our nineteen respondents from the Horn of Africa
had first gone to a neighbouring country, travelling via land, to Ethio-
pia, Sudan, Djibouti, Kenya, or Yemen, from which they arranged their
eventual trip to Europe.
Zhara left the country with her children, father, brothers and sisters,
and their children. The only member of the family who did not want
to leave was her mother who was living in a quiet area outside of Mo-
gadishu. She was not really affected by the war, preferring thus to stay
in Somalia. More tragic was the fact that Zhara’s husband was not in
the country at the time that war broke out because he was attending a
course in the US, and they had to leave without him. The family went
to Kismaayo by car, as Zhara explains:
We had four cars in total, and they were all fully packed with
people. In Kismaayo we took a boat to Mombassa [Kenya]. We
just left the cars there. I don’t know who is driving inn our cars
now, or who is living in our house.
According to Zhara, many people were looking for boats and some
boats sunk simply because there were too many people aboard. It was
not easy to get on a ship, and the lines were cumbersome, to say the
least. Some people fainted because they could no longer stand while
waiting. This happened particularly to those who had been walking for
days or weeks to reach the harbour. Zhara and a part of her family
found a dirty fishing boat on which they could cross for US $ 100 each
96 NAVIGATING BORDERS
(there was no special price for children). The boat was crowded and
there was hardly enough space for everybody. Zhara’s oldest child was
eleven at that time, and the youngest, at age five, had to endure a boat
journey lasting four days and four nights. Even though it was a horri-
ble trip, Zhara and her children were very fortunate. Zhara’s father and
her oldest sister, along with her own children, were on another boat.
After a couple of days, Zhara and the others heard that the other boat
had a severe accident and 22 people had drowned, including everybody
Zhara knew aboard. Zhara later learned that the shipwrecked boat did
not even have a motor, and that its passengers had been waiting for
the wind to take them.
When Zhara and the others arrived in Mombassa, there were UN
workers who gave them food and shelter. It was no less a difficult time
though, as they had to sleep on the floor and the camp did not have en-
ough food. Zhara did not want to stay in the camp. Fortunately, she
had brought her gold along and she sold it in Mombassa. She was also
lucky enough to have a brother in Italy who sent more money so that
she could afford a place in town for her and her children to all stay.
Zhara’s brother did them another favour – he contacted Zhara’s hus-
band to tell him they were safe. After nine months, Zhara decided to
move again. She did not want to stay in Kenya, nor could she go back
home, seeing as it was still very unsafe there.
Problems encountered while deciding to move on
Once people have decided to resettle, a new set of difficulties arises. Le-
gal options to migrate to the West are limited. Because people arrived
during different time periods to the Netherlands, it was possible to see
from their data how smuggling methods and routes have also evolved.
For example, it became clear that in the second half of the 1980s and
the beginning of the 1990s, it was relatively simple to travel to Western
Europe via Eastern European countries because visas were obtained re-
latively easily. Consequently, the routes taken were often ‘illogical’ and
the journeys long.
Since 1991, official Somali passports have no longer been issued,
which also means that a Somali national cannot get a visa to travel
abroad. On top of that, there are no working Somali embassies in sur-
rounding countries. As a consequence, there has been the start to a
trade in forged, borrowed, and stolen passports. People we interviewed
came not only on Yemeni and Djibouti passports, but also on Dutch or
other EU-country passports, while some came on UN documents.
Others did not know on what passport they travelled because their
smuggler was in complete control. Passports can be obtained through
theft or bribery, or they can be forged. Visas may be fraudulent, or
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ghost companies can obtain them on fake employment certificates,
bank statements, or letters of invitation. Zhara had heard that in Nairo-
bi it was easy to find a mukhali41 who could bring her and her children
to a safe place, in a safe way. In a Nairobi hotel, Zhara found her mu-
khali, a Somali man with a EU passport. She trusted him as he was
her compatriot, and because he promised that his method was very
safe. This ‘safe way’ implied travelling directly by plane. It was a costly
route, but also a secure one. Zhara could use the money sent by her
brother to finance their tickets and travel documents. He would accom-
pany the family to the Netherlands. She simply had to pretend to be
his wife and that her children were their children together. Zhara was
given a new name, Asha, and the children also had new names to learn
by heart. They were also instructed to call the mukhali ‘papa’. Zhara re-
ceived a new passport, and the children’s names were written in the
mukhali’s passport. Zhara had to spend money paying this man for his
service and on purchasing the plane tickets herself. The total cost for
her and her four children was US $ 7,000, though as she noted: ‘But
you must realise that was in 1992; I hear people pay around US
$ 7,000 per person nowadays.’
One morning, Zhara and her children were picked up by a taxi dri-
ver from their hotel to go to the airport. The mukhali was there and ac-
companied them the whole way. They were advised not to talk during
the check-in procedures and to stand a little bit behind. The mukhali
would do the communication. It worked out well, and they had a safe
flight from Nairobi to Amsterdam.
Most of the people we interviewed from the Horn of Africa came by
plane, via other European countries. They used the following transit
places: Paris, Brussels, Frankfurt, or Rome. Djibouti-to-France was a
well-known route among our respondents. From other research, it is
known that South Africa (Moret, Baglioni et al. 2006: 85) and Arab
countries, like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates, are also
used as transit places (Al-Sharmani 1998). Istanbul, Turkey, is now
also known as a transit place for people from East Africa (Brewer &
Yukseker 2005). Some smugglers accompany people on their plane
ride; others do not. In the latter case, smugglers just show up to make
sure their clients board the plane. When Zhara and her children ar-
rived at Schiphol Airport in Amsterdam, the mukhali left them, saying
they could ask for asylum there. And so they did, deciding to stay in
the Netherlands. After six months, Zhara and her children received
their residence permits, and Zhara’s husband could then finally join
them. The rest of Zhara’s family lives scattered around the globe in
Kenya, the US, Canada, England, and Italy.
But cases do not always follow such straightforward procedure – we
interviewed a number of people who were brought to France by their
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mukhali, but then decided to continue their journey to the Netherlands.
Sometimes family members came by car to pick up people who had
been stranded in other European countries. Migrants often perceived
this action as helping, whereas from a present-day law enforcement
perspective, this would also be considered smuggling. Unknown com-
patriots may also bring people to neighbouring European countries,
most of the time for a price, but also out of concern.
Smuggling from the Horn of Africa and corruption
Travelling on forged passports is not always a sufficient way to avoid
border checks. Officials working at airports are sometimes bribed to
not say anything about the poor quality of documents. Kenyan newspa-
pers42 carry numerous articles on corruption scandals at the airport.
As is the case at all international airports today, documents are checked
in three different stages: at the check-in counter, upon entering the de-
parture lounge, and directly before boarding the flight. In order to
avoid people destroying their documents, such as by flushing them
down the toilet, there are sometimes even checks when disembarking
from a flight. When flights are considered ‘risky’, documents are
photocopied upon boarding and checked during the flight so that ‘ille-
gal’ passengers can be deported immediately upon landing. Staff work-
ing at any stage of the embarking and disembarking process may also
be bribed. As one respondent said:
The person checking you at customs is the key figure for the
whole process. If he says no, everything is destroyed. So the
smugglers have to arrange everything beforehand, and they tell
you to go with this document, to this man or to that lady. He or
she will then have a quick look, but you can pass anytime.
This demonstrates how widespread corruption is the modus operandi
of smugglers. As a consequence, many smuggling networks are facili-
tated through bribing immigration officials intelligence, or police offi-
cers. Sometimes, such a manner of travelling that completely relies on
the contacts of mukhalis can cause delays for the migrant. One of our
respondents told us that he was sent back from the airport three times,
because according to his smuggler it was ‘not a good day’, and they
had to try again at a later time. This could have been because the per-
son with whom the smuggler has been in contact was off-duty or some
additional unforeseen controls. Corruption is also prevalent along the
last leg of the smuggling chain, such as in the Netherlands. Dutch
newspapers incidentally report cases of corruption at Schiphol Airport;
probably the most famous is of the cleaner who misuses his or her se-
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curity card to let immigrants exit using the transit lounge. Between
2000 and 2005, the Royal Marechaussee apprehended 675 employees
– roughly three people per week – for human smuggling. Most were
working as cleaners, in tax free shops, or for airline companies (Bogers
& Salden 2005). It is estimated that half of the 60,000 people working
at Schiphol Airport possess a security card. The Royal Marechaussee
screens everybody before issuing security cards. Criminal records and
financial debts are checked and, as much as possible, a person’s vulner-
ability to bribery is tested (Olgun & Schoof 2005). However, it remains
difficult to thoroughly screen all 30,000.
Another case of corruption in the Netherlands directly related to So-
mali smuggling is the so-called look-alike method. A criminal investi-
gation led by the police in Leeuwarden (a city in the north of the Neth-
erlands) uncovered a smuggling organisation based around the Somali
owner of a travel agency. The owner advised smugglers on which
routes to take and methods to use, as well as arranged visas and
bought passports for them. One of his tactics involved recommending
that Somalis sell or lend their Dutch passports for a price to look-alikes
in their countries of birth. Most of the Somali migrants using these
Dutch passports travelled through other European countries to avoid
Dutch language checks (expert interview 30/6/2001, see appendix I). It
is interesting to note that for this specific method, a large migrant
community is needed. A report on the secondary movements of Somali
asylum seekers reveals that Somalis who entered Switzerland clandesti-
nely often used forged documents, while for the Netherlands the look-
alike method proved far more common (Moret et al. 2006).
5.2 The trouble with getting out of Iraq
It is very difficult to depart directly from the northern region of Iraq.
There is no international airport in the area or hardly any other infra-
structure, for that matter, and there are only very few countries with
which Iraq maintains diplomatic ties. People leaving Iraq must first
travel to a neighbouring country before they can continue their journey
onwards. The neighbouring country one chooses depends on the geo-
graphy of the point of departure and the openness of the border, as
well as socio-political factors, such as the attitude of, and treatment by,
authorities. From Iraq’s north-east area (including Sulemaniya, Ranje,
and Irbil), people usually cross the border that is shared with Iran.
Marivan, Bane, and Sardast were often mentioned by our respondents
as the first towns in Iran people passed through. People then moved to
Razaiya (Urmia) or sometimes to Teheran, especially if the plan was to
reach a Dutch embassy. From the north-western part of the Kurdish
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area – in Zakhu or Mosul – people crossed immediately into Turkey
usually via Ibrahim Khalil (Habur), the official border crossing, to Silo-
pi, the first town in Turkey one comes upon when crossing from the
north-east part of Iraq. Some people crossed via Syria, but according to
one of our respondents, crossing the Iraqi-Syrian border without being
caught is difficult: the area is flat and hiding places are scarce. There
are also Iraqis who use Jordan as a transit country. This is not per-
ceived as the ideal crossing point among Kurdish migrants though,
since Turkey and Iran are closer, and Kurds prefer to travel over Kurd-
ish soil (Chatelard, 2002: 7).
For Kurds, there is also the problem of obtaining documents for
leaving Iraq. Theoretically, Iraqi Kurds have the right to a passport, but
almost no Kurd in Iraqi Kurdistan has one, due to the lack of Iraqi
authorities in the area. One Iraqi Kurdish woman we interviewed tra-
velled on her niece’s passport, because the two apparently looked alike.
When she successfully crossed the border with Iran, she gave her taxi
driver an envelope in which she had placed the passport, asking him to
bring it to the address on the envelope. For Iraqis to go to Iran, they of-
ficially need a bargai (permission to stay in Iran) from the Iranian gov-
ernment, but few can ascertain one. Smugglers provide the people with
alternatives. One of our respondent’s smugglers arranged papers for al-
legedly ill Iraqis to go to Iran for a couple of weeks for the purpose of
undergoing special treatments. Our respondent explained how he had
to pretend to be very sick. Travel to Turkey also requires a visa. In the
Kurdish area, visas are distributed by KDP (in Irbil) and by PUK (in
Suleimanyia), but waiting lists for these visas are lengthy (Cornillie &
Declercq 2003). A loophole in the law is darnak; a special document
for Turkomans from Iraq who wish to visit Turkey. Two of the people
we interviewed were able to receive a darnak from their smuggler,
though it meant they had to pretend to be Turkoman, which was diffi-
cult for them because they did no speak Turkish.
It is thus not only policies in countries of destination, but also in
countries of origin, that may drive people to employ smugglers43. Hal-
leh’s narrative illustrates the paradox of people being allowed to enter a
certain Western country yet simultaneously being forbidden from leav-
ing their own country. Halleh is an Iraqi woman who was officially in-
vited to come to the Netherlands for family reunification with her hus-
band. However, she could not leave Iraq because she could not obtain
an exit-visa. A smuggler was therefore arranged to remove Halleh from
Iraq so that she could at least reach the Dutch embassy in Iran. But be-
cause she was an Iraqi, the Dutch embassy could not help Halleh exit
Iran. She consequently found lodging in a hotel in Teheran, and there
she met other families who were in the same situation (some had an
official invitation to go to Sweden, others to Denmark). Through her
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new acquaintances, Halleh found a smuggler who could arrange an Ir-
anian passport for her. A man would accompany her to Dubai, and
there she would fly to Amsterdam as an Iranian. But, as it turned out,
at the airport in Dubai, Halleh was caught with her forged Iranian
documents and put in detention. Her husband immediately had to fly
to Dubai from the Netherlands to show them the official invitation to
get her out of detention and take Halleh along with him.
The story of Hussein
Hussein was born in 1978 in Kaladeze, a city on the border between
Iraq and Iran. When the Iraqi government destroyed the city44, he
moved, together with his parents, to Irbil. Luckily, his family had en-
ough money to buy a new house, and his father opened a shop where
Hussein could work. As Hussein grew older, he became interested in
communist ideology and acquainted himself with a local communist
party – which led to trouble with Islamic Parties. One day while he and
a friend were distributing flyers on the emancipation of women, they
were suddenly shot at. His friend was seriously wounded, but Hussein
managed to run away. He hid for a couple of days, and while in hiding,
he thought about all the trouble he had experienced in recent years.
Now at age 25, Hussein decided to leave it all behind. He only in-
formed immediate family of his plan. Luckily, they were in the position
to support him financially, and they even helped him find a smuggler.
Hussein’s uncle contacted a friend, a Kurd from Iran, who knew the
border area in detail since he was a trader (and according to Hussein,
not a smuggler). Hussein’s uncle had helped this man before, and now
the man could return the favour. Hussein knew he had a dangerous
trip ahead of him, and as he expressed it: ‘If you travel without a pass-
port you always run the risk of getting caught.’
If travelling without documents, passing through Iran is considered
an easier route than going directly from Iraq to Turkey, because the
border with Turkey is more tightly controlled. Hussein also crossed the
Iraq-Iran border. One day at six o’clock in the morning, his uncle’s
friend came to pick him up from the place where he was hiding. His
family had helped him pack his bag, which was not an easy task be-
cause he was not supposed to bring much luggage. He had a long
walking journey ahead of him and he knew it was better to pretend to
be ‘travelling’ as opposed to ‘migrating’. A small bag would be more
credible for the ‘travelling’ scenario.
Hussein drove with his guide to the border city, and at midnight,
they crossed the Iraq-Iran border by foot. The first village in Iran was
reached after five hours of walking. There, the guide had a car waiting,
and they drove via Sardašt, the first city to be reached in Iran, to a vil-
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lage at the Turkish border. There were two controls on the way, but
they avoided them by taking smaller roads. Hussein’s guide knew the
way, and everything went quite smoothly. From the border village, Hus-
sein and his smuggler started walking again, this time towards Turkey.
This was a very dangerous route, as described by many of our respon-
dents. This passage takes between five and eight days on foot. Usually,
people walk during the night and sleep during the day. At night, you
hear dogs barking, the mountains are steep, and people have to hold
each other while crossing particularly dangerous passages. There are
many mines and the Turkish army sometimes shoots at refugees trying
to cross the border. As one respondent stated: ‘No matter how silent
you are, when the border police hears just about anything, they already
start to shoot.’
A smuggler’s role can involve not only transporting people, but also,
more generally, facilitating travel. One smuggler, for example, ex-
plained to one of our respondents that he had ‘bought the road free for
that night’: there were no controls to be exchanged for money. Often
smugglers inform travellers beforehand that a border crossing is trou-
blesome, but that giving money can solve these problems. One respon-
dent recalls:
One of the border policemen said to me: ‘We are going to help
you, but are you going to help us?’ I gave him the US $ 200 I
was advised by the smuggler to put in my passport, and I could
pass. When Hussein had to cross the Iran-Turkey border, the
war between the PKK and the Turkish army was going strong. It
was public knowledge that refugees suspected of being PKK
members who tried to cross the border were shot at. Busses at
the border were also sometimes targeted for the same reason.
One of our respondents said that when his bus was shot at, both
the driver and the person sitting next to him were killed. An-
other Iraqi Kurd respondent had an experience in which the
whole village where he had stayed, while in transit in Turkey,
was suddenly surrounded by the Turkish army because the villa-
gers believed them to all be PKK members.
When Hussein arrived in the first Turkish village he had time to
wash45, change clothes, and say goodbye to his guide, who would go
back to Iran. Hussein’s uncle’s friend introduced him to a Turkish
smuggler who could bring him to the next stop, Van. It was only then,
upon arrival, that Hussein paid him US $ 100. As Hussein recalls,
from the moment he began travelling with this smuggler, trouble
started and the level of trust diminished. The Turkish smuggler needed
to be paid the US $ 150 in advance. In the first village Hussein also
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had to pay for drinks and food, whereas with his uncle’s friend he
never had to pay for anything. In the second village, he was handed
over to a new smuggler who said he could bring him to Van for US
$ 100. This smuggler did not know anything about the deal Hussein
had made with his first smuggler. Hussein felt really powerless, and
simply had to pay again; there was no other solution. The farther away
from home, the more people had to often rely on smugglers they did
not know or whom they had not heard anything about. It was then
more likely to go ‘wrong’, in the sense that people would have to pay
more, might be badly treated, or cheated.
Having arrived in Van,46 Hussein was brought to a house and pro-
mised that from there someone could bring him to Istanbul. He had to
pay US $ 100 again – US $ 50 for the bus ticket to Istanbul and US
$ 50 for staying in the house. After two days, Hussein was brought to
a highway. The smuggler told him it was impossible to get on a bus at
the bus station without a passport. When the bus came, Hussein
stepped in and he immediately saw there was no seat left for him.
When he turned around to speak to the man who brought him there,
the man was already gone. The driver told Hussein that he could come
along, but that he had to stand in the aisle. After a couple hours, the
bus was stopped and the Turkish police stepped on, asking for people’s
identity papers. Hussein did not understand a word of Turkish. He
only saw angry looking faces, because everybody in the bus had to wait
for him. The driver told Hussein he had to pay US $ 200 to stay out of
trouble, but he saw him give only US $ 100 to the police, and the other
US $ 100 disappeared into the bus driver’s pocket.
Waiting room Istanbul
Certain places in the world, such as Istanbul, serve as ‘hubs’ in the
smuggling process. Hubs are places where smuggled immigrants from
different countries are brought so as to be grouped for onward transfer
to other destinations, or to find another smuggler to continue their
journey. Istanbul is a very important ‘hub’ because several routes from
different countries to the EU pass through this city. One of the reasons
for the attraction is its key geography, being positioned next to the EU.
In these hubs, one can find transit migrants: people who come to a
country temporarily, with the intention of settling in another country
(IOM 1995: 127). Sometimes people become transit migrants acciden-
tally: they may not have had intentions to further migrate, but in the
end, decide to move on either because of safety reasons or limited eco-
nomic opportunities in their current country of destination. Another
scenario may be that their smuggler has dumped them at a particular
location, even though they have paid for a complete trip to a farther
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destination. Almost all our Iraqi Kurdish respondents said they had
used Istanbul as a ‘waiting room’ before they continued their journey.
When Hussein arrived in Istanbul he knew, thanks to information
from his uncle’s fiend, to go to an area called Fatih. Fatih was de-
scribed as a place where many Kurds live, as well as a place where it
would be possible to find a new smuggler. After asking for directions
on the street, Hussein arrived in Fatih – where the first thing he heard
was Kurdish. His uncle’s friend was right! Hussein approached a Kurd-
ish-speaking man, explaining that he was new to the area and looking
for someone to bring him to a safe country. The man brought Hussein
to a shop where he introduced him to someone who spoke both Kurd-
ish and Turkish fluently and knew many smugglers. This man imme-
diately made some phone calls and asked Hussein whether he had fa-
mily somewhere in Europe. After an hour of waiting in the shop, a
Kurdish man picked up Hussein. This man, who was also waiting to
be brought to a safe European destination, accompanied him to an
apartment where more Kurds were waiting.
In the literature, apartments for people in transit are called ‘safe
houses’ (Soudijn 2001). People wait there before continuing with their
travel and collect information about their next journey. Our Iraqi re-
spondents who passed through Istanbul needed, on average, two
weeks47 to find a new smuggler, to collect money, and to get ac-
quainted with the route to be taken. The first night Hussein spent in
his safe house in Istanbul, a smuggler already came to offer him a trip
to Greece. However, it took eighteen days before Hussein and his
smuggler finally left, and in the interim, the entire group of people
waiting in the safe house was not allowed to leave the apartment. They
were told that it was very dangerous to go out. If one were appre-
hended in the streets, there would be the risk of being deported. This
would mean losing all money so far invested, no to mention potentially
facing persecution upon arrival home. In one example, the windows of
a safe house were blinded and people were explicitly forbidden to eave;
however, most of the time people were simply advised not to do so.
There are also smugglers who arrange a Turkish ID called a kimlik for
their clients, but this costs additional money.
Bribing the police is a strategy to avoid deportation if apprehended.
The police in Istanbul caught one of our Iraqi respondents while he
was out walking on the street. They requested his ID and when he re-
sponded that he was from Iraq, they forced him into a police car and
asked how much money he had. He had kept all his US dollar bills in
his shoes and some Turkish Lire in his pockets. So he presented the
Lire as the last of his money. But the police started to threaten the
man, saying they would imprison him or deport him back to Iraq if he
did not produce more money. He consequently turned over all the
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money he had, and was let go. In this kind of scenario, social construc-
tions of gender roles might create advantages for women. An Iraqi wo-
man we interviewed was the only one allowed to leave the ‘safe house’
in Istanbul, because as a woman, she would probably not be appre-
hended on the street. She had even sewn an extra pocket in her under-
wear to store a large sum of the safe house group’s cash, seeing as wo-
men are usually not searched in Turkey. This advantage, based on gen-
der, is echoed by research done on the border between Mexico and the
US, where the police are less likely to apprehend women because they
are not suspected as being ‘illegal’ migrants (Doneto & Peterson 2004).
Sometimes when migrants run out of money, they must work while
in transit to finance the next leg of their journey. Our respondents who
found themselves in financial trouble, while in transit, all managed to
find a solution: most borrowed money from family members and/or
friends abroad, some even borrowed money from people they just met
in Istanbul. Others revised their initially intended terminus to a cheap-
er one. Being in transit can also affect the way people think about their
destinations, as they may, along the way, receive more specific informa-
tion about what it is like to live in certain countries, what the chances
are of obtaining needed documents, and the dangers and costs involved
in certain smuggling routes (see also Koser & Pinkerton 2002).
Entering the European Union: the route via Greece
From Turkey, six of our Iraqi respondents had a direct flight to the
Netherlands, and five found a lorry or car driver who could bring them
to Europe, either via the Greece/Italy or the Balkan route. The Balkan
route passes either through Bulgaria or parts of the former Yugoslavia,
or goes via Romania-Hungary to Austria or Germany. One of our re-
spondents followed an even more eastern route – he took the bus from
Istanbul via Trabzon to Georgia, then to Ukraine and, from there, he
continued via Poland to Germany. In Berlin, he contacted his brother
residing in the Netherlands, who then came to pick him up by car. Un-
der pressure of the EU, border control has become stricter in some
Eastern European countries, and as a consequence, some routes have
become altered to go through Mediterranean ports (Futo & Jandl 2005;
Ghosh 1998; IAM 2000). Two-thirds of our Iraqi respondents entered
the EU via the southern entrance, the Turkish-Greek border.
The Turkish-Greek border can be crossed in two ways. If one travels
over land, the northern route must be taken. This takes about a week
of walking and the Evros River (also known as the Meric) must be
crossed. After crossing this river, people usually travel to Athens via
Alexandroepolis, Komotini, and Thessaloniki. The southern route is a
sea route, along which people cross the Agean Sea by speedboat, sail-
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ing ship, or occasionally by simple inflatable boats (Icduygu 2004).
Sometimes smugglers drive the boat and unload people quickly, but it
also may be the case that a passenger serves as the boat ‘driver’ under
instruction of the smuggler. Many boats depart from Istanbul or other
Turkish coastal cities, such as Izmir, Bodrum, and Antalya, to reach
one of the many small islands in the Aegean Sea (Samos, Kos, Rhodes,
and Lesbos). Only a few people head directly to the Greek mainland by
boat.
In the safe house in Istanbul, Hussein and some of the other mi-
grants had agreed to go with a smuggler offering a trip to Greece via
the southern route, for US $ 1,200. They would first travel to Bodrum,
and from there, take a boat to one of the Greek islands. They paid
everything in advance to the man who offered the trip. This man, how-
ever, did not accompany them; he had sent instead a man who took
the bus with them to Bodrum. In Bodrum, they stayed at a very nice
hotel for one night, and the next day very early in the morning, they
went to the coast in a dolmus (a van). The man said that Greece was on
the other side of the water, explaining how they had to get off the boat
just before reaching the coast and swim the last stretch. The driver of
the boat could then go back immediately, at high speed, without get-
ting caught. For Hussein, this moment was really special: he had
waited so long for this. Seeing the lights of Europe made him realise
that a safe place was in reach. The trip, however, was terrifying. All the
passengers had to hold on tight because the boat was going really fast.
Within twenty minutes, they arrived in front of – what Hussein later
learned to be – Kos. It was like a movie scenario: they jumped off the
boat, swimming to the coast with all their clothes still on, while tour-
ists were everywhere. The migrants had been instructed to shout for
the police and identify themselves as asylum seekers. Nobody, however,
came to see them, so they decided to go to the police themselves. At
the police station, they were told that they would not be given permits
in Greece; instead, they would be sent to Athens by boat the next day
and, from there, could decide for themselves where they would go.
Transit within Europe and the differences between national asylum systems
When Hussein and the others were dropped off in Athens, the ques-
tion of what to do next arose. One of the fellow travellers already knew
that in Athens, Amonja was where to go to meet other Kurds. These
experienced migrants could inform the new migrants on how to sur-
vive without papers, sharing not only where to get free food or where
to sleep, but also providing legal advice. In Amonja, Hussein learned
that it is impossible to get asylum in Greece48. Having taken a liking
to the Greek climate and culture, he was disappointed to discover that
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he could not stay there. Hussein then had to try to get his bearings, to
decide where to go next. He had heard that the only way out of Greece
was to go to Patras, where one could sneak onto lorries waiting to go to
Italy. In Patras, Hussein tried more than ten times to sneak onto a lor-
ry. The drivers were very suspicious, usually checking their lorries be-
fore they left the harbour. Hussein was kicked out several times. By the
time he found himself inside a lorry and heard the engine turn on,
after three hours of waiting, he knew that this time it had worked out.
He felt the lorry drive on board of the ship.
One danger of hiding in the back of a lorry is the possibility of suffo-
cation. In the lorry, people normally keep two plastic containers, one
with water and one for urine. It is also advised to eat light food (in an-
ticipation of the need to defecate) and to refrain from making any
noise. Children sometimes are given sleeping pills so that they remain
quiet. Each time the lorry stopped, Hussein was afraid of being caught.
Upon finding somebody hiding in his lorry, a driver might beat up the
migrant or force him or her to pay money. When the ship stopped,
Hussein knew he was in Italy. The last obstacle was figuring out how
to get out of the lorry without being seen.
When people cannot get out of the lorry themselves, they are usually
advised to bang on the door, but in these cases, there is always the dan-
ger of being apprehended. Fortunately, Hussein could open the door
himself, though he waited until he did not hear any sound. One hour
after its engine had stopped, he exited the lorry. He saw lorries every-
where, and he did not have a clue where he was. He asked the drivers
in the parking place where the closest train station was, and after one
hour of walking, arrived at a station to depart for Rome. On the train,
Hussein was arrested. It was the first time in his life that he was hand-
cuffed, and it felt strange because he did not feel he had done some-
thing wrong. The police sent him to prison. There he was told that he
would be released and given a letter permitting him to stay in the
country for fifteen days, but that he had to leave Italy before this time
was up. At this point, Hussein knew he could not remain in Italy
either; he had to move again.
In prison he was told that, without a passport, the only way into
France was via Ventimiglia, and that a smuggler was not necessary to
follow this route. Hussein thus took the train to Ventimiglia and
walked across the border, experiencing no problems. From the small
village of Menton, France, he took a bus to Nice and then a train to
Strasbourg. Because he had been told it was also very hard to get asy-
lum in France, he decided to continue his journey once again. He took
a taxi to Germany (costing US $ 80), but there again, he did not stay,
for he had heard rumours about racist attacks. He was also told that
Kurds are more easily accepted in the Netherlands, which prompted
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his decision to make the Netherlands his final destination. Hussein
bought a train ticket to Amsterdam and, upon arrival, went straight to
the police to ask for asylum. In total, the whole journey from Iraq to
the Netherlands took six weeks and cost US $ 5,000.
5.3 The story of Oemar from Chechnya
Oemar was born in 1983 in Grozny, Chechnya. His mother is Azeri
and his father, Jewish. He used to live together with them in the Jewish
district of Bashirovka in Grozny. But Muslims in the surrounding areas
had been intimidating. Oemar’s mother even had to quit her job be-
cause she experienced hated as a Muslim woman who had affiliated
herself with a Jew. Oemar and his brother were also bullied at school.
According to Oemar, the war in Chechnya is much older than its offi-
cial ten years: ‘It has always been there, not explicitly, though.’ Two
years after the war officially started in 1997, Oemar’s parents sent him
away. Oemar’s father was in trouble, and his mother wanted to protect
her fourteen-year-old son by sending him to stay with another Jewish
family in the village of Katelnikovo, near Volgograd (Russia). There he
could go to school quietly and be spared from war. According to Oe-
mar:
Katelnikovo was so small and forgotten that there was not even
an asphalt road to get there. I did not like it there at all. At
school I was hated. This time not because my father was a Jew,
but because I was from Chechnya. Katelinikovo was a small vil-
lage where everybody knew each other. These people were not
too bright and didn’t understand that although I am from
Grozny, I am not necessarily a Chechen.
Oemar wanted to go return to his parents and his older brother, but he
could not. His parents did not allow him to come back, and besides,
the borders were closed. Three years later, in 2000, his mother sud-
denly arrived in the village. She told him the devastating news that his
father and his brother had probably been killed. They had gone to the
market, but had never come back home. One of his father’s friends
had come to visit his mother, telling her he would take care of every-
thing, in reference to the funeral, and advised her to go to her son as
soon as possible. From Katelinikovo, the mother and son tried to ar-
range their trip abroad, since returning to Chechnya would probably
mean they too would be killed. The decision to migrate and ask for asy-
lum abroad was not a difficult one. Oemar’s mother found somebody
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who was willing to smuggle them through the grandfather of a family
they knew.
Oemar’s mother had decided to go to the Netherlands, but Oemar
does not know why. He did not ask her – nor does he want to ask her
now – because she is traumatised and trying to forget everything they
went through. Another Jewish family were travelling with them, but
they were bound for Germany. The smugglers were Russian and their
method was simple – they went by car. In total, there were two cars
and, in each, two smugglers. One drove while the other rested. The
other family was always behind or in front of them. They only stopped
to use a restroom or to get fuel. At the border, Oemar saw the smug-
glers pay money to the guards; they never experienced any problems.
The smugglers had told them in advance that the most difficult part
would be the border between Poland and Germany, but they did not
encounter problems there either.
The Odra border
For a long time, the Polish-German border was a typical example of a
border that could be crossed by simply avoiding checkpoints. With the
Odra River forming a large part it, local smugglers could help migrants
by informing them of areas without the presence of border guards, in
so allowing them to easily cross on their own. A trick frequently used
at the Polish-German border was the so-called ‘fisherman’s way’. In
this set-up, a smuggler sits by the river and fishes. He usually chooses
a point from which he can observe everything. Then, using either a
mobile phone or a radio, he informs the rest of the migratory group of
the optimal moment to cross the border. Meanwhile, the immigrants
in a group, which may comprise up to twenty, have been waiting in the
bushes (Krupa & Pasztelanski 1999). This crossing at the Odra River is
so well known that we came across a special name for it, richnaja visa.
This literally means in Russian ‘visa for the river’. Everybody knows an
ordinary visa is an impossible object to obtain in the former Soviet Un-
ion. The term richnaja visa correlates crossing the Odra River with get-
ting a visa. In the Netherlands, around 10 per cent of ‘illegal’ immi-
grants claim to have travelled by themselves, with the majority of this
group originally coming from the former Soviet Union or the former
Yugoslavia (Engbersen et al. 2002).
When Oemar and his mother crossed the Polish-German border in
2000, the situation was different than it is currently. With expansion
of the EU, the Polish-German border is now relatively open, as empha-
sis on control has shifted eastward. A tightly controlled, nearly im-
permeable, border on the eastern side of Ukraine was one of the prere-
quisites for the country to be given EU membership. As a result, Eur-
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ope’s external border has shifted from the Odra River, dividing Poland
and Germany, to the Buh River, dividing Poland and Ukraine. Citizens
of Poland’s former Soviet Block allies (Ukraine, Belarus, and the Rus-
sian Federation) now need a visa to cross the Polish border. Along this
new border, controls and surveillance have been intensified. For Ukrai-
nians, Poland is perceived to be like ‘the West’. With salaries five to six
times higher than at home, Poland draws in a large Ukrainian popula-
tion (Bernstein 2004). Moreover, transit migrants in Poland have been
deciding, more and more, to make what was just a transit point their
end destination (Okólski 2000). Yet, there are also Ukrainians who
keep moving – to actually reach the West. In Portugal, for example,
Ukrainians are currently the third-largest immigrant group, after Cape
Verdeans and Brazilians (Baganha et al. 2004).
When Oemar and his mother arrived in the Netherlands, the smug-
glers gave them a piece of paper with the address of a reception centre
in Rijsbergen. Oemar and his mother changed reception centres three
times in almost four years and, in the meantime, received two negative
replies from immigration officials. At the time of our interview with
Oemar and his mother, their status was still uncertain. In complete
contrast, the other family they travelled with was almost immediately
granted refugee status in Germany where they stayed on.
Such stories show how context, as well as a migrant’s own personal
position at the onset of travel, impact considerably on how an ‘illegal’
journey is organised and will evolve. The next sections will take a closer
look at how age, gender, and the level of insecurity a person must con-
tend with impact the way borders are crossed, as well as migrants’ so-
cial, economic, and human capital.
5.4 How age, gender, and levels of insecurity shape border
crossing
Border-crossing processes differ considerably for men versus women,
the young versus the elderly, and for political refugees versus economic
migrants. From the smuggler’s point of view, children, women, the el-
derly, and sick or injured people are a ‘burden’: they hold back an en-
tire group that is being smuggled and increase the chances of being
caught by border police. As such, there are smugglers who refuse to
take on the responsibility of ‘vulnerable’ people. However, there are al-
ways exceptions. One Iraqi respondent with back problems, who
wanted to migrate in order to undergo surgery in the West was sup-
plied a horse by his smuggler so that he did not have to walk the route.
At the other extreme, there are smugglers and traffickers who specifi-
cally profit from people who cannot easily travel on their own.
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OCHA49 reported in 2003 how the trafficking of Somali children oc-
curs on a large scale (Hannan 2003). Women also find themselves at a
similar disadvantage due to gender-specific dangers of border crossing.
As an Iraqi woman said:
For me, as a woman, it was even harder to decide what route to
take. There were fewer possibilities for me because I had heard
that some smugglers refuse to take women and children. For ex-
ample, I heard about a route which only men could travel be-
cause you have to run through a tunnel, and if you are too slow,
you may get run over by a train. And then of course, it was im-
portant to choose a trustworthy smuggler – for a woman alone,
there is the risk of getting raped by your smuggler. That’s why
there are so few women travelling alone.
It must be noted that gender constructions also play a role. Most of
our Kurdish respondents were Sunnite Muslims, which made it more
difficult for them to migrate on their own (see also Schoorl et al.
2000: 60). Arab women often must travel with their fathers, uncles, or
brothers – or at least pretend to do so. One of our female Iraqi respon-
dents pretended to visit a brother in Iran, telling the border policemen
that he would pick her up directly across the border. Though this was
not true, the border policeman was reassured and the woman per-
mitted to continue her travel. Hagan (1994) reports in her study on the
Maya community in Houston, Texas, that female migrants often must
rely on two ‘coyotes’: one to lead her through the highlands and across
the Guatemalan-Mexican border, the other to take her through Mexico
and across the US-Mexico border. Usually a friend or a relative from
Houston meets her once she has crossed the border into the US. Men
only need one smuggler to cross the Mexico-US border. As a result of
the more complicated border crossings, women pay, on average, US
$ 1,200 in fees, while men only pay US $ 500.
By contrast, smuggled female respondents from the Horn of Africa
often travelled unaccompanied, and did not seem to encounter pro-
blems without a male family member on hand. This may be the result
of differing gender roles: African women seem to be more in control
than their Arab counterparts when it comes to decisions regarding the
family. Reporting less border-crossing dangers may also have to do
with different concepts of safety. Men from the Horn of Africa often
said they wanted their wife and children to be safe, meaning they
should migrate first. For Iraqis, the reverse sequence was considered
safer: men migrated first, their wives later followed. Differences in bor-
der crossings might also play a role. Women from the Horn of Africa
usually travel by plane on forged documents, which is a relatively safe
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way of travelling, even though the initial part of the journey is often
more risky because it is over land.
Migrants from the former Soviet Union, also often travel in docu-
mented ways. Of course, general visa policies have impact on migra-
tion options because it is easier for those migrants from the former So-
viet Union to arrange a visa than those in Iraq or a Horn of Africa
country. Furthermore, migration options are gendered, women from
the former Soviet Union can travel relatively easily via a mail-order
bride agency, or through the offer of specific jobs.
Tamara is a schoolteacher from Moscow who worked on the side as
a photo correspondent. She is divorced, with a son from her first mar-
riage. Immediately after her divorce, she started to think about finding
a good father for her son, saying when interviewed: ‘If I had a girl I
could have raised her myself, but I think a boy needs a father.’ In Rus-
sia, Tamara did not see any opportunities to find a ‘good’ husband. As
she explained: ‘It is not easy in Russia; all the good men were killed or
deported in the Soviet period. The ones left are alcoholics, and they’re
very conservative.’ Tamara had the opportunity to migrate to the US be-
cause she has family there. But, as she explained:
They all live there, in their own closed community. The Rus-
sians there only have contact with other Russians. I believe
when you move abroad you need to adjust, learn the language
and culture, and communicate with the native people. It
wouldn’t feel right for me to enter such a closed community. Be-
sides, finding a job there and improving my English would not
allow me enough time to find a husband.
Tamara thus decided to start searching the Internet for websites of
Russian marriage agencies – one of which she registered at. As Tamara
recounted:
I had a lot of responses from Western men. Some of them re-
plied immediately with replies such as: ‘Come to my country
and I’ll be willing to marry you.’ I did not buy into these kinds
of things. These men just want to get you into their beds.
Because her mother’s best friend from school lives in the Netherlands,
Tamara decided to concentrate her search for a good husband there.
One day she bought a ticket, and was soon informing the marriage
agency of her imminent trip to the Netherlands. She had made comfor-
table arrangements to stay with her mother’s friend, from whom she
had already received an invitation. The agency then informed all its
male clients in the Netherlands that Tamara was coming.
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From that moment on, I started to get more letters from Dutch
guys. I fell in love with one of the candidates, Jan. I fell in love
with him from his second letter on. He was very romantic. He
is 22 years older than I am, but I don’t care. When I would come
to the agency I always asked for my favourite guy, so everybody
knew I liked him the most. And we used to talk for four or five
hours on the phone at night, when my son was already in bed.
The agency advised Tamara not to focus on just one person, but it soon
became clear that she did not want to see men other than Jan.
Jan had been so clever to pick me up from the airport, to show
me the beach, and from the second day on, I did not stay at my
mother’s friend’s place any longer, but at his place. Together we
cancelled all the other dates I had.
After Tamara went back to Russia, Jan started to visit her and her son
in Moscow: ‘He came almost every month. And one day he suggested
we could come to Holland, so that we could finally live all together.’ Ta-
mara and her son first travelled on a three-month visa, but even before
returning to Russia, they decided to apply for a permanent stay. All
three now live together in the Netherlands.
Sometimes other, third parties contact smugglers so as to get people
out of their country of origin as soon as possible. Obviously, migrants
who must hide have fewer resources than people who are freer and
less time-pressed to actively seek what opportunities there are in West-
ward migration. Local newspapers in former Soviet Union countries of-
ten publish advertisements on foreign travel and job opportunities.
They sometimes even openly advertise travel visas and advise on the
best way to emigrate to Western Europe. Apart from the fact that peo-
ple may be forced to contact one specific smuggler without sufficient
time to consider their other options, the route ultimately followed may
also be influenced by a migrant’s past and related fears. For instance,
one day Yuri, who worked at a top-secret military post in Azerbaijan,
had to escape from the FSB (Russian Federal Security Service). But be-
cause he only had a military ID and held no passport, he could not
book an international flight for himself. Moreover, the situation was
risky – being caught travelling on his military ID would have led to
prosecution by the Ukrainian government. Yuri was offered the oppor-
tunity to fly to Moscow on a forged passport and from there, he could
take the train to the Netherlands. But sure that the Russian and the
Ukrainian governments worked closely, he was terrified that he could
be caught in Moscow. He thus refused to pass through the city. Yuri
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consequently took an alternative route: from Dagestan passing through
Belarus, Poland, and Germany, to finally arrive in the Netherlands. On
a Dutch visa, with a forged passport, completely via bus, this route took
far longer than if it would have if Yuri had flown. But, as his story ex-
emplifies, personal fear can influence the way borders are crossed.
Barsky (2000) and Collyer (2003) come to the same conclusion in
their observation that some refugees specifically do not want to migrate
to nations with which their own countries have good political relations,
because they see such ‘good’ relations as increasing the likelihood of
deportation.
5.5 How social, economic, and human capital shape border
crossing
The importance of strong and weak ties
As chapter four revealed, at the time of our interviews with them, half
the respondents had social connections abroad. Migration may be
made possible when people abroad officially invite prospective mi-
grants. For irregular migrants it was shown by Staring (1999) and En-
gbersen et al. (2002) that, more than other migrants, labour migrants
made use of the ‘visiting’ option by becoming part of settled migrant
communities. Most labour migrants entered under the classification of
‘visitor’ and then overstayed their visa. But it’s a different picture for
newcomers. When more detailed questions were asked regarding the
help our respondents received from the people they knew abroad, it be-
came clear that what counts it is not so much if a migrant knows peo-
ple abroad, but how well the migrant knows these people and whether
they are in a position to assist in the migration process. Distant rela-
tives or remote friends abroad might, for example, prefer to reserve
help for their immediate family. This is illustrated by the story of a
Russian couple we interviewed, who were faced with constraints be-
cause of their family’s unwillingness to support them:
The only problem is that it is necessary to find a person who is
willing to take responsibility for you. I have a cousin in the Uni-
ted States, but this cousin has a brother who also wants to mi-
grate. My cousin told me that she would rather take responsibil-
ity for her immediate family than for us, and she could not af-
ford to support two families. I understood her attitude, but still,
it made it very difficult for us to move.
Apart from those reluctant to help, some family members of our re-
spondents found it very difficult to officially invite and/or support
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others financially, as much as they would have liked to. These difficul-
ties are often related to the financial and legal situation in which mi-
grants abroad find themselves. In the Netherlands, the person who of-
fers the invitation must legally reside in the country, have a permanent
working contract, and earn more than 120 per cent of the minimum
wage to guarantee the stay of his/her guest. Most of our respondents’
social ties abroad were ineligible to act as sponsors. To make matters
more complicated, there are also migrants who specifically do not want
to go where there is a large ethnic diaspora, so as to avoid socially sti-
fling situations, for example in the case of Tamara. As such, these mi-
grants may deliberately choose to go to places where they have no con-
nections.
Those migrants who do not have a social network abroad – or cannot
(or opt not) to make use of one – exploit such potential connections by
relying on smugglers and/or other intermediaries. These connections
can be called ‘migration-specific social capital’ (Massey & Espinosa
1997). The migration process is affected by whether a migrant might
know an experienced migrant who has previously crossed the border in
a clandestine way, is acquainted with a smuggler, or is in touch with
somebody offering other relevant connections. One woman we inter-
viewed, for example, made use of her mother’s connection to a stewar-
dess working for Kenyan Airlines. It allowed her to leave the country
free of charge and free of complications. Specific contacts may thus
have considerable impact on the smuggling process’ evolution. Most of
our respondents found their initial smuggler through family members,
friends, or acquaintances. It is interesting to note that, rather than im-
mediate relatives, it was more often the so-called ‘weaker’ ties (friend-
of-a- friend sorts) who facilitated finding contacts to get in touch with
smugglers. As Granovetter (1973) describes, ‘strong’ ties (family mem-
bers, friends, etc.) seem eminent in sustaining one’s livelihood, be-
cause of the mutual trust and greater motivation to help each other.
However, people benefit more broadly from contact with members of
other networks – weak ties – because they span greater social distance
that reach a larger number of people.
Those to whom we are weakly tied are more likely to move in circles
different from our own and thus will have access to information differ-
ent from that which we receive (Granovetter 1973: 1371). Often, money
replaces social capital in these ‘alternative’ opportunities of a commer-
cial nature.
‘I went as far as my money would take me’ (Van Hear 2004)
As our empirical data was collected in the Netherlands, little can be
said about differences found when comparing those who only migrate
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to neighbouring countries versus those who are forced to stay in transit
countries. Nevertheless, research material shows that there are hierar-
chies of destinations for migrants, as designated according to the avail-
able resources of a country. For the majority of refugees, there is no
other option than to stay within the region where they already find
themselves. For those who do have the resources to migrate any
farther, there is also a hierarchy of preferred destinations. In the Neth-
erlands, we came across stories of people for whom the US or Canada
was too expensive; Europe was their second choice. While there exists
some data on related smuggling fees, it is very much a smattering
across policy papers, migration bulletins, and the media. Furthermore,
there are a number of impediments when it comes to comparing the
data on smuggling fees already in existence (Petros 2005). First of all,
little distinction has been made between smuggling and trafficking
fees in the data. The perspective on costs may therefore also differ:
sometimes there was an accounting for the price smuggled migrants
paid, and in other cases, for the debt incurred from being trafficked.
Secondly, the locational details with which fees are reported differs:
some sources provide costs over specific countries, others reflect only
the costs within broad regions. Thirdly, it is not clear who exactly is
moving at such a price: a family or an individual. Fourthly, prices are
often provided without situating related details of the journey. For ex-
ample, it is very often unclear whether the fee was only to guide some-
one across a border, or if travel tickets, shelter, and food costs were also
included. When several smugglers are used, it can be difficult to mea-
sure the total amount paid across various fields of service. Still, it re-
mains interesting to compare the prices paid in different areas, by dif-
ferent people, using different smuggling methods. Van Liemt (2004)
has compiled sources of information on smuggling fees.
Our data also shows that smuggling fees differ across destinations
and according to smuggling methods (such as means of transportation,
the use of documents or lack thereof). For people from the Horn of
Africa, timing of travel also mattered. Of our interviewees who arrived
during the early 1990s, migrants paid, on average, US $ 1,000 for a
trip to the Netherlands. Those who came later paid around US
$ 5,000. In the literature, there are indications that smuggling fees
have doubled since 9/11, with the average amount Somalis pay increas-
ing to US $ 7,000 per trip (Hannan 2003). Before 9/11, it was easier
to get on a plane as a Somali traveller; now customers are checked
more frequently, and at more places. Consequently, the need for high-
er-quality forgeries has driven the smuggling fees up.
Our interviewees from Iraq paid between US $ 4,000 and US
$ 10,000, depending on the route taken and the method used. The two
people who had paid US $ 10,000 came via plane on high-quality
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forged documents, while all the others travelled over land and paid
less. For people from the former Soviet Union, obtaining a visa was ty-
pically the most expensive part of the process. Although the standard
price for a visa may not be so costly, travel agencies can charge addi-
tional money since there are so many people wanting to leave the
country who do not fulfil the entry criteria. Again, prices varied over
time. For example, people in Ukraine mentioned paying US $ 200 for
a tourist visa in 1999, while in 2001, others paid US $ 300, and in
2002, someone paid US $ 500. A couple who travelled with a smug-
gler from L’vov, in western Ukraine, to the Netherlands paid US
$ 10,000 altogether (US $ 6,000 paid in advance). From Chechnya,
the price for two was ‘only’ US $ 4,000 (US $ 3,000 paid in advance).
This shows how the prices paid for smuggling do not follow a dis-
tance-determined logic nor do they keep in specific accordance with
the market.
Human smuggling and human capital
Singer & Massey (1998) have developed a theoretical model that views
undocumented border crossing as a social process influenced by the
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Figure 2: Smuggling fees into Europe
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nomic capital, they add human capital – in the form of personal experi-
ence and information – as an important social factor for the border-
crossing model. Those who are informed can make better choices on
where and with whom to cross. Being informed is also crucial in the
sense that it can determine what route and destination migrants chose.
At the Mexico-US border migrants often cross the border several times
as they come and go. These so-called circular migrants can also profit
from personal experience. ‘Although a person’s first crossing may be
intimidating and fraught with difficulties, once entry has been accom-
plished, the prospect of undertaking another trip does not seem so
daunting; and on the third or fourth trip, it may even seem routine’
(Singer & Massey 1998: 4). Repeat border crossings were atypical
among our respondents, except for some people from countries in the
former Soviet Union, who decided to cross the German-Polish border
on their own after having previously crossed with a smuggler. Human
capital, in this case, substitutes for economic capital – saved is the cost
of hiring someone to assist with border crossing. In general, informa-
tion plays a crucial role in almost all smuggling processes.
A commonly conjured image of the relation between smugglers and
migrants is one that portrays the smuggler as out to collect as many
clients as possible in order to make large profits. As a result, the con-
tact phase between smugglers and migrants is often simplistically de-
scribed as a one-way process (Salt & Stein 1997). Frequently overlooked
in some cases is the possibility that migrants themselves might need –
and consequently, contact – a smuggler. The empirical research col-
lected in our study of the Netherlands shows that migrants, them-
selves, actively look for smugglers, and that it is very important for
them to find a ‘good’ smuggler to travel with in order to minimise
risks. As previously stated, people can find smugglers through their
own individual contacts. But according to our respondents, there are
also certain spots renowned as places where one can find smugglers.
The recruitment then is actually quite centralised. As one Iraqi man ex-
plained to us:
If you don’t know a smuggler yourself, or you don’t know any-
body who knows smugglers, you can go to the bazaar or to a cer-
tain teahouse, both of which are known as meeting points for
smugglers.
At such places, rumours may circulate about what it is like to travel in
a given way, and who is or is not a good smuggler. An Iraqi woman ex-
plained to us that she heard a lot of miserable stories before she herself
had left, well knowing the risks that could be involved in the smug-
gling trip.
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I heard that many people get lost, that people pay too much
money, and that they get cheated, for example by smugglers
who drive in circles or who just sail for a while and then set
ashore in the same country where they left from. And all these
stories about leaking boats and people that drown. Horrible. The
most horrible story I had heard was about a man who was in a
small boat together with his pregnant wife, and when the boat
capsized, his wife drowned in front of him. He himself had to
swim for two days to reach shore.
For those who do not know smugglers personally, the most trustworthy
information comes from other migrants who have previously travelled
in a similar way themselves. The following fragment of an interview
with an Iraqi man illustrates the important role of information for the
continued evolution of the smuggling process.
Before I even left Iraq, a friend of my nephew already had given
me the telephone number of a smuggler that I could contact in
Istanbul. So, the first thing I did when I arrived in Istanbul was
to look for a phone booth. When I called him, it unfortunately
turned out that he was still in Van [Turkish city at the eastern
border] with another group of people, and it would take him
three more days before he was back in Istanbul. I was disap-
pointed, but when I stepped out of the telephone booth, I met
three men from Iraq, also waiting for their smuggler. They told
me that their smuggler would bring them to Europe tomorrow,
and they told me I could easily join them. The hostel I had to
stay in was quite expensive. And, there was a danger of getting
caught by the Turkish police and being sent back to Iraq, but
still I decided to wait for the smuggler recommended by the
friend of my nephew, as I thought that was more secure.
As this story demonstrates, some migrants really prefer a smuggler
they have heard positive stories about, even when other ‘good’ offers
are made. Most of our respondents from the former Soviet Union also
first tried to gather information about travelling abroad through family
and friends before deciding to contact an agency.
Conclusion
Inside perspectives make it possible to provide a more complex and dy-
namic picture of what smuggling is and how differently its process can
evolve. Smuggling is often portrayed as a process in which all phases –
mobilisation, en route, insertion – are connected and follow each other
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in a linear way (Salt & Stein 1997). Hussein’s story, however, illustrates
very well how dynamic the smuggling process can be. People may re-
quire several transits before reaching their end destination, or they
might be detained, or even deported back home. Moreover, people in
transit may come across information or meet other smugglers, which
can impact their decision-making process. Moreover, the inside per-
spective makes it possible to consider country- and/or situation-specific
opportunities and constraints to migration. For example, for people in
refugee camps who are not considered the ‘most vulnerable’, resettle-
ment is not an option. This exclusionary categorisation may turn such
people into the hands of smugglers. Or, when people at a refugee camp
may feel unsafe and/or fear deportation, they may also decide not to
wait for official resettlement, thereby contacting a smuggler so as to
migrate sooner. In other cases, it is not always easy to get out of a
country, thereby forcing people to utilise smugglers. An extreme illus-
tration of this came from an Iraqi woman who was allowed to enter
the Netherlands, but could not leave Iraq to thus take advantage of the
legal opportunity at the receiving end. This shows that it is not only
the receiving country’s policies that may lead to smuggling, but also
the country of origins’ policies.
In the case of former Soviet Union countries, it is often visa policy
and related EU accession decisions that determine where, and under
which heading, one can legally travel. Polish or Lithuanian passports,
for example, give access into Europe, and altering one’s biography may
be sufficient to travel in a semi-legal way. By looking at various border
crossings, it also becomes clear that opportunities and constraints dif-
fer from place to place, and create variety in smuggling processes. For
instance, corruption at Kenyan airports makes it possible to smuggle
migrants by air, while collaboration amidst a long tradition by Kurdish
smugglers in Iraq, Iran, and Turkey make smuggling over land possi-
ble. The lack of Somali embassies and the restrictions on Somali pass-
port fuels the forged passport industry, whereas in former Soviet Un-
ion countries, there are more legal opportunities to migrate as well as
a greater likelihood of finding a loophole within the legal framework.
Personal characteristics such as age, gender, and the level of insecur-
ity faced by a migrant also impact the way borders are crossed. Wo-
men, minors, and reactive migrants – those who must leave immedi-
ately – make different calculations than men, adults, and those who
have time to prepare their travel more carefully. The social, economic,
and human capital migrants take with them also impacts how borders
are crossed. If one has enough money, border crossing will be faster,
safer, and more direct. The same advantages hold true if one has rele-
vant contacts with family or friends already residing abroad. In addi-
tion, good contacts with smugglers, officials working at airports and
CROSSING THE BORDER IN VARIOUS IRREGULAR WAYS 121
embassies, or border control authorities also affect how the migration
process evolves. If migrants do not have any such contacts they can still
try to become well-informed themselves; as such, human capital and
migration-specific information play a crucial role. Smugglers and mi-
grants often have mutual interest in this process, especially when
smugglers are directly or indirectly part of the migrants’ social net-
work. Migrants may actively look for smugglers and, simultaneously,
smugglers may try to promote themselves. Smugglers may additionally
have an interest in maintaining customer satisfaction if they are bound
to the community back home. This situation makes the process’ evolu-
tion more complex than the stereotyped depiction of a merciless crim-
inal exploiting a passive victim. The next chapter further addresses the
relationship between the smuggler and the migrant and its importance
for understanding human smuggling processes.
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6 Different types of smuggling and internal
dynamics
In addition to understanding why people use the services of smugglers,
and how the starting position of a migrant impacts the smuggling pro-
cess, it is also important to know more about who smugglers are and
how they are organised. This chapter provides an overview of different
types of smugglers found through our fieldwork in the Netherlands
among smuggled immigrants from Iraq, the Horn of Africa, and the
former Soviet Union. Interviews with smuggled migrants do not pro-
vide the full picture of how smuggling is organised, but an attempt is
made to link the empirical findings to IOM’s classification, as de-
scribed in chapter two. The empirical material allows us to take a look
beyond the usual way smuggling processes are described and to have
an inside perspective into the process of human smuggling. What we
can then see is how internal dynamics evolve, and how different smug-
glers’ modus operandi have varying outcomes in smuggling processes.
Smuggled migrants who have ended up in the Netherlands may
have gone through different smuggling experiences, and some may
not even have opted for the Netherlands as their final destination. The
Netherlands is famous for its effective and extensive transport infra-
structure, including venues such as Schiphol Airport and the Rotter-
dam harbour, that make it an easy country to enter and a convenient
place to transfer migrants (see also Bijleveld & Taselaar 2000; Staring
et al 2005). Chapter seven takes a closer look at what it may mean vis-
à-vis the position of migrants in Dutch society to arrive in a country, by
chance, where one hardly knows anybody and/or where one may not
have access to a legal status.
6.1 Classifications of smuggling types
Occasional smugglers and small-scale network
Chapter two presented IOM’s classification of smuggling types. Based
on our data, we could say that the experiences from our Iraqi respon-
dents fit the first and the second types of smuggling of this classifica-
tion: the occasional smuggler and the small-scale network. In the litera-
ture, this is referred to as ‘mom-and-pop’ smuggling (Kyle & Liang
2001). In the beginning of the journey, respondents from Iraq often
used an occasional smuggler who worked in the border area between
Iraq, Iran, and Turkey. Usually borders were crossed in clandestine, of-
ten dangerous ways. Clandestine crossings mostly occur on foot or by
boat, in the middle of the night, and in isolated areas. Some smugglers
walk with their clients across borders, but it may also be the case that
the smuggler simply shows the migrants the way. In the latter scenar-
io, the smuggler only provides information. Modern technology has
made it easier for smugglers to have contact with other smugglers, as
well as to guide their clients from a distance. Besides, most smugglers
know exactly when and where the controls are placed.
Some smugglers only lead people across the border to leave them on
their own afterwards, but there are also those who provide their clients
with a phone number or ensure there is someone at the next stage to
help them. A Kurdish smuggler interviewed in Icduygu’s research ex-
plains how this works.
I usually handle the route between Van and Istanbul, but I also
help the people in establishing contacts for the continuation of
their journeys from Istanbul onwards, I can make arrangements
from Istanbul to Italy by boat. I just call friends in Italy, to tell
them that I am sending people who want to go to Italy. I can
even make arrangements for them after Italy. (Icduygu 2004:
84)
This smuggler could be classified as being part of a small-scale net-
work. However, the exact composition of the network and the intensity
of the cooperation within it are not clear. How often does this smug-
gler really collaborate with his ‘friends’ from Italy? And are these
friends, themselves, connected to one other, or do they each have their
own business? Interviews with smuggled migrants provide little infor-
mation on how smugglers may relate to other smugglers. Migrants
usually only have contact with smugglers working on the ground, lack-
ing insight into the hierarchy of smuggling organisations.
As part of these small-scale networks, besides the smugglers who ac-
tually do the transporting, there are also those who provide shelter and
middlemen who bring migrants to the next smuggler. But attempting
to place these smugglers or their roles in simple classifications is diffi-
cult; people may even work for several smugglers at one time. Addi-
tionally, migrants who are waiting to continue their journey might be-
come part of the local ‘support staff’, blurring the line between who is
a smuggler and who is a migrant. For example, in the refugee camp of
Sangatte, in France, some migrants who had been there for a long time
became the helpers – or more literally translated, the ‘dogsbodies’ or
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touts – of smugglers. The responsibility of touts is to recruit clients for
smugglers. They spend most of their time at the camp’s entrance gate,
and as soon as newcomers arrive, they explain the main features of the
camp and arrange meetings with smugglers (Courau 2003). Potential
migrants often place more trust in other migrants, and for those in
transit, helping smugglers can be an easy way to make money to fi-
nance the rest of the trip.
Large-scale networks
We came across only two examples of smuggling organised by a large-
scale third-party organisation. Of course there may have been discre-
pancies in our research, since people travelling in this way may be re-
luctant to speak about it. One example we found was in the case of
Sheila, whose story was outlined in chapter four. Coming from Sierra
Leone, Sheila did not pay anything for her trip to the Netherlands. A
Dutch man arranged everything for journey, including forged papers,
and she was brought directly from Sierra Leone to the Netherlands.
However, upon arrival, she was forced to have sex with the man who
transported her, and he also tried to force her to work in a brothel
where he had connections with the owner. Apart from this trafficking
case, we came across another example of smuggling by a large criminal
organisation. A Russian family who lived in Tajikistan was forced to
leave the country due to persecution. Through their neighbour, they
managed to contact Russian smugglers who made their escape possi-
ble. As the son tells it:
One night, while we were sleeping all together in the bedroom
of my mother, the apartment was torched. While the living room
was burning, we escaped from the bedroom, and left the apart-
ment through the entrance door. We then all went to my place
and were hiding there for two months. We never left the build-
ing, afraid of being found. The neighbour, an older Russian lady,
brought us food and kept us updated. It was a horrible time. We
weren’t even turning the lights on in the evening. This old lady
somehow managed to find smugglers who could bring us to
Europe. I didn’t know how she found them. I only know that
she didn’t know them personally, but found them through other
people. They were professional smugglers. They were Russians.
They smuggled weapons, drugs, and people – I would say, they
would smuggle anything you ask, wherever you ask. I had to
pay them a total of US $ 4,000, for the three of us. The entire
amount had to be paid beforehand. And I didn’t know where
they were taking us.
DIFFERENT TYPES OF SMUGGLING AND INTERNAL DYNAMICS 125
This description of Russian smugglers involved in other ‘illegal’ busi-
ness reflects the possible relationship of smuggling with organised
crime. However, in this case, this assumption was largely based on pre-
conceived notions; the Russian family had no real contact with these
smugglers and did not know who they were. The fact that they had to
pay for everything beforehand but did not even know where they were
going, however, may also reflect a more professional type of smuggling
organisation. Both of these cases serve as examples of large-scale net-
works; for the Russian family, the whole migration trajectory was cov-
ered by one, clearly managed organisation consisting of several people.
Moreover, it seems likely that the smugglers were part of a larger crim-
inal network involved in activities other than smuggling, but this can-
not be claimed for sure. Situations in which forged, fraudulent, or bor-
rowed documents are used are more difficult to classify. If we apply
the strict technical definition of smuggling to the entire process, many
more of our respondents would fall under the category of ‘large-scale’
smuggling, even if they so much as used a forged passport.
6.2 A look at who else is involved in the smuggling ‘business’
By taking a broader look at human smuggling, different types of smug-
glers become evident (see also Van Liempt 2004). Ordinary enter-
prises, such as travel agencies, can make migration possible for people
who do not have access to these options. IOM has neglected to address
kinds of smuggling cases in which the borders between legal and ‘ille-
gal’ activities are blurred. Should agencies involved in helping people
without authorisation to cross the borders be classified as large-scale
smuggling? Chapter four presented the story of Anna, a woman who
entered the Netherlands as a tourist through the help of an agency and
now works in the informal economy. Remarkably little is known about
the exact involvement of these agencies in current migration processes.
However, in many places in the world, their advertisements domi-
nantly stress possibilities for work abroad (Kuptsch 2006).
Agencies involved in migration processes can be distinguished by
the legal or ‘illegal’ nature of the agency and by the legal or ‘illegal’ nat-
ure of the service they provide. A distinction therefore can be made be-
tween legal travel agencies providing ‘illegal’ services on the side (as
was the case with Anna’s agency) versus ‘illegal’ agencies providing ‘il-
legal’ services. Both could be prosecuted for their ‘illegal’ activities,
such as forging the certificates from which visas are issued. Further
complicating matters, agencies involved in the migration business may
not know that their clients are misusing their services for other pur-
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poses. A telling example may be found in the group holiday packages
that people book, though they have already decided beforehand that, at
a certain point, they will deliberately ‘lose’ the group. It can also be the
case that smugglers – in the strict sense of the word – do not know
they are part of a smuggling operation. In Greece, for example, many
migrants try to sneak onto lorries waiting to make the crossing into
Italy. Their drivers do not always know they are ‘smuggling’ someone.
On the other hand, they may ask migrants for money when they find
people have been hiding in their lories. In these cases, mere transpor-
ters instantly become smugglers.
All sorts of people can earn money on the side by facilitating some
part of the smuggling process, whether frequently or occasionally, pro-
fessionally or individually. Some people might even be involved in
smuggling without pay. Historical examples are easy to find, such as
smugglers helping Jews escape Nazi persecution during the Second
World War. Political parties may also be involved in smuggling, even
though it is difficult to substantiate this claim since political parties are
unlikely to admit this. They may be involved in smuggling people as a
way to internationalise their party’s political struggle or to help their
own party members escape danger. Papadopoulou (2002) found that
some of the Kurdish asylum seekers in Greece had been helped by
their party. In our interviews, we also came across an example of such
smuggling, not from a Kurdish respondent, but an Eritrean woman
aided by her party to leave the country.
One day a man approached me and told me that I had to hide
for a while. Apparently, there were problems and my political
group could be in trouble. I had never seen this man before, but
this was the way we usually worked: we didn’t know each other,
we only knew one person. If something would go wrong, yet
you knew everybody in the organisation, it could be a real pro-
blem. Now, if they catch me, I can only talk about one person,
because I only know one.
After a month, somebody came and told me that I had to leave
now. I was not really surprised. He had bought a bus ticket for
me to Asmara. In Asmara, somebody waited for me where the
bus stops. I simply followed him. We then went to a house
where we had lunch and where I was prepared for the trip. I
was very nervous; there were so many things that could go
wrong. You have no idea what can happen to you. I didn’t have
any clothing with me, but they gave me some things from the
house. I remember that I had two or three clothes; this is one of
them [points at her sweatshirt]. I still wear it. They asked me to
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get ready and I had to go to a place called ‘Nederland’. I didn’t
know anything about ‘Nederland’ – well I knew there was a
place called like this – but I didn’t know what it was exactly.
They told me how I had to travel, I had to take a plane from As-
mara to Cairo, and then to Frankfurt, and the last stop would be
Amsterdam and that would be my destination. They paid for
everything: the ticket, the passport. It was not my own passport
I travelled on. It was a Djibouti passport, with my photo on it. I
did not pay anything. They also told me that there would not be
problems at the airport; I believe they had some connections.
Usually it is very difficult to get out of the country, but I didn’t
have a problem, they simply said: ‘Go, go, go.’
At Schiphol Airport a man was waiting for me, I had to give the
passport back to him, and he bought me a train ticket to Rotter-
dam. That was it. He did not tell me anything about asylum or
anything. ‘Just ask people in the streets,’ he said, nothing more.
I did not know anybody and I felt very lonely.
As Hussein’s story illustrated in chapter five, bus drivers and police-
men may also profit from the fact that migrants need to use their ser-
vices to cross borders. For people coming from the Horn of Africa and
taking an air route, airline employees and officials were also often in-
volved in smuggling processes. This connection with institutional offi-
cials may also be a criterion on which to base the smuggling organisa-
tion a professional one.
6.3 How did migrants perceive their smuggler?
Before suggesting another way of classifying smuggling types, it is im-
portant to realise that from migrants’ perspectives, there is often little
stigma attached to the smuggling business. As mentioned before, there
are few migrants who would testify against their smuggler, either be-
cause they perceive him or her as a helper, or because they know of
other migrants who will need the same services. The general pattern
that emerged from the interviews we conducted with smuggled mi-
grants is that most migrants perceive smugglers as a ‘necessary evil’.
Smugglers offer alternatives to those who do not have access to docu-
ments, or cannot travel in a legal way because their country is at war.
As a man from Iraq explains:
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If you want to travel from countries in war you need a shield.
For us, smugglers are like a shield. You only have to buy the
shield. This shield however is quite expensive.
Smuggling can thus be ‘illegal’, but licit, or socially accepted, at the
same time. It can also be part of a local tradition. In the Kurdish part
of Iraq, the smuggling of human beings often takes place along the
same routes where goods have been smuggled for years. As an Iraqi re-
spondent said:
In this region smuggling is part of our economy. It is a way of
life. On the thousand-years-old Silk Road, whatever item needed
is smuggled, that is part of a tradition. In politically turbulent
times, it is even people who are smuggled.
The Kurdish situation is even more particular: because state borders
are not recognised by the Kurds, it is easier to justify smuggling activ-
ities. Kurdish smugglers at one end of the border work closely together
with Kurdish smugglers at the other end.
By analysing the way migrants talk about their smuggler, it is possi-
ble to get a better idea of how smugglers are qualified, and what criter-
ia are used to base these judgements on. Most of the migrants we in-
terviewed did not use the actual term ‘human smuggler’, but talked
about smugglers as professionals who offer alternatives to legal migra-
tion. From the Horn of Africa, people often used the word ‘carrier’.
More specifically, among the Somali community, a smuggler was often
referred to as mukhali. Mukhalis are described in the literature as alter-
native migration experts who reduce the chance of getting caught. The
expression hambaar is also used. Hambaar refers more generally to ‘il-
legal’ border crossing and the ‘bringing in’ of ‘illegals’ (Farah 2000),
but it is also used with regard to the trafficking of children (Hannan
2003).
Most of the Kurds from Iraq called their smuggler ‘qachaqchi’ or
‘muharrib’. ‘Muharrib’ comes from the word ‘harraba’, which means ‘to
help someone run away’ (Doornbos & Shalmashi 2001). Although
there may be fewer stigmas attached to smuggling than assumed, mi-
grants are still proactive as they decide for themselves with whom to
travel or not. One Iraqi woman, for example, made a clear distinction
between qachaqchi and helpers. She explains:
The word qachaqchi means ‘bad person’ – I mean, it refers to a
smuggler, or something like this, but it has a strong negative
connotation. Actually, it means ‘I am going to ask you for a lot
of money’. The people who helped me were simple guides, no
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qachaqchi. My Turkish helper was really nice. He had a migra-
tion past himself. He was a real adventurous type, he did very
exciting things, but I would not call him a qachaqchi. I paid
money, yes, but if you go with qachaqchi you probably also have
to sleep with him, as a woman, I mean. I did not have to do
that.
The woman makes a connection between qachaqchi and profit-making,
and between qachaqchi and rape. As such illustrations show, links
made to the mafia or organised crime are not advantageous. It is better
for smugglers to have the reputation of ‘helper’, rather than having any
association with that of a criminal. Smugglers may also have ideologi-
cal motivations to be in the business, such as wanting to help people
escape dangerous situations or war. Of course, it is difficult to comple-
tely separate profit-making motives from others, as smugglers can con-
ceivably be both criminals earning a lot of money from people’s des-
pair, as well as lifesavers. Smugglers may also deliberately position
themselves as ‘helpers’. Still, smugglers’ motives turned out to be an
important factor on which migrants based their judgments. Usually
people tried to avoid smugglers they believed were only in the business
for money. Those who charged exorbitant prices, for instance, were per-
ceived as harder to trust.
Other characteristics our respondents attributed to a ‘good’ smuggler
were related to their nationality or ethnicity; someone with the same
background was entrusted more easily than a ‘stranger’. In general,
those who were helped by family members or friends usually had
brighter memories of the smuggling process and spoke in a far more
positive way about smugglers than those who travelled with unknown,
anonymous people. Some migrants even used cultural arguments to
motivate their smugglers’ behaviour:
He was a friend of the family, he is not a smuggler. He just
helped us, that is something you do in our culture.
Another characteristic was related to the contacts smugglers had with
officials or with other smugglers. An Ethiopian man explained how his
first meeting with a smuggler took place and how important it was for
him to know that this man had good contacts.
Some friends, or actually acquaintances, of mine had given me
the telephone number of a smuggler in Kenya. I did not really
know them, but they were the ones with contacts. When I was
in Kenya I called this man and we made an appointment. He
was very professional. At our first appointment, he did not show
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up. Later, he told me that he had been there, at our first appoint-
ment, but that he was only observing me. He was very careful
with people he did not know personally. At the next appoint-
ment, he offered me a trip to Germany. I travelled as though I
were working for Ethiopian Airlines. He was a good smuggler
because he had good contacts.
Apart from the important qualification of having good contacts, this in-
terview fragment also shows that it is not only migrants who actively
orientate themselves to their circumstances. Smugglers also have an
interest in knowing who they are dealing with. Smuggling remains a
covert activity, and migrants may, at any point, turn their smuggler
over to the police.
A last interesting point that highlights the way people talk about
their smuggler is the actual smuggling experience. Those who spoke
negatively about smugglers had all had bad personal experiences with
smugglers. In one instance, an interviewee who had been promised
Sweden as a final destination but ended up in the Netherlands, had no
good word to say about smugglers.
They are criminals; they do everything for money. They cheated
me just for the money. They ruined my whole future.
6.4 The internal dynamics of smuggling and the role of trust
Our data suggests that it is not sufficient to only look at how smug-
glers cooperate among themselves. Migrants are not passive actors;
their relative power and their subsequent decisions may differ from
smuggling type to type. Moreover, as it turns out, trust plays a vital role
in the decision-making process of both migrants and smugglers (see
also Bilger et al. 2006, Van Liempt & Doomernik 2006b). In order to
include these elements in our classification of smuggling types, we
decided to focus on the internal dynamics of human smuggling. By in-
ternal dynamics, I refer specifically to the type of relations that exists
between smugglers and migrants, as well as the relative power mi-
grants hold within the smuggling process.
The relation between the smuggler and the migrant
Chapter five discussed how smugglers are often friends of friends, at
least in the initial phase of the smuggling process, and that the deci-
sions migrants make regarding smugglers are very often based on
trust. Personal relations make it less likely that smugglers will betray
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their clients, which can impact the smuggling process considerably. In
one of our interviews, a man from northern Iraq described his smug-
gler’s panic when something went wrong with someone he personally
had known in the group.
Taha had a special status in the group because the smuggler
knew his parents. He was the first to cross the river together
with the smuggler. But before they had reached the other side, I
saw the boat capsize, and Taha fell into the water. The river took
him and he was gone – just like that. This image keeps coming
back to me. It was horrible. The river was so cruel. I will never
forget this. The smuggler completely freaked out. He wanted to
go back to Turkey and kept mumbling: ‘What do I tell his fa-
mily? How do I explain this?’ He told the group it was impossi-
ble to continue. We all went back to Istanbul. This was an ex-
pensive decision, because we went by taxi and the smuggler paid
for it all.
This example clearly underscores how understanding the internal dy-
namics of smuggling can be crucial, adding another dimension alto-
gether to the smuggling process. When migrants do not know their
smuggler personally, they must rely on their reputed trustworthiness
as well as assess risk-reducing strategies. Smugglers, therefore, also
have an interest in presenting themselves as trustworthy. ‘Guarantees’
are one way a smuggler may strategise the gaining of migrant’s trust.
When a guarantee is on offer, the condition is that, for a fixed price
mutually agreed upon, a client may try as many times as needed to
reach the goal destination. Guarantees are common at risky border
crossings where the chance of getting caught is high. For instance, an
Iraqi respondent who wanted to cross into Italy discovered in the har-
bour of Patras the existence of something like a guarantee.
There are people helping you to find a truck that will make the
crossing into Italy, which you can then sneak into. If I failed to
get aboard the boat, they said I could try again. That is what they
call a ‘guarantee’, because you only have to pay once. But of
course it is ‘illegal’, and there is in fact no guarantee. But any-
way, I tried because otherwise I could not move at all, and I
thought this was the safest way.
Offering a guarantee sends a strong signal to clients that their smug-
gler’s intention is not only to take their money; smugglers are also con-
cerned about their clients’ migratory success rate.
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Beyond guarantees, the price requested may also be a reflection of
relations between the smuggler and the client. In some cases, the
amount may decrease if the individual shares the same nationality as
the smuggler. Lahlou (2002) found price fluctuations for crossing the
Morocco-Southern Spain stretch; for Moroccans the cost was US $ 200
to US $ 350, and for non-Moroccans, the price went up five times, cost-
ing US $ 1,000 to US $ 1,200 (see figure 2 taken from Van Liemt
2004). In another example, two French journalists who wanted to
make the crossing from Sub-Saharan Africa to Fuerteventura, to make
a documentary on human smuggling paid E 2,000 each, twice the
price refugees paid (Contrast 05/11/ 2004). These examples show that
smugglers depending on only their own community for clients will
take greater care in building up trust than those smugglers who work
with numerous people and have a broader range of clients.
The payment method as a way to illustrate internal dynamics
Apart from the range of prices, the terms for payment transaction are
also useful in illustrating the different relations that may exist between
smugglers and their clients. For the smuggler, it is a risk to permit the
migrant to pay only upon arrival, since the migrant might run away
without having compensated anything, or the migrant may be appre-
hended by authorities along the way, which would also leave the smug-
gler empty-handed. However, when migrants pay everything in ad-
vance created is a relationship of financial dependence. Migrants may
then run the risk of not getting what they paid for. They might be
abandoned, dropped somewhere along the road, or lose everything
should the smuggler not turn up in the first place. It may also be the
case that smugglers offer to lend migrants money to finance the jour-
ney. But for the migrant, this could mean entering into a debt situation
with the smuggler, and therefore increasing his or her risk of being
exploited. Being in debt opens up the migrant to different levels of vul-
nerability, which may result in scenarios whereby paying off debts is
connected to forced prostitution or other exploitative working condi-
tions.
In our research, we did not come across migrants who had entered
debt bondage contracts with their smugglers, apart from Sheila who
had not paid anything though was promised a trip to Europe, and then
forced to work in the sex industry upon her arrival in the Netherlands.
All the others who needed money to finance their journey borrowed
from family and friends. Contrary to the popular belief that the Chi-
nese migration process relies on loan sharks, Chin (1999) found that
most of the 300 smuggled Chinese migrants he studied had borrowed
money from friends and family, rather than from people involved in
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the business. As Chin reports: ‘Of the 264 subjects who borrowed
money to finance their passage, 164 borrowed from relatives in China,
147 from relatives in the US, and 53 from friends in one country or the
other50. Only eleven respondents said they borrowed all or part of their
smuggling fee from loan sharks in China’ (1999: 118).
The payment conditions most common among our respondents fell
somewhere in between paying everything in advance and paying every-
thing afterwards. Those who travelled step by step also paid step by
step. For the migrant, this is not an ideal situation, because he or she
must then travel with plenty of cash, trusting their luck to soon find a
new smuggler in the neighbouring country. Moreover, robberies take
place along smuggling routes and people may be bribed into handing
their money over.
Some of our interviewees said they paid a certain portion of the fee
beforehand, and the rest upon arrival. Payment upon arrival is usually
conducted through an advanced system. The migrant gives the total
amount of money to a middleman before leaving. This middleman
then ensures that the money is paid to the smuggler. Both the smug-
gler and the smuggled migrant must trust this middleman. An Ethio-
pian man explained how this system worked for him:
I had made an agreement to pay US $ 4,300 for travel docu-
ments and a passport. My parents helped me to collect the
money. I still have to pay them back. I paid all the money to my
friend, and he paid the smuggler. My friend gave something
more than half of it to the smuggler when I left, and I would
give him a sign if I had arrived safely. Only then my friend
would pay the smuggler the rest of the money.
This is, in fact, an old procedure already documented in the 1970s
among Portuguese migrant workers travelling ‘illegally’ to northern
countries. Berger & Mohr (1975) describe in their book, The Seventh
Man, clandestine journeys along both the Spanish and the French fron-
tiers. Smugglers in Lisbon arranged crossings, with a fee of US $ 350
per person51. Many would-be migrants were cheated after having paid
this sum. They were led into the mountains just across the Spanish
frontier, only to be left there. Totally disoriented, some died of starva-
tion and exposure; others found their way back, though US $ 350
poorer. These migrants then devised a system to protect themselves.
Before leaving, they would have their photograph taken. The photo-
graph was then torn in half; one half given to the guide and the other
kept by the migrant. Upon reaching France, the migrant sent his or
her half of the photo back to family in Portugal to testify having been
safely escorted across the frontier. The guide then came to the family
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with his half of the photograph to prove that he had personally es-
corted the migrant. Only then would the family pay the promised US
$ 350 (Berger & Mohr, 1975).
Icduygu & Toktas (2002) call this money-keeping middleman or
friend the cashier. A cashier can be located in the country of origin, a
transit country, or in the country of destination. Koser (2004) found
that in Peshawar, Pakistan, the third party, or cashier, is usually a jewel-
ler or one of the moneychangers at a bazaar in the old part of the city.
He even issues formal receipts to the potential migrant, his or her fa-
mily, and the smuggler, and a full refund is guaranteed if the migrant
is deported.
6.5 Classifications of smuggling types along internal dynamics
To fully understand the impact of smuggling on the migration process,
it is important to not only look at smugglers’ modus operandi, but also
to analyse internal dynamics to the process: what migrants and smug-
glers, both, must consider and interactions between the two groups.
An effective way to research the impact of smuggling is to evaluate the
final outcome of the migration process. Robinson & Segrott (2002), in
this regard, differentiate between positive and negative channelling to
come up with three different types of interaction between smugglers
and asylum seekers. In the first case, migrants have a fixed idea of
where they want to go and the smuggler simply acts as facilitator. In
the second case, it is the smuggler who decides where the migrant
ends up. The final destination is based on the smugglers’ decisions
only and the outcome is often negative for the migrant. In the third
case, negotiations between the smuggler and the migrant take place.
In this case, migrants have some degree of choice and smugglers can
offer several options (Robinson & Segrott 2002: 20-22). This typology,
especially of the third category, accommodates the idea of internal dy-
namics and migrants’ self-agency. The following section provides an
empirical grounding of the different smuggling types.
The service type
The first type can be called the ‘service type’ of smuggling, because mi-
grants have a fixed idea of where they want to go and the smuggler
simply brings them there. The destination is clear from the beginning,
and the migration pattern does not greatly differ from legal migration
processes. Bringing to bear internal dynamics, relations between smug-
glers and migrants within the service type are usually based on trust.
The destination chosen is often influenced by the existence of an al-
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ready established community in the destination country and/or family
members residing abroad. The ethnic community may also be involved
in smuggling activities, for example by providing passports that can be
used for smuggling people in. The Spanish police, to give a case in
point, possess a large quantity of Dutch passports and residence per-
mits that have been confiscated in the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and
Melilla, as well as the Spanish harbour Algeciras, where boats leave for
Morocco. Most of these documents were used by Moroccans who were
given by family members or friends already living in the Netherlands
(Van Urk et al. 2003: 26). Another indication of document reuse is re-
flected in the number of lost passport reports made to Dutch authori-
ties. Between 1996 and 2001, 682,000 passports in the Netherlands
were reported stolen or missing. A proportion of these ‘lost’ documents
were probably reused by other migrants in order to enter the country.
The new Dutch Passport Law (Article 24b: 2001) made it possible to
refuse a passport to someone with a ‘frequent-loss’ history, possibly
leading to a decrease in passport reuse.
Previous colonial bonds and, to a lesser extent, language may also
determine preferences for destination (see also Böcker & Havinga
1997). Moreover, job opportunities have an impact on migrant’s prefer-
ences. For respondents from the former Soviet Union, eight out of thir-
teen respondents had consciously chosen to migrate to the Nether-
lands, either because they had work opportunities or they had found
marriage partners in the country. Some people had contacts that could
help them find a job upon arrival or they received concrete offers al-
ready made back home. Others ‘bought’ contacts abroad that deter-
mined their choice of destination. One Russian couple paid for a con-
tact in the Netherlands who could supposedly help them to find work.
We went to a friend who works at a travel agency and told her
about our plans to leave Russia. We asked her which country
she would recommend and whether she had contacts abroad.
She told us she knew a woman in Spain who could help me (as
a woman) to get a job, but it would be hard for my boyfriend to
find work there. Then she also knew a woman here (in Russia)
who was deported from the Netherlands, but who still had con-
tacts there. This woman could help my boyfriend find a job; it
was a job in the fields. For me it would be harder to find some-
thing in the Netherlands, she said. We did not know what to do,
but in the end, decided to go to the Netherlands. We had to pay
this woman E 400 just for the contact! This woman’s contact
was an Afghan man and we only had his phone number. He
was supposed to pick us up at the airport, but he never came.
When we called him, he said he did not know that woman and
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hung up. So there we were in the Netherlands, E 400 poorer
and still without any contacts!
In the case of travelling through an agency, it is not trust that binds cli-
ents and service providers, but documents; these papers are what pre-
dict the migration’s final outcome with a safe journey along the way.
The directive type
Cases in which the smuggler decides where migrants end up can be
called ‘directive types’ of smuggling; this type of smuggling is fre-
quently referred to in the literature. Koser (1997) concludes from his
research that smugglers may choose destination countries that are not
necessarily the first choice of prospective immigrants. Engbersen et al.
(2002) interviewed 156 irregular migrants in the Netherlands, with 40
per cent having stated that they would have preferred to go to another
country. In this case, the smuggled migrants had very little to no
choice over where they flee, and the place they ended up in was often a
matter of coincidence. In the directive type of smuggling, migrants
have a low degree of autonomy within the smuggling process and the
relation between the smuggler and the migrant is usually anonymous.
Analysing various smuggling experiences, it became apparent that,
within the directive type, there are actually several possibilities: smug-
glers may only offer one destination or misinform their clients, the mi-
grant may have no preference at all, and so leave it up to the smuggler,
or external interventions may determine the final outcome.
Limited options
First of all, smugglers may only offer one destination, which means
that migrants’ options are limited. Robinson & Segrott (2002) analysed
smugglers’ decision-making processes to also conclude that smugglers’
connections may play a vital role in selecting the final destination. The
story of an Eritrean man illustrates this type very well.
I went to Italian school when I was a child and I knew a lot
about Italy, I even spoke the language. Sometimes, I know it
sounds funny, but sometimes I feel like an Italian. When I hear
the Italian language I feel a connection. It was a pity I could not
decide where I wanted to go. The mister who brought me here
decided for me that the Netherlands was my destination. He
had a business connection with the Netherlands and he took me
with him. He did not even ask me where I wanted to go.
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Wrong information
Secondly, the mismatch between a migrant’s preferences and the ac-
tual outcome of their migration may become clear only upon arrival
when smugglers, who once seemed to speak frankly about destinations
and prices, are discovered to be lying. The respondent who expressed
his anger toward smugglers in chapter six told us that he found a
smuggler who was willing to bring him from Iran to Sweden where he
had family. Our respondent explained his journey to have begun on
foot, walking with a guide from Iran to Turkey. Then in Turkey, a Turk-
ish smuggler drove him to Ankara, and from there, he flew to Schiphol
Airport in Amsterdam. The smuggler accompanied him and was in
charge of the forged documents. The trip was safe and problem-free.
But in Amsterdam he had to stay in a safe house to wait for the right
moment to travel on to Sweden:
We kept asking when we could finally leave that place, but they
were very vague about it. It was really getting on our nerves, be-
cause we just wanted to move on and they kept mumbling about
car problems and other rubbish! Finally, after three days, we
were woken up at six o’clock in the morning, and we were ready
to go. First we drove towards Eindhoven, and there we went to a
gas station, I think it was around eight o’clock. The smuggler
bought coffee and cigarettes for us, and we were anxious to fi-
nally reach our goal. Now I realise that smoking back then chan-
ged my whole future. The smuggler went to the toilet and I
smoked a cigarette outside. But then he never came back; he
had left us behind! There we were somewhere near the motor-
way, close to Eindhoven. Now I am still here in the Netherlands.
I never told my family in Sweden I was planning to come to
them. They still do not know. The asylum procedure kept me
here for a long time, and now it feels strange to move on again.
No preference
Thirdly, smuggled migrants may not have any preference at all. This is
usually the case for asylum seekers. All our respondents from the for-
mer Soviet Union who ended up in the Netherlands, though without
having chosen the Netherlands as their destination (which were five of
the thirteen we interviewed in total), had asked for asylum. Their main
concern was safety. This pattern is confirmed by others in the literature
(Barsky 1994; Bijleveld & Taselaar 2000; Böcker & Havinga 1997; Ro-
binson & Segrott 2002). One respondent from Cameroon expressed
being guided more by emotions and concerns for her safety.
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I was going like a blind man. When I think back, it was really
dangerous what I went through, but at that moment, I didn’t
realise what I was doing. The only thing I had in mind was that
I needed to be far away, far away from the danger, no matter
where.
Government interventions
Fourthly, interventions from outside may determine the final destina-
tion outcome. Many of our respondents who travelled by plane did not
plan to go to the Netherlands initially, but were intercepted at Schiphol
Airport, for either possessing false documents or not having any docu-
ments at all. The risk of interception is the unavoidable consequence
of migrating through unauthorized channels. The migrant’s choice is
thus not only limited by what the smuggler can offer, but also by
authority interventions in countries that may have been envisioned to
be just places of transit, but become – even if only for a time being –
the final destination. Migrants are often instructed by smugglers to de-
stroy their documents so as to avoid deportation. If their nationality is
unknown they cannot be sent back immediately. The same holds true
if someone asks for asylum. Therefore, migrants are often instructed
by smugglers or fellow countrymen to ask for asylum in an instance of
apprehension, even if they had been en route to another place.
The negotiable type
In the third case, negotiations between the smuggler and the client will
determine a destination, which is usually unknown beforehand and
leads to travel in a step-by-step process. Within the process, migrants
are free to shift from one smuggler to another, and for this reason, the
role of carrying information is crucial. Hubs – those places where mi-
grants seek new smugglers – are usually the same for many people,
and they serve a vital need in the process. For example, in Istanbul,
passport forgers and other document providers wait at hotels where
they know people transit so as to offer their services, either directly to
migrants or to their smugglers. In this case, smugglers have several
options, each for a certain price, and the migrant is in the position to
choose from among them. Illustrating this decision-making process is
the following conversation relayed to us by an Iraqi man, who situated
himself in Istanbul by inquiring at a shop as to where he should con-
tinue onto.
DIFFERENT TYPES OF SMUGGLING AND INTERNAL DYNAMICS 139
When I entered the shop in Istanbul there were a few boys and
a woman sitting there. They offered me a cup of tea and then
we talked a bit.
* Where do you want to go?
+ Europe
* Of course. Everybody wants to go to Europe. But which coun-
try in Europe?
+ I don’t know, somewhere where I can stay.
* OK, at this moment we can offer you Canada, Germany, and
the Netherlands. But you have to know it costs a lot of money.
With us, you pay a lot, but you will get what you want. If the
first time fails we will try again, but this time on our ex-
penses.
+ How much does it cost and how long do I have to wait?
* Canada costs US $ 10,000, and we can arrange [the trip] with-
in two or three weeks. Germany is US $ 8,000, and this will
also take two or three weeks. Holland is also US $ 8,000, but
that we can arrange within five days.
+ OK, I will go to Holland.
This excerpt from a dialogue our interviewee conveyed illustrates how
smugglers do not always completely control travel plans, and that mi-
grants may have a say as well. It also highlights how crucial the role of
information is, and that decisions are often made based on such little
information. Sometimes smugglers even advise against certain destina-
tions that could have a severe impact on the whole process, or even the
future life of a migrant. A smuggler told an Eritrean woman who
wanted to go to Sweden, but first travelled through to Sudan, that it
was better to go elsewhere.
I wanted to go to Sweden because I have a girlfriend in Sweden.
When I was in Sudan I called her, and the idea of going to Swe-
den had really settled in my head. Then those people who ar-
ranged the journey, they did not send us to Sweden. A docu-
ment was made for my child and me. We were given a new
name and date of birth and they sent us to Greece. The ticket
was from Khartoum to Athens. They told me that Sweden was
very difficult. They said you can try, but we predict that you will
be sent back to Sudan very soon. It is better to go to the Nether-
lands. The Netherlands is fine. I believed them, what can you
do? But I was worried, because I did not have any information
on the Netherlands, and it would be very difficult to survive
there, as I did not know anybody.
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More generally, it must be acknowledged that the three types of inter-
action within the smuggling process are not static. People may shift
from one type into another during the travel. Some smugglers might
only say initially that they will bring the migrant to a ‘safe country’;
this would be classified in the second category, the directive type. How-
ever, at a certain moment in the process, they may tell them which
country they have in mind. If migrants are then offered several op-
tions, they shift to a type of relation that can be classified in the third
category, the negotiable type. The migrant’s position may change if
there are several defining moments for crucial decision making; this
calls for different smuggling types and subsequently produces different
outcomes. Apart from the capacity of smugglers to offer several service
options, migrants can also inform themselves so as to be better fit for
travel. Some of our respondents without prior preference for their des-
tinations decided they would come to the Netherlands only once they
were already in the EU and had heard about the Dutch asylum system.
This meant they shifted from type two to type three in smuggling clas-
sifications. Smugglers can also provide migrants with jobs upon arri-
val. Employment may be voluntarily or forced, the latter of which turns
smuggling into trafficking (as was probably the case for Sheila).
Conclusion
Seeing as smugglers have started to play an increasing role within the
migration process of many migrants, it is vital to understand more
about who the smugglers are and how they operate – they largely deter-
mine how a migration process evolves. Smugglers are often discussed
as a static category and prejudice exists, often presuming smugglers
are linked to organised crime. Taking a closer look at those participat-
ing in the smuggling business and how migrants relate to these peo-
ple, it becomes apparent that classifying all types of smuggling as a
form of organised crime is highly misleading. Contrary to popular be-
lief, people who are involved in human smuggling can be embedded
within a local culture. Therefore, it is hardly strange that migrants
sometimes have personal relations with their smugglers. Furthermore,
people are not always involved in the smuggling business for profit-
making reasons. Political and humanitarian reasons might play a role
as well. While en transit, migrants may even start working for smug-
glers, blurring the line between who may be classified as a smuggler
versus a migrant. Moreover, if we take a wider look at the opportunities
available to migrants who want – or need – to cross the border, many
kinds of agencies surface uncommonly associated with smuggling. But
they still provide the same service to shape thus the migration process.
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This chapter devoted specific attention to the impact smugglers have
on the migration process. Distinctions were made among smuggling
as the service type, the directive type, and the negotiable type. In the
first type, migrants have a fixed idea of where they want to go and the
smuggler brings them there. Most of the time, a migrant’s preferences
are based on family relations, but they can also be influenced by job
opportunities. Because the destination is clear from the beginning, the
migration pattern does not differ that much from legal migration pro-
cesses. If we link this type to IOM’s classification, we could say that
this type would be considered large-scale smuggling, in which the
whole travel trajectory is covered by one organisation. However, if
someone travels on a forged passport or on a visa obtained under false
pretences, there is no need for a hierarchical organisation with a lead-
ing figure on top, thus making it problematic to classify this type as
large-scale smuggling. Moreover, this type of smuggling is not necessa-
rily linked with organised crime.
In the second type, migrants go where the smugglers take – or aban-
don – them. Known as the ‘directive type’ of smuggling, in this case,
the migrants’ destination is primarily guided by smugglers’ considera-
tions. However, a distinction can be drawn between those who have a
destination in mind, but could not get their preference met, and those
who, from the start, did not care where the smuggler would take them.
Another option that came to the fore through our material was that the
migration process could very well be interrupted by government in-
terventions. Being at the wrong place at the wrong time thus can jeo-
pardise the whole irregular migration process. As such the role of ‘co-
incidence’ should not be underestimated in these kinds of migration
processes.
In the third type, the ‘negotiable type’ of smuggling, the role of infor-
mation is crucial because it permits people to be in the position to
choose from several options. Migrants can, in this case, measure the
costs and benefits of risks involved, consider the existence of social
contacts in certain destinations, and assess the degree to which they
think they can trust this specific smuggler. In the negotiable type peo-
ple travel step by step. In IOM’s classification of smuggling, migrants
either travel with an occasional smuggler, who works in isolation, in
geographically bound areas, or they travel within a small-scale network,
which is flexible and loosely works together with others.
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7 Impact of smuggling and legal limits to
integration
This chapter raises the question of how smuggling affects the integra-
tion process. In the previous chapter it was shown that someone may
end up in a country other than that of where one’s network resides.
This may have a direct impact on the ease with which someone adapts
to a new society. However, there is more to consider: adaptation and
participation in a new society cannot be studied without examining
someone’s legal position. When smuggled migrants come to the Neth-
erlands, they are confronted with a system that categorises them as a
specific type of migrant. The fact that they entered the country assisted
by a smuggler may impact their classification, but there are other rea-
sons as well why people are denied access to the legal system. The
Dutch legal system will be explained in this chapter. Among our re-
spondents from the Horn of Africa, Iraq, and the former Soviet Union,
49 of 56 had asked for asylum upon arrival in the Netherlands; seven-
teen were rejected asylum; and seven had cases still pending at the
time of our interview. Those who did not ask for asylum came on visas,
which they overstayed. Some later regularised their status.
Table 6: Legal status of our respondents
Horn of Africa Iraq Former SU Total
Refugee status 13 11 1 25
Still in procedure 0 5 2 7
Rejected 6 8 3 17
Entered on visa, now undocumented 0 0 5 5
Entered on visa, now legal status as
marriage partner
0 0 2 2
Total 19 24 13 56
7.1 The Dutch asylum system
Until the early 1980s, it was mainly invited refugees who entered the
Netherlands. The annual number of asylum applications was low. In
1981, for example, 750 applications were filed, and in 1982, 1,210. Dur-
ing this period, the Netherlands had been inviting two large groups of
asylum seekers, Chileans and Vietnamese (whose populations totalled
6,000) (Lucassen & Penninx 1994). These refugees were entitled social
benefits, including the offer of enrollment in a Dutch language and in-
tegration course. Housing had to be arranged by the applicants them-
selves, though mostly with the assistance of volunteers and the non-
governmental organisation Vluchtelingenwerk (Dutch Refugee Coun-
cil)52.
From the 1980s on, asylum seekers started, more and more, to ar-
rive spontaneously. In 1985, the number of asylum applicants (many
who were Tamils from Sri Lanka) had reached 4,522. This unexpected
surge marked the beginning of a shift in responsibility for asylum see-
kers, from local to state governments. The need for control arose and
reception facilities were centralised. All Dutch municipalities had to
make a certain number of houses and apartments available for the re-
ception of asylum seekers, and they were also made responsible for
providing benefits.
(Source: Statistics Netherlands (CBS)) 
Figure 3: Asylum request in the Netherlands over time
In the 1990s, the numbers of asylum requests started to rise, with its
peak in 1994 of 52,576 requests. At this time, the Dutch government
saw how it was faced with a new phenomenon: the so-called ‘asylum
tourists’ from Eastern Europe. They were referred to as ‘tourists’ be-
cause they were believed to be only using the Dutch asylum system for
cheap holidaying, not for protection (het Parool, 4/8/1994). This situa-
tion summoned a more careful distinction between different types of
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asylum seekers. During the peak year of 1994, the 1965 Aliens Act was
changed in order to centralise the asylum procedure. Application cen-
tres run by the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND) were es-
tablished, and an accelerated procedure (which took 24 hours) was in-
troduced to separate the ‘bogus’ asylum seekers from the ‘serious’
ones. Asylum lawyers voiced their concern about using this procedure
for all sorts of cases across the board, but they were reassured that the
accelerated procedure would only be used for asylum ‘tourists’ and
‘thin’ cases (NJCM 2003).
Apart from the relatively luxurious conditions found at Dutch recep-
tion centres, other possible explanations for the sudden rise in Dutch
asylum applications can be found in the literature, where asylum poli-
cies in surrounding countries are mentioned (Jennissen & Van Wissen
2002). Politicians also often claim that the stricter measurements ta-
ken in Germany with regard to asylum seekers had an impact on the
situation in the Netherlands. Van den Tillaart et al. (2000) emphasise
another, yet related, explanation: namely the particularly attractive
‘safe’-countries list of the Netherlands. The Netherlands admitted asy-
lum requests from a broader variety of countries than other European
states did. For example Somali, Iraqi, and Iranian applicants enjoyed
affirmative decisions in the early 1990s, which could have a chain of
appeal to more people from these countries. However, a recent report
by Grütters (2006) shows that the link between asylum policies aimed
at specific countries and an increase of asylum applications from such
countries cannot be precisely proven.
No doubt the Dutch asylum system also has its negative sides. The
most obvious is that asylum seekers are only permitted to work while
they are in procedure (a total of fifteen weeks a year after the first half-
year). Further in this chapter more attention will be given to this speci-
fic condition and how our respondents experienced this system.
In 1998, the number of applicants reached such high levels that
Dutch reception facilities became overcrowded, to the extent that peo-
ple were being accommodated in leaky tents. Some politicians voiced
their concern over human rights violations, while others claimed that it
was a signal to show that Dutch reception centres were no paradise
(Van de Beek & Sant 1998: 1-2). To smugglers, the Dutch asylum pro-
cedure before the introduction of the new Aliens Act was optimal – for
its lengthy nature, a high recognition rate, numerous grounds for ad-
mission, free legal aid, and compared to other countries, the good qual-
ity of reception facilities (shelter, a weekly allowance, educational facil-
ities, and free medical care). The lengthy nature of the Dutch asylum
procedure, however, changed with the introduction of the new Aliens
Act in 2001.
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7.2 The new Aliens Act
A new Aliens Act was designed with the intention to shorten and
streamline asylum procedures, solve the problem of overcrowded re-
ception facilities, and decrease the workload of immigration officers.
Juridically speaking, the most important changes implemented in the
new Aliens Act were the introduction of one permit for a fixed, albeit
temporary period53, and abolishment of the chance to appeal. The latter
prevented people from having the option to proceed for long times
(Grütters 2003: 61).
The new Aliens Act has resulted in the larger-scale use of the acceler-
ated procedure as a means to expedite asylum applications and a corre-
sponding increase in the number of rejections. There are no specific
criteria for channelling cases to the accelerated procedure. If it is
thought that an application can be examined within 48 hours of pro-
cessing – meaning no time-consuming investigations (such as investi-
gations in the country of origin and medical examinations) – it will be
processed in the accelerated procedure. It is difficult to say whether the
high rejection rate is a consequence of an increase in ‘bogus’ applica-
tions, or of overly hasty, possibly negligent examinations by the autho-
rities. Some researchers argue that asylum seekers are not offered en-
ough time, space, or tranquillity to make their claim under the new
law (Chadbourne 2003: 11; Doornbos 2003: 254). Lawyers also com-
plain about the limited time they have to collect evidence when cases
are dealt with in the accelerated procedure, as well as the growing mis-
trust of asylum applicants (about, for example, whose ‘fault’ it is if a re-
cent arrival has no documents) (expert interview 5/11/2002, see appen-
dix I).
The new Aliens Act does not stand on its own; there are related laws
that have been introduced to combat ‘illegality.’ The Benefit Entitle-
ment Act (1998) was already mentioned in chapter one. More recently,
reinforcement of the criminal discourse surrounding ‘illegal’ migration
has emerged in the form of the Policy Document on Illegal Immi-
grants (Illegalennota 2004), the Policy Document on Return (Terug-
keernota 2003), and the implementation of the expanded obligation to
carry proof of identity (as of 1 January 2005). The Policy Document on
Illegal Immigrants (Illegalennota 2004) laid down an expansion of the
police’s capacity over the supervision of ‘illegal’ immigrants. The Policy
Document on Return (Terugkeernota 2003) further increases prison
cell capacity for ‘illegal aliens’ and focuses more attention on forced re-
turn. In previous years detention was only used as an emergency mea-
sure, but slowly it has become a central element of not only Dutch, but
also greater European-wide immigration law (Autonoom Centrum
2004; Schuster 2004). This has led to people being detained on a lar-
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ger scale than before, even though the structural difficulties surround-
ing return have not diminished. For a historical overview of detention
of ‘illegal’ immigrants in the Netherlands see Autonoom Centrum
(1998).
It is difficult to prove a causal relation between the introduction of
these new laws to combat ‘illegality’ and the number of asylum re-
quests. It is true that the amount of asylum requests has dramatically
diminished in the Netherlands since the introduction of these mea-
sures. In 2001, 32,580 asylum requests were filed in the Netherlands,
whereas in 2005, only 12,350 were filed (Central Agency for Statistics
Netherlands). But in other European countries, the numbers have gone
down, too. One explanation for the decrease in the Netherlands may be
that smugglers, as well as asylum seekers themselves, no longer view
the country as an attractive destination. Under the new law asylum, de-
cisions in the Netherlands are made quickly – we observed how people
were rejected and already put on the streets after 48 working hours,
one workweek. Migrants and smugglers both may communicate this
information back ‘home’, which may impact the Netherlands’ position,
as it shifts from final destination to a place of transit. Robinson & Seg-
rott (2002) have concluded that asylum – as well as deportation – poli-
cies play a role in a smuggler’s decision-making process. Another ex-
planation for the decrease may be that fewer people ask for asylum in
order to avoid expulsion: they avoid making themselves publicly known
to the authorities and go underground immediately after arrival.
7.3 The Netherlands as a destination of coincidence
Chapter four relayed how our respondents knew few people in the
Netherlands. Of our the respondents, around half, 26 out of 56, had fa-
mily members, friends, and/or acquaintances living abroad54. But of
these 26, only eight had potentially supportive contacts who resided in
the Netherlands. The limited opportunities available when determining
the initial choice of a migrant’s destination may cause the discrepancy
between where a migrant’s potential social support network is located,
and where the migrant’s ultimate destination winds up being. It could
have been the case that the smuggler had only one viable destination
to offer. Or sometimes migrants might have been dropped off in the
Netherlands by a smuggler who led them to believe they were heading
elsewhere. In other cases, people were apprehended at Schiphol Air-
port because their documents were not valid. When apprehension oc-
curs, most people ask for asylum immediately because it is the only
way to avoid deportation. Migrants may also be misinformed by their
smuggler about the prospects of moving within Europe, as shown in
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the story of one Iraqi woman who had friends in the Netherlands and
family in Sweden. Her smuggler had told her that he could bring her
to the Netherlands and that she could easily travel to Sweden on her
own from there.
I came on a Dutch passport, with a Persian name, to Schiphol.
My flight was really comfortable. Upon arrival, my friends came
to pick me up and they took me to Amsterdam. When I told
them about my plan, that I wanted to go to Sweden because that
is where my family lives, they gave me some crucial informa-
tion. The first thing they said was that if you want to stay in the
Netherlands you have to ask for asylum within 24 hours. That
already made me nervous. Then they said that the route to Swe-
den was not an easy one, and especially the border between
Denmark and Germany was supposed to be strictly controlled. I
got frightened and thought about the possible scenarios. If I was
caught at the German/Danish border I might end up either in
Germany or in Denmark, where I do not know anybody. In the
Netherlands, I at least have my friends. It was a really hard deci-
sion for me to make. I remember that day very well. In the end,
I decided to stay in the Netherlands.
Limited information
Taking account of their many considerations, it becomes clear that mi-
grants are not merely the passive bystanders to smugglers’ actions, but
they can inform themselves regarding where it is best to ask for asy-
lum. Sometimes the term ‘asylum shopping’ is used to describe this.
As chapter one showed, the harmonisation of European asylum policy
has still not been put into practice. Moreover, categorical protection po-
licies differ considerably from country to country, thus making the
strategy of ‘shopping’ around a plausible option to improve one’s situa-
tion. However, people may have limited information on how asylum
works exactly, and many decisions are based on limited information.
We learned about a family from Azerbaijan who had arranged their
plane tickets to Moscow and train tickets to the Netherlands through a
booking office. An employee of the booking office told them that she
had heard of a building in Amsterdam called ‘Asiel’, which was she be-
lieved was situated next to the zoo. That was all she knew.
Because neither I, nor anybody else in my group, knew anything
about asylum, we never saw any weak points in that story. We
saw asylum like a certain kind of building, where you’ll be
picked up. You’ll then be given a separate room, where you can
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relax. After that, you’ll be asked about your problems, and they
would carefully deal with your situation. We thought of an asy-
lum like a sort of a hotel. But it turned out we came all the way
from Baku to see the Dutch zoo!
A policeman the family encountered on the street explained that they
should go to Schiphol Airport and ask for asylum there, adding, how-
ever, that it would not be possible after five p.m. But he advised them
to go there anyway, so they wouldn’t have to remain outdoors. They
spent that night at the airport and asked for asylum the next day. Then
they were told that they would be sent to Italy, because they had regis-
tered their visas through the Italian consulate in Baku. According to
the Dublin II Regulation, they should thus apply for asylum in Italy, a
concept completely new to them. A corollary to the Dublin Regulation
is that also constraints those who want to move onto other countries,
but are stuck in the country where they are supposed to ask for asy-
lum.
7.4 26,000 rejected asylum seekers
Another important change implemented in the new Aliens Act is that,
during the appeal or subsequent proceedings, neither asylum seekers
rejected in accelerated procedures (but who, theoretically, still have the
right to appeal to the Council of State) nor those who have filed a sec-
ond or a third application are granted any form of reception support.
They become ‘illegal aliens’. Human Rights Watch claims that, in ac-
cordance with international agreements, the Netherlands must, at a
minimum, ensure that all asylum seekers with claims still under con-
sideration have access to basic assistance, such as accommodation and
food. Rejected asylum seekers in vulnerable situations, such as families
with young children, must also be able to appeal to Dutch authorities
for continued material assistance (Chadbourne 2003). Nevertheless, re-
jected asylum seekers are also legally classified as ‘illegal aliens’ and ex-
pected to leave the Netherlands immediately after rejection. It is the
Dutch government’s official policy that ‘illegal aliens’ are responsible
for their own return home (IND 2005), with the argument that people
can turn to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to facil-
itate voluntary return. If a person is suspected of trying to evade expul-
sion, administrative detention may be ordered (Articles 57-59 of the
Aliens Act 2000) to prevent ‘illegal’ residence or onward migration,
and to further facilitate the removal of a rejected asylum seeker. Re-
jected asylum seekers still residing in reception centres may be moved
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to ‘departure’ centres to prepare them for their return (Terugkeernota,
2003:19).
However, people may have straightforward reasons for why they can-
not return home. A migrant’s lacking a passport may be due to the
lack of time for gathering documents before having left home. Or a mi-
grant can lose it along the way or upon arrival to destination. When
people travel on forged documents, the smuggler usually keeps their
original IDs. Sometimes smugglers promise to return these docu-
ments, but this promise may not be kept. As an Iraqi man explained to
us:
When I had arrived in the Netherlands, I contacted the man
who had given me the fake document I had travelled on – which
I had flushed down the airplane toilet, as instructed. He had
promised me that I could get back my own ID card, which was
still in the safe house where I had been staying. But when I
called him, he was making things up about why I could not get
my ID back. One day the phone number was changed, and I
could not reach him anymore.
In the case of missing documents, countries of origin have to cooperate
with removal procedures to take their citizens back. Certain countries
of origin, such as Algeria and China, may not cooperate with the re-
turn of citizens. Some migrants are presented at their embassies sev-
eral times only to hear, over and over again, that their country of origin
does not want them back. In practice, these people are put out on the
street and disappear from the statistics. There even exists a special ad-
ministrative category for these people: MOB, a Dutch acronym that
stands for Met Onbekende Bestemming vertrokken [‘left with unknown
destination’] . Such migrants either remain living in ‘illegality’ in the
Netherlands or depart for another country. It may also happen that
people are caught several times, put in detention, and then again re-
leased (expert interview 24/6/2002).
In 2003, discussions began in the Netherlands regarding the pro-
blem of asylum seekers who had filed their applications before the in-
troduction of the new Aliens Act of 1 April 2001, and had thus been re-
siding in the Netherlands for a long period still without a final answer.
Approximately 2,300 of the applicants had been granted permanent
status under an amnesty programme. Their application was filed be-
fore 27 May 1998, but was still pending a final decision by 27 May
2003. But the problem was not solved through amnesty alone, and in
January 2004, the Dutch Minister of Alien Affairs announced the in-
tended removal of 26,00055 rejected asylum seekers who had applied
for asylum before the implementation of the new Aliens Act of 2000,
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but remained residing in the Netherlands. In order to facilitate their re-
turn, ‘Project Return’ came into operation on 1 July 2004, with a plan
to achieve its goal within three years. Regardless of all the efforts to
send people back, on 6 April 2006 ‘only’ 698 people – of the 18.500
cases handled – (four per cent) were sent to removal centres, and 174
of them were deported. Of the 18.500 cases, 30 per cent were placed in
detention centres and ten per cent were put back on the streets. Even-
tually 8,100 (44 per cent) people received a residence permit.
State responsibilities have no borders. Non-refoulement and the danger of
deportation
Human Rights Watch not only criticised the lack of material assistance
given to rejected asylum seekers, but also voiced concern that the de-
portation proposals represented a further degradation of the Dutch
commitment to the right to seek asylum and the principle of non-refou-
lement. Article 33 of the 1951 Geneva Convention includes the following
provision:
No Contracting state shall expel or return (refouler) a refugee….
to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, member-
ship of a particular social group or political opinion.
Several reported incidents show how the Dutch government has not al-
ways applied the non-refoulement principle. There were even incidents
reporting how people were put at greater risk because of deportation.
For example, in July 2004 it was reported that Somali deportees were
jailed upon repatriation, because the Dutch Immigration and Naturali-
sation Service had used forged documents to deport them to Somalia
(De Volkskrant 5/7/04). Because there were no direct flights from the
Netherlands to Somalia, two indirect routes were used for deportation:
one via Nairobi, Kenya, and the other via Dubai, United Arab Emirates.
For the first flights, standard European travel documents were handed
out by the immigration authorities. For the last leg of the journey to
Somalia, however, forged documents were sometimes used. It is even
suggested that Dutch immigration officers used smugglers to accom-
plish these deportations (Autonoom Centrum 2004:157-160). In June
2005, a scandal arose surrounding the case of Congolese asylum see-
kers in the Netherlands. Dutch immigration authorities had apparently
shared information on asylum cases with the Congolese authorities,
placing the migrants’ lives in extreme danger – leaving the Congo and
claiming asylum abroad is seen as an offence.
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The problems with return from the migrants’ point of view
Return migration is a very delicate subject. Most people we spoke to
were homesick and expressed wanting to return some day, but they
could not at the present moment. As with migration in general, a low
return rate for asylum seekers goes hand in hand with the ‘dream to
return’. For migrants currently residing in the Netherlands, it seems
hard to give up the lives many have already constructed. Some have
fallen in love with Dutch citizens or have born children in the country.
For these children who are raised in the Netherlands, speak Dutch flu-
ently, and have built their social lives here, it would also be very hard
to return to a country they hardly know. Parents are often concerned
about not disrupting the education of their children. Nevertheless, dif-
ferences in conceptions of ‘home’ often lead to difficult situations with-
in families.
The fact that people have been smuggled may also affect the possibi-
lity to return home, seeing as many people have sold everything they
possess in order to pay for their Westward journey. They have literally
nothing left to return to. Shame and embarrassment can also play a
role. The notion of shame comes up in interviews from a Dutch study
on the possibilities of returning to country of origin after alien deten-
tion. One respondent stated:
… the longer I stay in Europe, the more the homefront expects
from me. We want to return to our country of origin one day,
but of course not empty-handed. I would be burning with
shame to go back empty-handed. I’d rather die.
(Van Kalmthout et al. 2004: 11)
Additionally, the message sent by politicians in the West (or from the
so-called Fortress Europe) is that it is very hard to re-enter the West
after returning home. This makes repatriating a very definitive decision
and constrains those who might wish to go back, just to see what it is
like, and then decide whether they want – or even can – stay there or
not. Research done in the US shows how intensified border controls
have not prevented migration, but rather, promoted the transformation
of shuttle migration into permanent settlement processes (Massey et
al. 2002).
Also, it must be said that the impact of deportation differs by group.
Some respondents from the former Soviet Union were deported several
times, or they left voluntarily (with help and pocket money from IOM)
before we interviewed them again in the Netherlands. This shows how,
for those who really need protection and are immobile, return pro-
grammes are often unrealistic. For example, victims of trafficking may
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be afraid their traffickers will find them again once they have been de-
ported. After all, the traffickers usually work within transnational net-
works and have very close connections with the home countries. No
doubt a moral stigma surrounding prostitution in a migrant’s home
country may affect considerations regarding repatriation for someone
who has worked in the industry (Van Eimeren 2004). When people are
supposed to leave a country and are not permitted – or are too afraid –
to return where they come from, situations of legal limbo often arise
and make survival in the country of residence all the more difficult.
7.5 How to survive without state support or a social network
to rely on
The earliest impressions of people who arrived to the Netherlands
without previously knowing somebody in the country, usually relayed
their impressions of the cold, the rain, and the “strange and difficult”
language people speak. Those who arrived as such usually tried to seek
out people from their native land. Interviews revealed that the flow of
information about jobs, housing, and other necessities for those with-
out a social network often came through chance encounters: speaking
to someone on the street, at the train station, in a shop, or meeting
people at churches, welfare, and/or political organisations. A migrant’s
political or ethnic background might, however, also delimit finding
support from the community. An Eritrean woman we interviewed who
had worked for a radical political movement did not want to contact
Eritrean organisations in the Netherlands because she was not sure
who they were, what party they were affiliated with, and how they
would respond to her. As a result of her suspicion and caution over
whom to contact, she had no compatriots in the Netherlands and felt
very lonely. Another example of how background may affect possibili-
ties for integration was found among Somalis. For some people, clan
structures were still of vital importance in the Netherlands. In one in-
stance, a Somali man waited at Amsterdam’s central train station to
find somebody from his country who could show him the ropes of
Dutch society.
I did not see many Somalis, and there was a problem because
the first one I met was not of my clan. And he told me to wait
for a clan member, he refused to help me. The next man I met
was from my clan. He asked me whether I knew certain people
back home, and fortunately, I knew them. That’s how it works
in our society. I had to wait eight hours till somebody passed by
who was willing to help me. But then this man invited me to
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stay at his place, and he was really nice to me. He was married
to a Dutch woman, and they lived in Gouda. The next day, this
man introduced me to other countrymen and another Somali
man accompanied me to the police to ask for asylum.
Sometimes people were given contact details, either by friends or by
their smuggler. However, if the police apprehend someone who is tra-
velling in an irregular way, and contact details are found on this per-
son, it can mean trouble. People are therefore often instructed to throw
away notes, telephone numbers, and receipts revealing their earlier pre-
sence in other ‘safe’ countries. We also came across several examples
where people had lost details of potential contacts.
Our contact person in France had given us an address in the
Netherlands, in Rotterdam. But the problem was that it is not
wise to have such a note with you, because these people [con-
tacts] then can get into trouble if the police catch you. So we
tried to remember the address, but we forgot it! At Centraal Sta-
tion in Rotterdam, we met someone from Eritrea, and he helped
us further.
Where to find a place to stay
Smuggled migrants often arrived penniless, not even able to buy a
train ticket to reach a place where asylum may be requested; much
less, can they afford a place to stay. One Somali woman we interviewed
had to sell her jewellery at Rotterdam’s central train station to survive
her first days in the Netherlands. Many people also experienced a
downgrading of their social status. This often came as a complete
shock, especially for those who belonged to more affluent parts of the
population back home. Asylum seekers who are rejected, thus having
no state support, as well as other ‘illegal’ immigrants who cannot rely
on personal networks are dependent on alternative networks to find a
place to live. In the Netherlands, there are several private organisations,
NGOs, and churches that work at the local level to help people in vul-
nerable situations. For instance, in the Amsterdam squat scene56, sev-
eral initiatives have also been taken to support rejected asylum seekers
and ‘illegal’ immigrants. In some squats and living communes, rooms
are made available for rejected asylum seekers and undocumented im-
migrants. Sometimes these accommodations are even supported by lo-
cal governments (Van der Leun & Rusinovic 2004). The Association of
Netherlands Municipalities frequently debates the issue of legitimacy
in national asylum policy, and the debates are likely to continue in the
future. Some people are excluded from social assistance because their
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case lacks legal validity, or, for a number of reasons, they may not wish
to make use of it57. Thus, they must find a place to live on their own.
There are also people who ‘rough it’, sleeping in parks or garages in
De Bijlmer, a high-immigrant neighbourhood in south-east Amster-
dam, while others find a place to sleep during the day in Internet cafés
or libraries.
After a while, most people find a room or a house in the informal
economy, usually through subletting. This may present problems, as
exemplified by a Russian couple we spoke to. They had prepaid a huge
sum of rent for a place in Utrecht, but after residing there for a month,
came to find that the locks had been changed. Upon ringing the door-
bell, the landlord opened the door and stated shouting that he had
brought their clothes and other stuff to the police. He threatened that
he would turn them in.
So there we were in our T-shirts (it was summer), in the middle
of the street. Fortunately we didn’t trust him [the landlord] from
the beginning, so we always took our passports and money with
us when we left the house.
More extreme instances of profiting from people’s vulnerabilities are
mentioned in a report by SIOD (Social Intelligence Investigation De-
partment), such as the case in which someone paid E 150 a month to
rent a mere chair (SIOD 2005). Under the new Aliens Act, internal
control has increasingly become a tool to combat ‘illegality’ (WODC
2004: 105). Should ‘illegal’ stay be suspected, it is now easier for the
police to do house searches (Article 53) and to make arrests (Article
50). With the new Identity Law, effective 1 January 2005, everyone aged
fourteen and above is required to carry official identification in the
Netherlands. This law also makes it easier to stop people on the street
and ask for proof of identity.
Finding a job
It is often assumed that smuggled migrants are still connected to their
smugglers once they enter a country, relying on them to find jobs so as
to pay back their debts. We did not come across any enduring contacts
between smugglers and migrants, or people who had outstanding
debts to their smuggler. If one finds a job within the informal econo-
my, the lack of a fixed salary and no pressure for employers to pay
means high risk of exploitation; sometimes migrant workers have to
wait for a long time to receive their salary or they may not receive it at
all. The job is always uncertain – ‘illegal’ immigrants can be fired at
any given moment. Moreover, people working in the informal economy
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are not insured, and employers have little incentive to uphold health
and safety standards. Accidents are of major concern to many people
working in this sector of the economy, seeing as they are often em-
ployed in relatively hazardous occupations, while being completely de-
pendent on the money they earn day by day. As such, people may actu-
ally refuse certain jobs, such as those that present large health risks
(Glerum & Glerum 1995: 154). Abusive and exploitative labour rela-
tions can be classified as forced labour or, under the new Dutch juridi-
cal article on trafficking, as trafficking58. In these terms, rejected asy-
lum seekers may, over time, become victims of trafficking as they start
working in the informal economy. The same counts for unaccompa-
nied minors who are recruited outside reception centres for work in
prostitution when, about to turn eighteen, they are sent back to their
country of origin. It is unknown to what extent this happens exactly –
and there may be a great deal of overestimation as a result of sensa-
tional reporting (Bronsveld 2004; Van Dijk et al. 2000) – but a num-
ber of incidents have in fact been documented (Van Dijk 2002; Kloos-
terboer 2004).
A problem with classifying all types of exploitative relations as traf-
ficking is that it fails to take into account those cases in which people
anticipated living as an ‘illegal’ migrant and doing a dirty job, so to
speak. Again, when migrants’ self-agency is taken into account there
emerges a different, more complex picture. When we asked a Ukrai-
nian boy working in the flower bulb fields about his working condi-
tion:
Farmers shout at you ‘sneller, sneller’ [‘faster, faster’], and they try
to save every cent. For example, we had to use one teabag for
four people, and over two breaks. I was shocked the first time,
but then you get used to it. I never looked at the boss as some
kind of slave driver, who never did anything himself and who
walked around with a whip, no. He also worked hard himself;
maybe he even worked harder than we did. I thought of it as
just the way farmers live.
If people do not classify themselves as victims, is it appropriate to clas-
sify them as victims of trafficking?
Work in the formal economy is excluded for undocumented mi-
grants. Asylum seekers still in procedure are, after the first half-year, al-
lowed to work fifteen weeks a year. Many people we spoke to said that
they felt that they had wasted what could have been the most produc-
tive years of their lives in the new country. They were eager to find a
job, to rebuild their life, but were constrained by rules and regulations
(see also Ghorashi 2005). These complaints also reinforce Harrell-
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Bond’s claim that the way in which refugees are ‘helped’ may in and of
itself undermine personal coping strategies (1999).
A way some migrants circumvent work restrictions is by working on
other people’s documents. The unwritten rule in this case is that the
work papers’ rightful owner keeps 30 per cent of the net salary earned
by the undocumented migrant (Mazzucato 2005: 9). Another option is
to obtain forged papers and work through those labour agencies known
to turn a blind eye to false or forged papers. In the Netherlands, some
labour agencies let people work even if they do not have the right docu-
ments (Van Urk et al. 2003). Most jobs fall below the skill level of
highly educated asylum seekers and refugees. Even those who are
granted status with subsequent access to work in the legal economy of-
ten have problems finding a job that matches their skill level. Several
studies show how the integration of refugees in the labour market has
had a problematic development (Klaver et al. 2005; Mattheijer 2000;
Van den Tillaart et al. 2000). Employers often overlook the capabilities
of refugees and discriminate against them as a group. Moreover, quali-
fications gained in their country of origin are not always recognised. It
is no surprise, thus, that most refugees work below their level of apti-
tude.
7.6 Health problems among refugees
Refugees may suffer from social isolation, psychosocial problems, and
sometimes even from psychotic disorders (Klaver et al. 2005; de Ruuk
2005). Many of our respondents also suffered from health problems.
We interviewed people who had severe headaches, insomnia, and disor-
dered eating due to the ongoing stress they experienced. Some people
also had bad memories about the smuggling experience. An Iraqi wo-
man we interviewed told us about a fellow refugee in the group with
whom she travelled: a young girl so traumatised by everything that she
had experienced on the journey that she stopped talking. The Iraqi wo-
man still occasionally sees the girl and her family who ended up in
Germany. She has been able to observe the girl’s health eventually im-
proving, but for a long time, the girl did not talk and showed other
signs of anxiety, such as bedwetting. No doubt, to find peace of mind it
is important to live in the present and to come to terms with daily exis-
tence, but the insecurity migrants often face over their legal status, and
the levels of destitution they experience does not make life easy. Re-
search among refugees in the Netherlands shows that many asylum
seekers become ill due to anxiety caused by boredom and, most of all,
insecurity (Jongh & Van Ee 2002). A Syrian woman we interviewed
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discussed the day that she, her husband, and her child were promised
refugee status, but in the end, they did not receive it:
One day, they promised us a status. I didn’t believe it, and so I
went to the Dutch Council for Refugees to check. They said:
‘Yes, we were told that you would get a status’. When we went to
the Foreign Police, it appeared they had made a mistake. I really
did not understand anything. We were the only Syrian family in
the reception centre, our data was in the computer, and the re-
sult shown on the screen after our name was to receive a status.
But they did not give it; they said they had mistaken us for an-
other family. I was really depressed after this occurred. My
daughter was just one month old and, from that day on, I
couldn’t breastfeed her any longer. My body was simply refusing.
A life in isolation and homesickness may also impact a migrant’s men-
tal state of being, especially if someone comes from a from a former
life that is busy and full of social interaction. The pain of loneliness
was apparent when we interviewed a woman who had to leave her
daughter behind when she came to the Netherlands. She cried when
showing us a video of her daughters’ birthday, regretting that she could
not be with her on that day. She also said that she dreamt of being
pregnant again, as a way to stave off her loneliness. She knew it was
unrealistic to even think about raising a child in her insecure situation,
but the intimacy of a mother-child relationship had such enormous ap-
peal. Moreover, she said she missed caring for somebody – having a
purpose in life:
I dream of getting pregnant, of being a mother again. I would
love that. I just want to give meaning to my life. I feel so empty
now. I have the feeling nobody is waiting for me, nobody needs
me.
7.7 Here and there: how people stay connected
From the 1990s onward, ‘transnationalism’ has become more and
more focused upon in the development of migration literature. Trans-
nationalism criticises the ‘here or there’ dichotomy created through
more traditional ways of viewing migration. It conceptualises migra-
tion as a continuous flow of people, goods, money, and ideas that si-
multaneously connect different physical, social, economic, and political
spaces. Migrants are consequently more often ‘in between’ rather than
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‘here or there’. Basch et al. define transnationalism as ‘the processes
by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations
that link together their societies of origin and settlement’ (1994: 7).
The technological explosion in the domains of transportation and com-
munication has made it easier to connect people. Nowadays, updates
on how people back home are doing can be easily and quickly commu-
nicated through phone calls or emails. Transnational studies, in gener-
al, sees migrants as self-managed and highly mobile, with an emphasis
on how an increased international circulation of people, goods, and
ideas opens up possibilities for empowerment and liberation. However,
migrant and refugee communities are too often homogenised and pre-
sented in an undifferentiated manner (Al-Ali & Koser 2002: 5).
Guarnizo & Smith (1998) make a plea for studying transnationalism
from below. One of the most important contributions of the study of
transnationalism from below is its revelation that transnational mobi-
lity is not equally accessible to all migrants and may differ among
groups. When people live in a precarious situation, links with their
home country may, in some instances, become weaker instead of stron-
ger. At the other extreme, forced migration may also lead to forced
transnationalism (Al-Ali et al. 2001). Family responsibilities may push
asylum seekers, refugees, or irregular migrants into greater involve-
ment with their home country than they may wish for. Assisting fa-
milies and friends financially, or in the form of goods, can thus also be
perceived to be a responsibility, and occasionally, even a burden.
For many of our respondents, it was difficult to remain in touch with
family and friends in their country of origin, which reinforced feelings
of homesickness and social isolation. Some no longer had contact with
those left behind because of the specific circumstances under which
they left their country. One Somali woman, for example, lost contact
with her husband during the war. For three years, they did not know
each other’s location. Finally, the woman located him through the Red
Cross. Moreover, the fact that asylum seekers, refugees, and undocu-
mented migrants fall under separate legal categories can heavily com-
plicate remaining transnational ties. People cannot easily travel abroad
if they do not possess the right documents. Most of our respondents
had not seen their families for a long time because of such travelling
constraints. In addition, they often lived under impoverished circum-
stances, making it more challenging to pay for transnational communi-
cation, and all the more for travel. These obstacles have thwarted the
development of transnational communities.
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7.8 Strategies to secure one’s status
As already demonstrated in previous chapters, immigrants do not pas-
sively accept immigration policy, but instead interpret it for themselves
and then base their actions on these interpretations. Undocumented
migrants may attempt to find ways to ‘regularise’ themselves (see also
Hagan 1994). Information about how to secure one’s own status often
circulates within the migrant community. One of our Ukrainian re-
spondents was informed as such of possibilities for regularisation
when he became undocumented.
My friends didn’t want me to return to Ukraine. They suggested
providing me with valid papers. They recommended two ways.
One was they could provide me with an Italian residence permit
for two years. I only needed to extend it once, for another two
years, and then I would be able to receive an Italian passport. I
wouldn’t even have to leave for Italy to arrange this. They had
good contacts in Italy, and they could arrange it for me. It would
cost me E 8,000 in total. Another way was a marriage in Bel-
gium. My friends would arrange it in a fast way and they sug-
gested this as the best option. It would, however, cost me
E 10,000. In the Netherlands it was even more expensive:
E 15,000.
The first option meant showing a work contract (which in this case,
would be fake), and then applying for a residence permit. This scenario
emerges from the relative ease with which Southern European coun-
tries allow temporary labour migration. By contrast, in Northern Eur-
opean countries, the status of temporary protection is directly contin-
gent to the need of protection for asylum seekers (Finotelli 2004).
Along this same line of reasoning, we also came across examples of
people who went to Spain, Portugal, or Italy, where they applied to reg-
ularisation programmes.
Marriage was the second option mentioned by the Ukrainian man in
our interview. This is an attractive strategy for obtaining a residence
permit. In the Netherlands, a residence permit is contingent on a spou-
se’s permit for the first three initial years of marriage. No doubt the
precarious situations many migrants find themselves in creates the ba-
sis for relationships motivated by factors other than love, to say the
least. In the Netherlands, one constraint to the marriage ‘solution’ is
that even after a marriage proposal, foreign citizens often must wait
from within their country of origin for an official MVV (Machtiging tot
Voorlopig Verblijf) [‘Temporary Resident Permit’] before migrating to
the Netherlands. For undocumented migrants who have already taken
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up residency in the Netherlands, this poses a serious obstacle. Further-
more, there is an age limit and an income requirement imposed on
anyone who wishes to bring over a marriage partner from abroad. In
November 2004 these requirements became even more restrictive. To
be able to invite a prospective spouse, a Dutch resident must now be
twenty-one years old (previously the age was eighteen) and earn 120
per cent of the minimum income (which is approximately E 1,300 per
month, after taxes). Another problem, possibly the most crucial, is that
spouses may, in practice, be refused MVVs if their marriage is sus-
pected of being fake. A flourishing business to circumvent these rules
is underway. Mazzucato (2005) comes to the same conclusion based
on her research among the Ghanaian community in the Netherlands.
When obtaining a visa via legal means proves impossible, migrants will
search for someone with papers who is willing to marry them. In 2003
and 2004, the going rate for a bogus marriage invitation was between
E 10,000 and E 15,000 (Mazzucato, 2005: 9). Moreover, there is grow-
ing business in the Netherlands for forged papers (Van Urk et al.
2003). One interviewee bought an Israeli identity card in the Nether-
lands for E 500. The card was valid until 2010, and if stopped by
authorities, he said he would claim to be a tourist. With the expansion
of the EU, the passports of certain nationalities have become of great
value on the forged passport market. Polish and Lithuanian passports,
for example, have become valuable as they provide access to Western
European countries. Among our respondents, we heard of prices vary-
ing between US $ 400 and US $ 1,000 for such passports. One ex-
treme case was a Ukrainian respondent who possessed five different
passports to be used according to the situation he found himself in.
Apart from individuals selling these documents, institutions are also
involved. Lawyers themselves rely on loopholes in Dutch immigration
rules. The simple fact that people have filed some kind of application
for residence already gives migrants hope, regardless of what the out-
come will be. In addition, it will also prevent deportation. These advan-
tages have created a demand for ‘bastard institutions’ (Hughes 1971)
that offer all sorts of legitimate and illegitimate services. Lawyers might
offer migrants the opportunity to obtain a legal residency status, as one
of our respondents relayed. He paid E 400 to a lawyer to register him
with the police, but this registration was worth nothing. Another re-
spondent paid E 1,000 for a lawyer’s service, but the lawyer never
helped him either. In sum, there are many people making money off
of immigrants who are desperate to find ways to secure their status,
though may lack information to better steer their future. The migration
business is thus not only at the work of bringing people into a country,
but also of preventing their expulsion.
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Moving on
When migrants end up in a country other than they had intended, as
is often the case with the directive type of smuggling, or if they find
themselves in a precarious situation they could not have anticipated,
considerations to move again arise. Some of our respondents reported
leaving a country before the result of their procedure was even an-
nounced. A man we interviewed from Chechnya, for example, told us
that he witnessed many people depart from his reception centre:
I saw a lot of people stop their procedure and leave the Nether-
lands. [It is difficult] when they continuously tell you that you
came here only for financial reasons – one day you will break
down. If I had known the situation in the Netherlands, I would
have chosen another country – France, Spain, or even Belgium.
I hear people do get status there.
Some of our respondents who were rejected in the Netherlands now
live in Belgium, the UK, or a Scandinavian country; a few have secured
residency status in these countries. Differences in migration regula-
tions may thus be seen as a way to secure one’s status. Criminal inves-
tigations have shown that human smugglers, very often themselves ex-
asylum seekers, are active in reception centres, where they find people
to smuggle out of the Netherlands (IAM 2000). The UK is popular as
a second destination after the Netherlands. Some travel on forged
documents by plane, others try to sneak onto boats. This is in keeping
with unpublished figures from the Koninklijke Marechaussee border
police. In 2004, 447 ‘illegal aliens’ were found hiding in trailers in the
Dutch harbours of Vlissingen, Hoek van Holland, and Schevingen,
which held ships destined for the UK. The dual role of the Netherlands
as a destination country as well as a point of transit illustrates that the
smuggling process is very dynamic – and not, as Salt & Stein (1997)
have suggested, a closed circuit. After some time, countries of destina-
tion may become departure points, and a whole new process for the
migrant may start over again.
It is not only ‘illegal’ immigrants who leave the Netherlands; refu-
gees with legal status may also decide that the Netherlands was not
their ideal destination. From 1998 to 2003, it is estimated that 10,000
Dutch Somalis left for the UK: in particular, Birmingham, Leicester,
Bristol, and London (Van den Reek & Hussein 2003). This is one-third
of the official 30,000 Somalis residing in the Netherlands. Reasons for
leaving the Netherlands point in two directions: limited social-econom-
ic participation and cultural-religious opportunities. Highly educated
men especially complain that they cannot find decent jobs in the Neth-
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erlands. A separate, albeit related, reason for leaving the Netherlands is
that the Dutch system is perceived as patronising, offering too few in-
centives for migrants to participate. Moreover, women mainly mention
the lack of large social networks in the Netherlands, and the difficulties
they encounter to express their ethnic identity.
Conclusion
People without legal options to migrate may indicate that they cannot
rely on people’s help to survive either. To some extent, this is true –
most people who had to make use of smugglers had poor social net-
works upon arrival, or none at all. But the picture may be more compli-
cated. Some people did have connections somewhere in Europe,
though not in the Netherlands. They either ended up somewhere else
because of their smuggler’s decisions or were apprehended at the
Dutch border. They could therefore not benefit from their existing net-
work, which led to situations of social isolation. No doubt this can have
a direct impact on the ease with which someone integrates a new so-
ciety.
Migrants who have to survive without social networks in the Nether-
lands face many difficulties, especially if they do not have access to
gaining legal status. The fact that they entered the country assisted by
a smuggler who instructed them on how to best handle authorities
may have had an impact on the ultimate decision that refused their le-
gal status, but there are other reasons as well. Respondents without a
legal status are faced with all sorts of vulnerabilities. There are indivi-
duals and institutions that profit highly by subletting houses to people
without papers, exploiting people at work in the informal economy,
selling forged documents, and smuggling migrants out to other coun-
tries.
Moreover, under the old Aliens Act, asking for asylum in the Nether-
lands meant entering into a system that fostered dependency, while
people were only allowed to work for a limited period of time, fifteen
weeks per year and procedures could last for years. Research shows
that such dependency on the state leads to frustrations and passivity
among asylum seekers (Ghorashi 2005; Harrell-Bond 1999; Korac &
Gilad 2001). Under the new Aliens Act of 2001, and within the shift-
ing political context, asylum seekers’ situation has changed dramati-
cally. In the Netherlands, many applications are now rejected within
48 hours, no longer to be supported by the state.
Apart from having an impact on migrants’ integration in a new
country, smuggling, and the precarious situations people may end up
in thereafter, can also impact return migration. Constraints on return-
ing are usually fundamental, such as a lack of basic security in the
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country of destination. But, it can also be the case that people lack tra-
vel documents, thereby making it impossible to be taken back by their
countries of origin, even if migrants wish to return. Sometime suffi-
cient funds can not be saved in the country of destination to return
home with any hope for prosperity, especially with so much having
been invested to migrate in the first place. Smuggled migrants usually
arrive at their destination destitute, with all their money having been
invested in their journey. Lack of financial means strongly constraints
the decision to return. NGOs and churches play a vital role in the sur-




From the 1990s onwards, the map of migration changed considerably
as more migration to Western Europe started to take place from coun-
tries with which no links existed before. It became apparent that mi-
grants do not always move because they are invited by family members
or even by governments, but that they, themselves, take initiatives – or
are sometimes forced to do so. As a result, immigration processes have
became more fragmented than they were during the relatively transpar-
ent guest worker and colonial migration era (Böcker et al. 1998; Bruba-
ker 1994). Governments generally reacted to the increase of ‘sponta-
neous’ migration by tightening national restrictions and increasing
European cooperation on border control. Despite tightened admissions
policies, there does not seem to be a decline in the numbers of migra-
tion to Western Europe. The difference is that these ‘spontaneous’,
‘non-invited’, or ‘unwanted’ immigrants often depend on intermedi-
aries in their migration process, which may impact the process consid-
erably. Restrictive migration policies have therefore had limited effect
on the continuation of migration processes, though they have affected
the way migrants move, along with costs and risks involved.
This study has examined the migration processes of people from
Iraq, the Horn of Africa, and the former Soviet Union who were de-
pendent on intermediaries to reach the Netherlands. In this concluding
chapter, the empirical findings of this study will be contextualised with-
in the wider framework of migration theories. Migration is often con-
ceptualised as a process that takes place between two countries. And it
is either the decision-making process prior to migration or integration
in the new country that receives most attention. How people move is
often taken for granted, assuming that the destination, as well as the
route taken, are clear and mostly predictable from the start. The under-
lying assumption is that movement is not constrained, but free for all;
and conversely, when movement is constrained, no migration will take
place.
This research has shown that the migration processes of those utilis-
ing smugglers can evolve very dynamically, with a number of unpre-
dictable outcomes. The variance this research has uncovered compels
migration theories to address the impact and the effects of constraints
on mobility. More attention should therefore be paid to the facilitators
of the migration process, a subject often neglected in migration litera-
ture. While sometimes they may be mentioned as actors, little is
known about how smugglers actually shape migration processes.
Although static assumptions are often made, ‘illegal’ migration actu-
ally includes a variety of types of movement, as well as statuses that
conflict with migration laws in the sending, transit, and receiving
countries. ‘Illegal’ migration encompasses ‘illegal’ entry, overstaying vi-
sas, and remaining in a country as a rejected asylum-seeker. Addition-
ally, in a single process of migration, a migrant may move between leg-
ality and ‘illegality’. Our data shows that, in reality, the division be-
tween legal and ‘illegal’ migration is sometimes hard to draw. For
example, ‘illegal’ migrants may very well use the services of legal agen-
cies and thus travel in a regular way, but with intentions to overstay
their visa, after a while they become ‘illegal’. The inverse also happens
whereby ‘illegal’ migrants may become legal residents after a certain
period of time. Therefore, ‘illegal’ migration is better understood as a
process rather than a state of being. Institutions, moreover, working on
the legal side of migration can simultaneously be involved in ‘illegal’
aspects of the migration ‘business’. More important in our research ap-
proach was the acknowledgement that what is considered to be ‘illegal’
may differ across settings (Van Schendel & Itty 2005). A broad under-
standing of smuggling was applied to move beyond the legal frame-
work and incorporate the fact that something defined as ‘illegal’ by the
state may still be licit.
The question raised in this research was: what does it mean for the
evolution of the migration process if people’s mobility is constrained
and they must thus make use of the services of intermediaries, such as
smugglers? This question was answered by studying three concrete
cases of human smuggling into the Netherlands through biographical
interviews. Personal experiences of smuggled migrants provided valu-
able insights into the process of human smuggling that made it possi-
ble to come up with a more nuanced picture of what smuggling is,
why people need smugglers to cross borders, the different types of
smuggling that exist, and how these various types have different im-
pact on migration processes.
8.1 The research method and its implications
In studies on smuggling, migrants’ self-agency is frequently over-
looked. Most studies focus on the smuggling organisations, and
smuggled migrants are usually seen as passive actors without agency.
By contrast, this research makes people its central focus, strongly in
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the spirit of Giddens (1984) who claims that people are not simply ru-
led by society, but have agency even when their options are limited.
Adopting the agency perspective means acknowledging that smuggled
migrants are themselves active decision makers. This study therefore
addresses how individuals cope with mobility constraints. Questions
that were raised were: how do people decide which smuggler to go
with? And how much autonomy do they have within the decision-mak-
ing? How do they negotiate prices, destinations, and routes taken? By
putting migrants’ stories at the centre and moving beyond the legal fra-
mework, it becomes easier to understand the very complex phenomen-
on of smuggling without making rigid, static, or unfounded assump-
tions.
The research method of biographical interviews permitted us insight
into how migrants choose their smuggler, how risks were calculated,
and also how migrants exerted power in negotiations with their smug-
glers. Furthermore, this research method seems the most appropriate
method to collect sensitive and in-depth data about individual experi-
ences. It allowed for respondents to tell their own stories and present
the issues that were of importance to them. It also created space for
dialogues that made the interviewing process more like a ‘normal’ con-
versation. This turned out to be of vital importance, seeing as most re-
spondents had negative experiences with official interviews (which
most people qualified as ‘interrogations’ by immigration officers) be-
fore talking to us. A question asked in much research is how to build
up trust with respondents: in this research setting, the vital question
became how to best remove distrust.
8.2 Why do people need smugglers and who moves?
Reasons people need smugglers cannot be understood without a
knowledge of the context in which people leave to begin with. Most of
our interviewees turned out, for several reasons, not to have legal mi-
gration options. While revealing people’s motives for travelling with a
smuggler, I realised that the very roots of the human smuggling ‘pro-
blem’ often escape our attention. Many researchers in the field of hu-
man smuggling have neglected systematic and structural causes of the
demand for smuggling services. Upon arrival, people are forced into
categorisations designed by policymakers in the West. Often overlooked
is the fact that migrants may come from states where it is not possible
to arrange travel documents, or that people may not be in the position
to make themselves known to authorities and therefore cannot arrange
for documents. For example, some of the respondents who came
through ‘an ‘illegal’ means would have had to make themselves known
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to UNHCR if they wanted international protection, but they decided in-
stead to continue travelling with smugglers. They either did not see
any future for themselves in the refugee camps, or did not feel safe en-
ough while waiting for official procedures.
People may have various reasons for leaving their country, and politi-
cal motives are not easy to judge as being ‘real’ or ‘bogus.’ Further-
more, the continuum between coercion and free will in migration deci-
sions complicates classification. The research method of biographical
interviews helps reveal migrants’ motives for using smugglers. It also
demonstrates that immigrants may deliberately try to fit into simpler,
state-defined categories, even when their actual motives for migration
are far more complex. These constructed identities relate to migrants’
experiences of what is considered ‘real’ political persecution or ‘real’
countries of war. Such categorical thinking, and the reactions it pro-
vokes among policymakers and the public, simplifies the issue and de-
flects attention from the complicated ‘root’ causes of human smug-
gling.
Migration: a selective process
Chapter four showed how comparable structures in specific countries
might have different outcomes at the individual level. The decision to
migrate has to do with more than just structural conditions, such as
political persecution or poverty. Personal factors, such as a sense of per-
sonal security and, to a certain extent, personality, are crucial if we look
at the decision-making processes of migration. One migrates easier if
and/or when willing to take certain risks, particularly during a time of
fear or persecution. Social and economic capital is also crucial to the
migration process. People are more likely to migrate if they already
know people abroad. Our respondents, however, could seldom make
use of their social network abroad. Although some did know people in
Europe, the legal, financial, or priority-related constraints faced by their
contacts made it impossible for them to benefit from such a network.
We did, however, come across examples of migrants who wanted to es-
cape the pressure of ethnic diaspora, thus deliberately chosing a desti-
nation with which their country of origin did not have strong connec-
tions. This preference indicates that the dominant focus in migration
studies on families, households, and transnational communities might
overshadow other significant motives for migration. Moreover, migra-
tion-specific social capital is, in this case, not only related to friends
and family, but to good connections with smugglers or personal con-
tacts at embassies and airports, who are in a position to facilitate the
journey. People are also more likely to migrate if they can finance their
trip. As such, it is usually not the poorest of the poor who migrate.
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This selection is reinforced when it comes to human smuggling, be-
cause migration with the use of a smuggler is usually more expensive
than regular migration. It must be added here that migrants may make
use of resources obtained through transnational networks to finance
their journey.
It was interesting to note that in places of civil war, such as in the
Horn of Africa, decisions made regarding issues of security sometimes
led to migration patterns opposite from what is usually expected. Wives
and mothers with their children, for example, sometimes migrated be-
fore their husbands, for in this specific context, it was considered safer
for them to migrate than to stay. For the former Soviet Union coun-
tries, we came across specific gender constraints, as well as opportu-
nities, to migrate; these included migrating for ‘love’ (that is, marriage
migration) or job prospects specific to females. Women thus also were
shown to take risks, travelling in ‘illegal’ ways as labour migrants, refu-
gees, or as family unifiers or re-unifiers. Most analyses of irregular mi-
gration, however, stop at the assumption that women migrate to join
men, and that they will only migrate once it can be done in a legal
way.
8.3 The journey to the Netherlands: three case studies
Specific obstacles to migration require specific alternatives within mi-
gration processes. These alternative options have a considerable impact
on the way the migration process evolves. In chapter five, three con-
crete border geographies (Iraq, the Horn of Africa, and the former So-
viet Union) were described to give insight into how these alternative
options shaped our respondents’ migration processes.
The Horn of Africa: travelling by air
All our respondents from the Horn of Africa entered Europe by plane,
travelling either on a passport falsely relating them to the smuggler, or
on forged or stolen passports. Some people did not know what docu-
ments they had travelled on because their smuggler held all the docu-
ments and took care of the contact that transpired with border guards.
Travelling on documents usually meant that people only needed one
smuggler; the journey evolved relatively quickly and safely. But very of-
ten there was corruption, as it was not enough to have a forged or bor-
rowed passport. The fact that some people had to wait for just the right
moment to travel indicated that smugglers often have connections at
airports to facilitate the business.
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We came across several different migration patterns from the Horn
of Africa. The first was a direct flight to an intended destination. The
second pattern was to fly initially to a country for which migrants could
easily get a visa, and then make a regional move. The third pattern in-
volved travelling first to a neighbouring country, and then continuing
to the intended destination. The first option was not possible for every-
one simply because there were not always direct connections to the
Netherlands. While in Eritrea and Kenya there were such options, this
route was more frequent among respondents who migrated in the
1980s. In general, very few of the more recent arrivals from the Horn
of Africa were able to make a direct journey to the Netherlands. Desti-
nations to which it is possible to get direct flights have diminished over
time. As such, restrictive immigration policies have had a direct impact
on how irregular migration processes evolve. The same holds true for
the second pattern. Transit destinations have changed over time accord-
ing to changing visa regimes. Some of our respondents flew to Paris,
Frankfurt, Brussels, or an Italian city, and then travelled on to the
Netherlands, mostly by train and without the assistance from smug-
glers. In some cases, friends or relatives picked people up in neigh-
bouring European countries.
Our respondents most relied on the third pattern, but there was sub-
stantial difference between Somalis, in one group, and Ethiopians and
Eritreans in the other. Most of our Somali respondents left the country
completely unprepared and made the decision to further migrate once
they were in a neighbouring country, whereas our Ethiopian and Eri-
trean informants generally had more time to prepare themselves before
leaving.
Iraq: travelling over land
All our respondents from Iraq left the country over land, either directly
exiting from Iraq, or via Iran to Turkey. The Iraqi-Turkish border is
considered a dangerous border for clandestine crossing, and some of
our respondents reported incidents of shooting by Turkish border po-
lice. The majority of people crossed the first border with small-scale
smuggling organisations or independent smugglers earning some
money on the side (in the literature, these are also referred to as ‘occa-
sional smugglers’). Our interviews revealed traces of smuggling as tra-
dition and smuggling as resistance, especially in Kurdish areas. In this
region, smuggling was not necessarily considered a bad thing, and ‘qa-
chaqchi’ (the word for smugglers used by our Iraqi respondents) were
not automatically seen as criminals. A long tradition of smuggling
goods into other parts of ‘Kurdistan’, in addition to the fact that certain
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borders are not even recognised as ‘real’ borders, has made smuggling
a regionally embedded business.
A typical step-by-step migration process for Iraqis meant that they
used several smugglers to reach their final destination. Looking at the
whole scope of this process allowed us to identify different types of
smugglers and different forms of interaction between migrants and
smugglers. Notably prevalent was a ‘chain of trust’. The first smuggler
usually was a friend of a friend and therefore a relatively ‘safe’ contact.
Later in the process, farther away from home, came more reported in-
cidents of ‘unsafe’ travelling.
Istanbul functioned as an important hub for almost all our respon-
dents from Iraq. It is both where people look for new smugglers and
where they collect information. Most of our Iraqi respondents only
decided, once they were in Istanbul, to which particular European
country they wanted to go. From Istanbul, some took planes to the
Netherlands, but the majority continued their journey over land. Most
common was a route via Greece, that may be divided into a land sec-
tion with a river crossing and a part by sea. Some of our respondents
took the Balkan route (from Turkey via Bulgaria, Rumania, and Hun-
gary to Austria, or via Poland to Germany) and hid in the backs of lor-
ries. Many risks are involved in such step-by-step smuggling processes;
people can drown in the middle of the sea or suffocate in the back of
lorries where they hide trying to enter the EU.
Former Soviet Union: the blurring boundary between regular and irregular
migration
The former Soviet Union is a very large and diverse region, and migra-
tion patterns from this region are difficult to map. The people we inter-
viewed from Russia or Ukraine usually could arrange some kind of visa
to travel on, which was impossible in Iraq or the Horn of Africa. These
cases very well illustrate the blurring boundaries between regular and
irregular migration. According to our respondents who travelled in this
way, some agencies were fully aware of the ‘multiple’ use of their ser-
vices. Apart from migrants who could prepare their migration process
to some extent, we also interviewed asylum seekers from this region
who had to leave in haste. Most of them came from more distant coun-
tries, like Chechnya, Azerbaijan, or Tajikistan, and their migration pro-
cess differed; they used the services of smugglers in the strict sense of
the word. They all travelled over land by car, bus, or lorry to enter the
EU via Belarus and Poland. This was a very different journey compared
to Iraqi smuggling: the whole process was over land, covered by one
smuggling organisation, and managed from above, making it impossi-
ble for migrants to exert any power in the migration decisions.
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8.4 Context matters: most migration theory is
de-contextualised
There is an awkward – if not worrisome – gap in migration literature
between descriptions of case- and country-specific migration and the
formulation of more general, empirical theses. As a result, migration
theory is often too generalised. By looking at three completely different
cases of human smuggling, the importance of context becomes abun-
dantly clear. A nation’s political climate and the relative safety of certain
border crossing points acted as ‘area-specific elements’ that had a clear
impact on migration processes. We also came across ‘state-specific ele-
ments’ that were vital for understanding migration processes. Exam-
ples include: the local administrative infrastructure, the availability of
passports, and the issuing of – or refusal to issue – exit visas. More
specifically, people may need a smuggler to get out of their country, as
is often the case for Kurdish people from Iraq because their state re-
quires an exit visa that is difficult to attain. Other document-related
problems were found in Somalia, where no administration whatsoever
exists and people cannot even get a passport. For migrants from the
former Soviet Union, most constraints were related to migration poli-
cies in the receiving countries. Compared to Iraq and the Horn of Afri-
ca, it is relatively easy in the former Soviet Union to obtain a visa for
travel. Though at the same time, there are (unwritten) rules for who
fits the visa profile, thereby limiting prospects, such as making tourist
visas only valid for three months. These conditions impact the migra-
tion process considerably.
Taking these different contexts into account, it also becomes clear
that smuggling differs from site to site. Moreover, specific mobility
constraints ask for specific alternative services offered by smugglers.
The different conditions under which people migrate are often ne-
glected in migration theory, even though they have a considerable im-
pact on the evolution of the process. Salt & Stein (1997), as the first
scholars to theorise the smuggling process, looked at smuggling from
an economic point of view, as well as from the perspective of countries
of origin, transit, and destination. They divided the smuggling process
into three phases: mobilisation, en route, and insertion.
Mobilisation è En route è Insertion
(Salt & Stein 1997)
Salt & Stein’s insights are still very useful, though today they seem
rather narrow-scoped. The life stories we gathered in our biographical
interview approach enabled us to trace migrants’ experiences from be-
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ginning to end. Based on these related experiences, we propose that
some nuanced adjustments could be made to the model. In the mobili-
sation phase, Salt & Stein deem smugglers’ action of recruitment as
the most important element. By adding the migrants’ point of view,
however, it becomes clear that contact between smugglers and mi-
grants is a two-way process. Our respondents all went to look for
smugglers themselves or asked somebody to do it for them, rather than
being recruited by smugglers. Another assumption made in Salt &
Stein’s model refuted by our findings is that smugglers lend money to
their clients, reinforcing the idea of recruitment and deceit. However,
none of our respondents are in debt to their smugglers. A valuable ad-
dition to the model would be to incorporate migrants’ agency as well as
the internal dynamics between smugglers and migrants. Related to
this, Salt & Stein’s focus on monetary aspects does not address the di-
verse experiences of migrants or smugglers who have mixed or other
motives for being involved in the ‘business.’
8.5 Different types of smugglers
Migrants’ stories show how the boundaries between helpers and smug-
glers are fluid, and that there is no such thing as the prototypical
smuggler. Many different people are involved in the business, includ-
ing individuals or institutions one might not readily associate with hu-
man smuggling including travel agencies, political organisations, and
churches. Political organisations and churches suggest that smugglers
may not always have exclusively economic motives for being in the
‘business.’ It was also shown that smuggling could be organised in nu-
merous different ways. For example, the Somali smugglers, known as
mukhalis, arrange documents and bribe officials to get migrants out of
the Horn of Africa in a different manner than the qachaqchi in Iraq,
who clandestinely travel over land with a group of clients. Operations
are altogether different among agencies in the countries of the former
Soviet Union as they attempt to mould ‘migrants’ into certain profiles
of ‘travellers’. The way smuggling is organised depends on all sorts of
factors, such as distance that must be covered and the structural condi-
tions that constrain people from moving and therefore compel them to
seek a way out.
Another crucial finding that came to light from our interviews was
that relations between smugglers and migrants differ. Some people
knew their smuggler personally; others established contact with their
smuggler via friends or acquaintances. In any case, a trustworthy repu-
tation for the smuggler seemed to play a very important role in the de-
cision over whom to travel with. This is not surprising when one
CONCLUSION 173
thinks about how migrants put their lives in the hands of a smuggler.
We came across examples of preferences for a trustworthy smuggler –
even over someone who could bring them to their top-choice destina-
tion – because they did not want to take high risks with someone they
did not trust. But when the smuggler is not personally known, a risk-
reducing strategy might take the form of collecting information on the
smuggler’s reputation. Smuggling fees may also be an indicator of ser-
vice. If a smuggler asks an extremely high fee, one may be suspicious
of intentions. Smugglers themselves work to appear trustworthy, and
their actions may be guided by concerns of maintaining their reputa-
tion. For example, a smuggler may offer guarantees which mean a mi-
grant will be guided to reach the destination as often as needed for one
price. Smugglers may also endeavour to bring migrants specifically to
places where they will not be immediately deported, for this could
harm the smuggler’s reputation.
The internal dynamics
Our data identified three different types of interaction between smug-
glers and migrants. In the first type, migrants have a fixed idea of
where they want to go and smugglers simply bring them there. In this
so-called ‘service type’ of smuggling, migrants’ preferences are often
based on family connections, but sometimes agencies may offer an op-
portunity in a specific country which shapes their preference. In the
second type, migrants go where the smugglers take them. Migrants in
this so-called ‘directive type’ of smuggling can be split into three subca-
tegories: those who could not go where they had intended and were
overruled by smugglers, those who were misinformed, and those who
had no preferences. From other research, it is known that asylum see-
kers often do not care where they are going, so long as it is to a safe
destination (Barsky 1994; Bijleveld & Taselaar 2000; Böcker & Havinga
1997; Robinson & Segrott 2002). Another result for the directive type
of smuggling may be because the migration process was interrupted
by government interventions, such as an apprehension at the border.
In the third type, migrants are in the position to look for opportunities
and destinations. In this ‘negotiable type’ of smuggling, migrants mea-
sure costs and benefits of the risks involved, including the existence of
social contacts in certain destinations, and the degree to which they
think they can trust their smuggler. Here the role of information is
crucial, as people often have to choose between several options and tra-
vel step-by-step.
These types may also function in combinations; a migrant can start
his or her journey in a negotiable type of smuggling, but end up with
a directive type, or the inverse may hold true if one is (wittingly or un-
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wittingly) dropped off somewhere and needs to find a new smuggler.
These three types are thus not static and migrants can shift from one
type to the other, especially when they travel step-by-step. Salt & Stein’s
model (1997) portrayed the smuggling process as a linear process.
Such linearity begs for revision because, in practice, not all phases are
clearly or chronologically linked to each other. More generally, the role
of transit in migration processes needs to be better understood.
8.6 The role of transit
Irregular migration processes can evolve very differently than regular
migration processes. Many of our respondents arrived in the Nether-
lands via transit countries or saw the Netherlands just as a transit
country and wanted to move on. A lacuna in the theory is found in the
little research conducted to explain for the time spent in between desti-
nations. After the growing migratory flows passing through Central
and Eastern Europe, IOM conducted a series of studies on transit mi-
gration in Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, Czech Republic, the Russian
Federation, Ukraine, and Hungary. In 1995 another study was pub-
lished on transit migration in Turkey, indicating that the experience of
transit migration could be very long; with the average transit period in
Turkey lasting four years (IOM, 1995). Besides these few studies, very
little is yet known about the impact transit has on the evolution of mi-
gration processes.
Our data show that migrants may have to travel step by step because
their smuggler only covers one stage of the journey, their smuggler
leaves them somewhere along the way, or the police apprehend them.
In all such cases, migrants are in transit and have to find a new smug-
gler if they wish to continue their journey. Migrants’ access to informa-
tion is then crucial, as people have to decide whom to continue with
and which route to take. Some people need several transits before they
decide where they want to go, which makes the migration process un-
predictable and sometimes very time-consuming. Upon arrival to a
country, a combination of social, economic, and legal vulnerabilities
may change people’s perspective, compelling them to move again, to
another destination. At the time of this study, the UK was a preferred
destination for secondary movements from the Netherlands. Continued
mobility is left out of migration theory even though it seems well
worth suggesting that the role of transit countries may be making di-
rect migration more difficult. As chapter one showed, asylum policies
and strict visa regimes divert asylum seekers to transit countries.
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8.7 How did smuggling affect the migration process?
Smugglers who bring migrants to a place where they do not have a
support network may create new links between countries. These links
can affect the continuation of migration processes, whereby pioneers
encourage others to come. But for the smuggled migrants who are in a
country where they do not know anybody, it becomes increasingly diffi-
cult to find a house, a job, new friends. And in a country without ac-
cess to a social network, the threat of social isolation looms large.
Smuggling may also have other consequences related to migrants’
integration. Many people arrive in a new country without any money,
as it had been invested in the smuggling journey. In cases in where
status is not granted to a migrant, their economic vulnerability is
further reinforced. Legal insecurity may be the direct effect of smug-
gling. Negative outcomes of asylum procedures may be the result of in-
accurate advice given by the smuggler regarding what story to tell im-
migration authorities. It may also be the result of implicit assumptions
made between the smuggling process and ‘bogus’ asylum seekers. The
act of smuggling, often implying that people have paid a lot of money
and/or travelled on forged documents can work against asylum seekers
as they present their cases, with a severe impact on their legal situa-
tion. In general, the current asylum system in the Netherlands deter-
mines quickly who is a ‘real’ refugee and who not (in the accelerated
procedure a decision is made within 48 hours). This new policy ap-
pears very effective reducing numbers: in the peak year of 1994, there
were 52,576 asylum requests; in 2004 only 9,782. The diminished rate
of granting legal status has had serious consequences for the integra-
tion of migrants in their country of destination. It is harder to find a
job, secure housing, open a bank account, and get medical support.
Moreover, migrants are excluded from participating in society, such as
by working in the formal economy, pursuing education, or voting.
The smuggling process may also affect return migration. If people
have to face many obstacles in their migration process, chances are low
that they will return to their home country, because they know how
hard it is to migrate (Massey et al. 2002). In most cases, the time fac-
tor also plays a role for return migration. Once someone has settled
somewhere for a while it becomes more difficult to return to one’s
country of origin, because personal ideas of ‘home’ have been rede-
fined. The asylum procedures in the Netherlands (at least before the
new Aliens Act) also played a part in the reluctance to return. Many
people felt they had built a new life in the Netherlands, thereby compli-
cating a previous desire to return to their country of origin. In relation
to smuggling, people could have sold all their possessions back home,
making return difficult, in material and emotional terms. Moreover,
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constraints on return could be due to losing one’s documents during
the smuggling process59. Another significant factor is that current re-
strictive immigration policies send out the message that entry is very
difficult. This policy’s intended effect is a decrease in asylum requests.
Indeed, after the implementation of restrictive policies, numbers in the
Netherlands have dropped dramatically. However, the unintended ef-
fect was that of forcing people who have come, despite such restric-
tions, to stay.
In current policy, a lot of emphasis is put on return migration, even
though, practically speaking, most people cannot return due to missing
documents, uncooperative home countries, or because it is unsafe or
socially challenging, making it difficult for them to return. Interviews
with people from the former Soviet Union showed how the effects of
deportation differ for various groups. For most who organised their
journey themselves, deportation was usually not seen as detrimental.
People were used to travelling frequently between the sending and the
receiving countries, even after being deported. As such, for people who
come from countries where it is easier to come and go, the conse-
quences of deportation are less severe than for those who will probably
never again be able to return to Western Europe.
8.8 Implications of this research for policy
This research has shown that policies aimed at controlling migration
are often based on inadequate understanding of migrants’ motives and
the mechanisms underlying migration. From our interviews, it was
clear that, for some migrants, smuggling was the only means to enjoy
fundamental rights: to live in union with one’s family, to escape vio-
lence, to make a living. Policymakers, however, often miss the complex-
ities at work to force people to travel with a smuggler or to contend
they cannot return to their home country. Failing to recognise these
important, yet sometimes less obvious, factors at work contributes to
false impressions of the smuggling phenomenon. Moreover, it some-
times works to deny protection to those who – even in accordance with
legal principles – should have access to it. It also feeds into the com-
forting illusion that irregular migration can be stopped. Smuggling is
often seen as something that needs to be combated because it violates
the law. Despite – or maybe because of the fights against ‘illegal’ migra-
tion – the involvement of human smugglers has only been on the rise.
And more people today currently enter the Netherlands in an irregular
manner. In addition, policies may even be counterproductive. A case in
point can be found in the restrictive migration regimes that have made
it more difficult for migrants to return to their country of origin, thus
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cutting off the circulatory movement of migration processes. These
paradoxical results make more pressing the need for a new approach
to dealing with irregular migration.
Finally, I would like to address some comments on the current
movement towards a common European asylum system. As early as
1997, Muus (1997) had stated that, although member states still have
very different asylum policies, it is clear that across the entire EU, asy-
lum policies have become more restrictive. Over the past several years,
the Netherlands has left behind its traditionally protective stance to-
ward asylum seekers, instead promoting a restrictive approach. Human
Right Watch voiced its concern with regard to the Dutch situation after
the new Aliens Act was introduced in the Netherlands (Chadbourne
2003). Their report concluded that the Dutch government successfully
tailored its asylum policies with an eye to stimulating efficiency in deci-
sion making and deterring manifestly unfounded claims, but it has
also pursued such new asylum policies at the expense of fundamental
asylum and refugee rights. The Netherlands’ restrictive asylum policies
stand out among Western European countries and are looked to as an
example in other European states. This downward spiralling brinkman-
ship may also be reflected in the common European asylum system.
The fact that it is currently very difficult to find protection in the EU
as an asylum seeker encourages onward movement to states where
people believe they can obtain a secure status, even if this means that
they are not accepted as refugees but as labour migrants. This leads to
more people living an ‘underground life’, especially those who are re-
jected status and cannot return home. This raises the question of how
far European member states can go to exclude people within their own
territories without damaging social cohesion, creating a host of huma-
nitarian problems, and violating international obligations. To break the
cycle of thinking in restrictions only, we need to rethink the very terms
we are using and seek afresh alternative solutions.
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Appendix I Overview of expert interviews
13/6/2002 Interview with support group Women without Resi-
dence Permits (SVZV) , Amsterdam.
24/6/2002 Interview with return officer at detention centre, Til-
burg.
17/7/2002 Interview with intermediary for migrant prostitutes at
Municipal Health Service, Amsterdam.
23/7/2002 Interview with volunteer at Jeannette Noël Huis, a living
community for rejected asylum seekers based on Catho-
lic Worker movement, Amsterdam.
12/9/2002 Interview on the lift of the ban on brothels and traffick-
ing with policymaker at Mr de Graaf Stichting, Amster-
dam.
29/10/2002 Interview with head of research department on smug-
gling, Foreign Police Amsterdam.
12/11/2002 Interview with head of Unit of Women Trafficking, Po-
lice, Amsterdam.
5/11/2002 Interview with founder and with volunteer lawyer, Work-
ing party Support Rejected asylum seeker (WOU), Am-
sterdam.
27/11/2002 Interview with priest who supports undocumented Afri-
can immigrants in De Bijlmer, Amsterdam.
17/12/2002 Interview with coordinator of criminal investigations,
Unit Human Smuggling (UMS), Zwolle.
14/01/2003 Interview with expert on Chinese human smuggling, In-
formation and Analysis centre on Human smuggling
(IAM), Zoetermeer.
5/02/2003 Interview with Amsterdam Support Committee for Re-
fugees (ASKV), Amsterdam.
12/02/2003 Interview with Chinese migration specialist who is a for-
mer employer of Stichting Valentijn (NGO for unaccom-
panied minors) and now works for Pharos, a refugees
and health knowledge centre in Utrecht.
10/02/2003 Interview with chairman of Vuurdoop, Christian support
group for rejected asylum seekers, Tilburg.
11/08/2003 Interview with research journalist on trafficking, Am-
sterdam.
4/9/2003 Interviews with experts on human smuggling and traf-
ficking, with discussions about experience in a Nigerian
trafficking case and a Chinese smuggling case, Foreign
Police, Brabant.
30/6/2004 Interview with team leader of large criminal investiga-
tion on a Somali smuggling case, Royal Marechaussee,
Enschede.
19/12/2005 Interview with immigration officer regarding new Aliens
Act and use of accelerated procedures, Zoetermeer.
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Appendix II







Marital status Education Profession
Iran Male NA Unmarried,
no children
NA NA






Iraq Male 1975 Married, no children,
wife still in Iraq
HVE Teacher
Iraq Male* NA Married, three children
born in Iraq, one has died
None Shepherd












Iraq Male 1978 Unmarried, no children Secondary
School
Shopkeeper
Iraq Male 1974 Unmarried, no children Secondary
School
NA
Iraq Male 1973 Married, two children




Iraq Male 1968 Unmarried, no children University Accountant
Iraq Male NA Married, two children
born there, now all here
University Engineer
Iraq Male 1975 Unmarried, no children HVE Shopkeeper
Iraq Male 1967 Married, wife and one
child still in Iraq
University Military service
Iraq Male 1965 Unmarried, no children University Shopkeeper
Iraq Male 1976 Unmarried, no children Secondary
School
Shopkeeper
Iraq Male 1962 Married, wife and 4
children still in Iraq
University Military service
Iraq Male 1978 Unmarried no children University
(literature)
Shopkeeper








Marital status Education Profession
Iraq Male 1978 Unmarried, no children Secondary
School
NA
Iraq Male 1972 Unmarried, no children HVE technical Left before
finishing
university
Iraq Female 1968 Married, two children
born in Iraq, now all in NL
HVE education Shopkeeper
Iraq Male 1971 Unmarried, no children HVE technical NA
Iraq Male 1973 Married, one child, born
in NL
HVE Hairdresser
Iraq Male 1972 NA HVE Technical NA
HVE = Highly Vocational Education
NL = Netherlands
* Whole family was interviewed, but male did most of the talking; translator was also a
male.
** Whole family was interviewed, but female was telling the story and the one most






Marital status Education Profession
Somalia Male 1953 Married, 4 children, 1 was
born in Somalia, 3 in NL
HVE Military Military service
Ethiopia* Male 1965 Unmarried, no children University Journalist







Ethiopia Male 1974 Unmarried, no children University Engineer
Eritrea Female 1958 Married, 2 children 1 born
in Sudan, 1 in NL
HVE Accountant






Somalia Female 1960 Married, 5 children born







Eritrea Female 1959 Married, 4 children, two
born in Eritrea, 1 still





















Marital status Education Profession




Somalia Male 1969 Divorced, 1 child in Saudi
Arabia. Second wife in
Saudi Arabia, 1 child and





Somalia Male 1960 Married, 4 children born
in NL
University Teacher











Ethiopia Male 1962 Married, 2 children born
in NL
HVE Military Inspector at
Ministry of
Defence
Somalia Female 1954 Married, 4 children born
in Somalia, 2 born in NL
HVE Accountant





Kenya Male 1971 (Unofficially) married, 1








* Born in Addis, Ethiopia, but raised in Asmara, Eritrea; mother is Eritrean and father is
Ethiopian.
** Parents are from Eritrea, but have lived almost all their life in Ethiopia. He and his
brothers were born in Ethiopia. In 1998 during the war, his parents and one brother were
sent to Eritrea and forced to take Eritrean identity; he remained in Ethiopia.






Marital status Education Profession
Ukraine Male 1974 Unmarried, no children University Neurologist
Russia Female 1973 Married to a Dutch man,












Russia Female 1974 Married to a Bosnian, 2
children, 1 born in Russia
and 1 in NL
University Office manager
Ukraine ** Female 1979 Married, 1 child born in
NL
HVE technical Employer at
power plant




Azerbaijan Male 1982 Unmarried, no children University Migrated before
finishing
university
Tadzhikistan***Male 1977 Unmarried, no children HVE in NL Accountant in
Tadzhikistan
Chechnya**** Male 1983 Unmarried, no children HVE in NL Student
Azerbaijan Male 1948 Divorced, 1 child from
previous marriage now
new girlfriend
Military AcademyWorked for KGB
Ukraine Female 1968 Married no children (she
was beaten up by SBU,













* Couple, though female participated in conversation more.
** A Russian minority with Ukrainian documents.
*** Has a Tadzhiki passport, but belongs to the Russian minority; his father is Russian and
his mother is Armenian.
**** Mother is Azeri and father is Jewish.
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Maps
Map of Horn of Africa
Map of Iraq
186 NAVIGATING BORDERS




1 Water metaphors are often used in migration discourse: ‘waves’ of immigrants are
‘flooding’ Western countries and the ‘tide’ needs to be turned.
2 Nation-states also may exert control over who can exit their territory.
3 All EU countries (except Ireland and the UK), plus the two non-EU countries of Ice-
land and Norway, now share identical lists of countries whose passport holders must
posses a valid visa.
4 The two pilots of the planes entered the US on valid visitor visas, and later applied
for a change in status, to that of student. Their applications were granted; US autho-
rities regard students as low-risk visitors.
5 Ceuta and Melilla were established as city fortresses after the expulsion of the Moors
from Spain, around 1500. They originally served as military outposts to provide ad-
vance warning of an Islamic attack.
6 Prior to 1991 Moroccans could enter Spain as ‘tourists’, to then overstay their visas
and work ‘illegally’.
7 Resettlement to a third country is possible through UNHCR for individuals who are
not sufficiently protected in their original host country or who are considered to be
particularly vulnerable for various reasons (e.g., being disabled, injured, or a ‘woman
at risk’).
8 The non-refoulement principle is laid down in the Geneva Convention (1951): it and
states that ‘no refugee should be returned to any country where he or she is likely to
face persecution or torture’.
9 Exceptions are made for ‘acute’ medical care, education for minors of school-age, and
legal aid in relation to residence status.
10 The next chapter explains the difference between smuggling and trafficking.
11 Immigrants who have died in detention centres are also counted for the UNITED
death list.
12 In economically and politically weak states, citizens may be viewed as valuable ‘com-
modities’ for export. (One case in point is the Philippines, a country whose main
source of income comes from migrant remittances). As such, the sending side’s la-
bour exporting agencies may be deeply embedded in society, involving actors from
both the private and the public sectors.
13 Export of labour can be contrasted with the import of slavery-like labour. The key fea-
ture of such an operation is that the migrants lose their freedom and may become
bonded labourers forced to live in servitude.
14 In this context, the term ‘servitude’ should be understood to include practices that
have elsewhere been defined as contemporary forms of slavery.
15 In 1997, no division was yet being made between smuggling and trafficking. Such
use of the term ‘trafficking’ would thus also encompass elements currently differen-
tiated by the term ‘smuggling’.
16 The Research and Documentation Centre (WODC) reports biennially to the Dutch
Parliament on the nature of organised crime with the so-called Dutch Monitor on Or-
ganised Crime.
17 Though it must be noted: Zhang & Chin (2002) found a surprisingly high percen-
tage of women involved in Chinese human smuggling. Soudijn (2006) confirms this
for Chinese smuggling to or through the Netherlands. Of the 178 instances in which
people were suspected of involvement in a Chinese human smuggling case, 86 per
cent were men and fourteen per cent, women.
18 The word ‘coyote’ is used colloquially to refer to smugglers working along the US-
Mexico border.
In mythical stories, this species of prairie wolf is often portrayed as a trickster who
arrives to transform tranquillity into chaos.
19 See Appendix 1 for list of expert interviews.
20 See appendix 2 for list of respondents and an overview of their personal details.
21 Doornbos (2003) found similar examples in her research on asylum hearings.
22 As a minor, one is granted special protection and care, the most crucial factor being
that one cannot be deported before age eighteen. This exception within the restrictive
policy makes it attractive to claim that one is a minor.
23 Harrell-Bond (1986, 1991) claims that this leads to a certain state of apathy and de-
pendency: what she calls the ‘refugee dependency syndrome’.
24 For more detailed information on the impact of trauma in life story research, see Ro-
gers & Leydesdorff (1999).
25 According to the police, many women refer to the place where they met their traffick-
er ‘a hotel’, but in reality, it is often a brothel (interview with police expert working
on trafficking cases, September 2003, Eindhoven).
26 With a Schengen visa one may enter one country and travel freely throughout the
Schengen zone.
27 The ‘Horn of Africa’ is not an indigenous term, but rather a geographical one that
springs from a glance at a map: the shape of this region looks like the horn of a rhi-
noceros penetrating the Indian Ocean. Initially, the Horn of Africa only comprised
Somalia and Ethiopia, but later, Sudan was also included. One common denominator
to the region is a perceived history of strife: disputes over borders, civil wars, eco-
nomic recession, and environmental decay, in addition to the famines that seem to
grow in scale and frequency. The term ‘Greater Horn’ has been used to include
neighbouring East African states threatened by food shortages (Woodward 1996). To-
day the Horn of Africa includes Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Kenya, and Su-
dan.
28 Although they share a common ancestry, religion, culture, and language, the Somali
people are highly divided, into clan, sub-clan, and family. Among the pastoralists (in
semi-desert areas), four major clan families exist: the Darod, Haviye, Isaaq, and the
Dir, while in the south, there are numerous descendent clans and sub-clans.
29 The campaign was repeated, twenty years later, in 2005, though this time with focus
less on collecting money, and more on putting pressure on Western governments re-
garding debt remission and removal of trade barriers.
30 National service in Eritrea is compulsory for all men and women between eighteen
and 40 years old; deserters are arrested.
31 In 1975, the Dutch government rejected permanent political asylum to Kurdish refu-
gees from Iraq because the Netherlands had good relations with the country. These
refugees had to sign a document testifying they would not participate in political ac-
tion from the Netherlands (Stein 1999).
32 Anfal is the name of the eighth sura of the Koran, referring to the fight against the
unbelievers.
33 The March 1991 Shi’ite Uprising was—in contrast to the Kurdish uprising—by and
large cut off from Western press coverage because it was difficult to access Iraqi soil
during the actual revolt. Western journalists had access to Kurdistan through Turkey,
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though to get to the Shi’ı́te Uprising, they faced the nearly impossible task of passing
the frontline of either the Republican Guard or the Iranian army. The omission from
international news had unjustly negated much of the uprising itself, no doubt a great
frustration of those who fought in it and survived its defeat (Sharif 2003: 51).
34 This family was rejected on the basis of a language test done by immigration services
that indicated they were from Iraq. The family’s explanation for this ‘mistake’ was
that the immigration officer didn’t know about an Armenian minority present in
Iraq.
35 An internal passport was the document the average Soviet citizen possessed. This in-
ternal passport system ensured that all citizens were registered with the police.
36 In 1991, the Soviet Union dissolved into fifteen independent states, with twelve of
these states reunited in the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States). The three
Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) were not included. Altogether, the fifteen
states were the Russian Federation, the western part (Moldavia, Ukraine, Belarus),
Trans-Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia) and the Central Asian Republics (Ka-
zakhstan, Kyrgyz, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan).
37 The fieldwork we conducted took place in the Netherlands between May 2003 and
May 2004.
38 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz, Latvia, Lithua-
nia, Moldavia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan.
39 Social ties abroad were defined as family, friends, or acquaintances (schoolmates, col-
leagues). We only counted whether they had ties or not. Most of our respondents’ so-
cial ties resided in Europe, others in the US or Canada. Social ties in neighbouring
countries like Kenya, Saudi Arabia, or Yemen were not counted, as this research ex-
clusively focuses on migration to the West.
40 Completion of highly vocational education and university were classified as higher
education.
41 This is the Somali word for ‘smuggler’. Chapter six will give more information about
how migrants refer to their smuggler.
42 For example: ‘How illegal migrants use Kenyan airports’, Daily Nation, 20 February
2002, and ‘Travellers detained over forged papers’ Daily Nation, 30 August 2002.
43 At the other extreme, certain countries of origin lack the will to combat irregular mi-
gration, as the highest state income comes in the form of remittances received from
overseas (Koser & Van Hear 2003).
44 In the mid-1980s, the Iraqi government destroyed several Kurdish villages along the
border of Iran. Many villagers had to move to Majma (camps owned by the Ba’ath re-
gime) close to the cities. The more wealthy people (like Hussein’s family) could move
to the cities of, Sulemani or Irbil (Hawler to Kurds). After the attack on smaller vil-
lages, the bigger conglomeration of Kaladeze was also destroyed.
45 Sometimes smugglers advise people travelling over land to bring a set of new clothes
to change into, so they do not appear to have just walked for a week across the
mountains.
46 Many Iraqi Kurds cross via Van. A UNCHR office is located in the city and there is a
substantial Iraqi population in Van.
47 Some smugglers guarantee migrants they will leave Istanbul within one week.
48 The Greek asylum application process is rather long, lasting between one and three
years on average (including appeals), and the rate of asylum recognition is very low.
In 2002 it was only 0.3 per cent, while in the rest of the EU it was 21.2 per cent (Pa-
padopoulou 2004: 10). The accommodation infrastructure for asylum seekers in
Greece remains insufficient. Moreover, the state does not grant social benefits to re-
fugees and asylum seekers.
49 The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
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50 Because some borrowed money from relatives in China and the US both, the total
number exceeds 264.
51 This payment required as much as a year’s earnings for the average Portuguese farm-
er.
52 For a historical overview of the Dutch asylum system see Bronkhorst (1990).
53 In the old procedure, there were several statuses and people could appeal until they
were given better status. Convention refugees were given a permanent status known
as A Status. The other two options of C Status and VVTV were temporary. C Status
was a residence permit given on the basis of humanitarian grounds. The VVTV was
a conditional residence permit that was given for a limited time period on the basis
of the general situation in the country of origin.
54 Only Western countries, such as those in Europe, the US, and Canada, were included
in the classification ‘abroad’. Regional ties like with Kenya or Yemen were not
counted, as the research focuses on migration to the West.
55 The number 26,000 was used as this was the estimated number of affected cases.
56 Squatting is legally permitted in the Netherlands according to a verdict of the High
Council in 1914. Unlike in other countries protected is the use of a house rather than
the house itself. In the 1960s, part of Provo (a group of intellectuals, artists, and stu-
dents that aimed to erupt authoritarian and conservative order by means of ‘provoca-
tion’), set up a squatting and organising bureau. After having squatted a few places
successfully, the group became overwhelmed by massive amounts of requests for
help in squatting. By the beginning of the 1980s, the squatting movement had
boomed to include around 20,000 people. Bars, theatres, pirate radios, squatter in-
formation services, cinemas, popular kitchens, discos, bike workshops, and printing
presses all provided the infrastructure for the thriving network of these autonomous
spaces. When city regeneration and later gentrification, was practiced many neigh-
bourhood facilities disappeared and the squatting movement became more isolated.
It finally led to the squatting movement’s isolation and implosion (Duivenvoorden
2000). However, to this day, the city of Amsterdam still benefits from the move-
ment’s legacy in the form of a rather extensive infrastructure.
57 While I was doing interviews at NGOs, it surprised me that so many people refused
to accept second-hand clothes offered to them by social workers. One respondent ex-
plained the symbolic meaning of clothing in the following way: ‘It is a symbol of pos-
sibilities, of a belief that one day things will be better. It is about not giving up hope.’
58 The new trafficking article in the Netherlands came into force at 1 January 2005 and
broadened the definition to sectors other than prostitution.
59 States are required to readmit their own citizens so as to avoid a situation in which
the state of which a person is a national frustrates the expulsion by other states. But
states may refuse to take citizens back if there is any doubt that the individual is a ci-
tizen of that particular state, so for readmission, a genuine passport is necessary.
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Içduygu, A. (2005), Transit migration in Turkey: Trends, patterns, and issues. Badia Fiesolana:
European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies.
Illegalennota (2004), Illegalennota. Aanvullende maatregelen voor het tegengaan van illegaliteit
en de aanpak van uitbuiters van illegalen in Nederland. Den-Haag: Directoraat-Generaal In-
ternationale Aangelegenheden en Vreemdelingenzaken.
IND (2000a), Smokkelbeeld. Gegevens over smokkel van asielzoekers uit de tien belangrijkste her-
komstlanden in 1999. Den-Haag: Immigratie en Naturalisatie Dienst (IND).
IND (2000b), Asielinstroom uit de Kaukasus en de Russische Federatie. Den-Haag: Immigratie
en Naturalisatie Dienst (IND).
IND (2001), Langs gebaande omwegen, migratie risico analyse West Afrika. Den-Haag: Immigra-
tie en Naturalisatiedienst (IND).
IND (2005), Reception systems, their capacities and the social situation of asylum applicants with-
in the reception system in the EU member states: The Netherlands. Den-Haag:INDIAC.
INDIAC (2003), Cohortanalyse asielprocedure 1994-2002. Den-Haag: Ministerie van Justitie.
IOM (1994), Trafficking in migrants: Characteristics and trends in different regions of the world.
Geneva: International Organisation for Migration.
IOM (1995), Transit migration in Turkey. Geneva: International Organisation for Migration.
Jacquin-Berdal, D. & M. Plaut (eds.) (2005), Unfinished Business. Ethiopia and Eritrea at war.
Trenton: Red Sea Press
Jennissen, R. & L. Van Wissen (2002), ‘Internationale vluchtelingen. Herkomst en bestem-
ming’. DEMOS, Jaargang 18 (3).
Jongh, D. de & M. van Ee (2002), Onderzoek naar gezondheidsbeı̈nvloedende factoren ervaren
door asielzoekers in een asielzoekerscentrum. AZC Crailo.
Jordan, B. & F. Duvell (2002), Irregular Migration. The dilemma’s of transnational mobility.
Cheltenham/Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Kalmthout, A.van, A. Graft, L. Hansen & M. Hadrouk (2004), Terugkeermogelijkheden van
vreemdelingen in vreemdelingenbewaring. Een onderzoek naar verhinderende, bemoeilijkende
of vergemakkelijkende factoren van terugkeer van vreemdelingen in vreemdelingenbewaring.
Deel 3: Het vergeten gelaat van de vreemdeling. Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers.
Klaver, J., S. Mateman & E. Tromp (2005), Vluchtelingenwerk Integratiebarometer. Een onder-
zoek naar de integratie van vluchtelingen in Nederland. Amsterdam: Regioplan.
Kleemans, E., E. van den Berg & H. van de Bunt (1998), Monitor Georganiseerde Criminaliteit.
Den-Haag: WODC.
Kleemans, E., & M. Brienen (2001), ‘Van vriendendienst tot slangenkop. Een analyse van
tien opsporingsonderzoeken naar mensensmokkel’, Tijdschrift voor criminologie, 43 (4):
23-36.
198 NAVIGATING BORDERS
Kleemans, E. & H. van de Bunt (2003), ‘The social organisation of human trafficking’, in: D.
Siegel, H. van de Bunt & D. Zaitch (eds.), Global Organised Crime. Trends and develop-
ments. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Kleist, N. (2004), ‘Nomads, Sailors and Refugees: A century of Somali migration’. Sussex
Migration Working Paper No. 23. Brighton: Sussex Centre for Migration Research.
Kloosterboer, K. (2004), Ongezien en Ongehoord. Kinderhandel in Nederland, een eerste in-
ventarisatie. Den-Haag: UNICEF Nederland.
Kofman, E., A. Phizacklea, P. Raghuram & R. Sales (2000), Gender and International Migra-
tion in Europe. London/New York: Routledge.
Kofman, E., P. Raghuram & M. Merefield (2005), Gendered Migrations: towards gender sen-
sitive policies in the UK. Asylum and Migration Working Paper. London: IPPR.
Kopnina, H. (2005), East to West Migration: Russian Migrants in Western Europe. Aldershot:
Ashgate.
Korac, M. & L. Gilad (2001), Dilemmas of integration: Two policy contexts and refugee strategies
for integration. Final report of a comparative study of the integration experiences of refu-
gees from former Yugoslavia in Rome and Amsterdam.
Koser, K. (1997), ‘Social Networks and the Asylum Cycle. The Case of Iranians in the Neth-
erlands’, International Migration Review 31 (3): 591-611.
Koser, K. (2000), ‘Asylum Policies, Trafficking and Vulnerability’, International Migration, 38
(3): 91-111.
Koser, K. & C. Pinkerton (2002), The social networks of asylum seekers and the dissemination of
information about countries of asylum. London: Home Office. Research Development and
Statistics Directorate.
Koser, K. (2004), ‘Why human smuggling pays’, paper submitted to Transactions of the In-
stitute of British geographers, september 2004.
Koslowski, R. (2000),
The mobility money can buy: Human smuggling and border control in the European
Union, in P. Andreas & T. Snyder (eds.), The Wall around the West. State Borders and Im-
migration Controls in North America and Europe: 203-218.
Kreyenbroek, P. & S. Stefan (1992), The Kurds: a Contemporary Overview. London: Routledge.
Kritz, M., L. Lim & H. Zlotnik (1992), International Migration Systems: A global approach. Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press.
Krupa, J. & R. Pasztelanski (1999), ‘Slave trafficking’. CIS news, digital newsletter.
Kunz, E. F. (1973), ‘The refugees in flight: Kinetic models and forms of displacement’, Inter-
national Migration Review 7 (2): 125-146.
Kuptsch, C. (2006), Merchants of Labour. Geneva: International Labour Office.
Kyle, D. & J. Dale (2001), ‘Smuggling the state back in. Agents of human smuggling recon-
sidered’, in D. Kyle & R. Koslowski (eds.), Global Human Smuggling. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins UP.
Kyle, D. & Z. Liang (2001), Migration Merchants: Organized migrant trafficking from China to
Ecuador. San Diego: Centre for Comparative Immigration Studies. University of Califor-
nia.
Lee, E. S. (1966), ‘A Theory of Migration’, Demography, 3 (1): 47-57.
Leenders, M. (1998), ‘Spanningen tussen stad en staat: de centralisatie van het vreemdelin-
genbeleid in de periode 1815-1940’, Migrantenstudies, 14 (4): 222-231.
Leun, J. van der (2003), Looking for loopholes. Processes of incorporation of illegal immigrants
in the Netherlands. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
Leun, J. van der & K. Rusinovic (2004), ‘Afgewezen asielzoekers tussen nationaal en lokaal
beleid’, in P. Mascini, P & N. Doornbos (eds), Amsterdams Sociologisch Tijdschrift, Onbe-
kend Terrein. Grenzen van het vreemdelingenbeleid 31 (3): 207-225.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 199
Leun, J. van der & L. Vervoorn (2004), Slavernijachtige uitbuiting in Nederland. Een inventari-
serende literatuurstudie in het kader van de uitbreiding van de strafbaarstelling van mensen-
handel. Den-Haag: Boom Juridische Uitgevers.
Lewis, I. M. (1988), A modern history of Somalia. Nation and state in the Horn of Africa.
Boulder: Westview Press.
Liempt, I. van (2004), ‘De sociale organisatie van mensensmokkel. Het beeld van mensens-
mokkel als grootschalige georganiseerde misdaad genuanceerd’, in P. Mascini & N.
Doornbos (eds), Amsterdams Sociologisch Tijdschrift. Onbekend terrein. Grenzen van het
vreemdelingenbeleid 31 (3): 38-61.
Liempt, I. van (2006a), ‘Trafficking in human beings: Conceptual dilemma’s’, in C. van den
Anker, and J. Doomernik (eds.), Trafficking and Women’s Rights, 27-42, London: Pal-
grave.
Liempt, I. van & Doomernik (2006b), ‘Migrant’s agency in the smuggling process. The per-
spectives of smuggled migrants in the Netherlands’, International Migration, 44 (4), 165-
190.
Liemt, G. van (2004), Human trafficking in Europe. An economic perspective. Geneva: ILO
working paper.
Lucassen, J. & R. Penninx (1994), Nieuwkomers, nakomelingen, Nederlanders. Immigranten in
Nederland 1550-1993. Amsterdam: Spinhuis.
Lucassen, L (1995), ‘Het paspoort als edelste deel van een mens.” Een aanzet tot een sociale
geschiedenis van het Nederlandse vreemdelingenbeleid’, Holland. Regionaal historisch
tijdschrift, 27 (1995): 265-285.
Mabrouk, M. (2003), ‘A sociological study of clandestine emigrants and their imaginary’
(Translated from Arab by Chrigui Hassine). Revue Semestrielle Tunisiennes de Sciences So-
cial. Tunis: CERES.
Mahler, S. J. & P. R. Pessar (2001), ‘Gendered geographies of power: Analyzing gender
across transnational spaces, Identities: Global studies in Culture and Power 7: 441-459.
Malkki, L. (1995), Purity and Exile. Violence, memory and national cosmology among Hutu refu-
gees in Tanzania. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Marcus, H, G. (1994), A History of Ethiopia. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Massey, D. S & K. Espinosa (1997), ‘What’s driving Mexico-U.S. Migration? A theoretical,
empirical, and policy analysis’, The American Journal of Sociology, 102 (4): 939-999.
Massey, D.S, J. Durand & N. J. Malone (2002), Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican immigra-
tion in an era of free trade. New York: Rusell Sage.
Mattheijer, M. (2000), De toelating van vluchtelingen in Nederland en hun integratie op de ar-
beidsmarkt. AIAS research report, no 2. Amsterdam: AIAS.
Matthews, M. (1993), The Passport Society. Controlling movement in Russia and the USSR. Col-
orado: Westview Press.
Mazzucato, V. (2005), ‘Ghanian migrants’ double engagement: A transnational view of devel-
opment and integration policies’, Global Migration Perspectives, no 45. Geneva: Global
Commission on International Migration.
McDowall, D. (1996), A modern history of the Kurds. I.B. Tauris: London.
Meeus, T. (2000), ‘Top Chinese smokkelaars blootgelegd’, NRC Handelsblad.
Meeus, T. (2002), ‘Monopolist in mensensmokkel’, in NRC Handelsblad.
Mittelman, J. (2000), The Globalization Syndrome: Resistance and Transformation, Princeton/
New York: Princeton University Press.
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This book is the product of a doctoral study on human smuggling from
Iraq, the Horn of Africa, and the former Soviet Union into the Nether-
lands. The central question it raises is: what impact does smuggling
have on how the migration process evolves and, consequently, what
choices do migrants make within this process?
Throughout the whole book a number of mistaken ideas about hu-
man smuggling are traced and nuanced. First and foremost, it be-
comes evident that the idea of human smuggling as a criminal offence
highly depends on which perspective such a belief is viewed from. In
the Netherlands, smuggling has been part of the penal code since
1993: before this time it was not considered a crime. Secondly, human
smuggling is almost without fail linked to ‘illegal’ and ‘unwanted’
forms of migration. Not taken into account are migrants’ motives for
using the services of a smuggler or the viable options for legal travel
that migrants have or – as is more often the case – do not have. Chap-
ter one gives an overview of recent migration laws and regulations and
shows that for some people in the world it has become difficult to find
legal ways to migrate to the West. Smuggling is in the Dutch penal
code defined as: ‘any person who, for motives of pecuniary gain, assists
another person in gaining entry to the Netherlands or in remaining in
the Netherlands, where he knows or has serious reason to suspect that
that person’s gaining entry or remaining is unlawful’. But if we take
into account the recently reduced options for legal migration and in-
creased controls on mobility, it does not seem appropriate to conflate
people who enter a country unlawfully with those who do not have le-
gitimate reasons to migrate. Thirdly, smuggling is often linked with
the presumed existence of well-organised criminal gangs who rule the
market and exploit their clients. This line of reasoning helps states jus-
tify the tough measures taken to combat human smuggling, but it also
loses sight of the other ways smuggling may be organised. Fourthly, it
is often assumed that smuggled migrants are passive actors who have
little or nothing to say for themselves in the migration process. The
fact that irregular migrants have less ‘state-recognised autonomy’ than
regular migrants does not mean, however, that they do not exert any
power in the process at all.
Chapter two demonstrates how the most powerful discourse sur-
rounding human smuggling is one of criminality. Most research in the
field of human smuggling is done from a criminological perspective,
focusing on questions of how smuggling is organised, who the smug-
glers are, and how they cooperate with other smugglers. More theoreti-
cal perspectives are largely based on economics. Salt and Stein (1997)
describe human smuggling as the ‘illegal’ side of the migration ‘busi-
ness’. This economic model explains all decisions – that of migrants as
well as smugglers – on the basis of economic gain and loss. Ignored is
the possibility that non-economic considerations may play a role in a
migrant contacting a smuggler, or conversely, a smuggler offering ser-
vices to a migrant. Moreover, Salt and Stein’s model leaves little room
for a migrant’s sense of self-agency. Accordingly, it is often assumed
that smugglers recruit migrants, yet in this study’s fieldwork, it turned
out that migrants actively seek out smugglers. Also ignored in Salt and
Stein’s model are all the interpersonal interactions that take place be-
tween smugglers and migrants.
Human smuggling is seen from a totally different perspective when
social perceptions are taken into account, particularly considering the
fact that states may – and often do – define human smuggling as
something ‘illegal’ or criminal. With the understanding that migrants’
reality can be very different from state perceptions, this research fol-
lows an alternative approach. The definition of human smuggling we
use is more sociological in nature: ‘Every act whereby an immigrant is
assisted in crossing international borders and this crossing is not en-
dorsed by the government of the receiving state, neither implicitly nor
explicitly’ (Doomernik 2001: 10-11). This definition makes a clear dis-
tinction between what is a state’s reality and what is a migrant’s reality,
leaving room for other types of human smuggling to exist besides that
which is well organised and profit-oriented.
Chapter three explains the research methodology on which this book
is founded, the life story method. The data, gathered between May
2003 and May 2004, comprises a total of 56 life stories, mainly from
(former) asylum seekers, which I collected with the help of three re-
search assistants from the selected regions. Early in the fieldwork, I
realised that my original plan to work with interpreters could be coun-
ter-productive, and I decided to train my research assistants to do the
interviews themselves. Many respondents had had negative experiences
with interpreters during their asylum hearings, so we had to ensure
that our interview setting would be a contrast to their previous, often
unpleasant interviews. Being able to decide on the order in which to re-
lay the events of their story and the amount of time spent answering a
question turned out to be important for this same reason. What quickly
became clear in our fieldwork is that showing interest in a person’s
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whole story makes a respondent more inclined to talk about sensitive
issues. Showing interest can completely change the interview setting,
especially if the respondent’s previous interview experience was
marked by distrust. The fact that my research assistants had all at one
time also migrated to the Netherlands, and they themselves knew a lot
about human smuggling helped to strengthen the trust relation be-
tween researcher and respondent. Of course it was also helpful that
most of the people we spoke with had been granted a status or were al-
ready rejected asylum seekers, thus leaving them unafraid to talk to us
openly.
Chapter four describes our respondents’ countries of origin so as to
establish the contexts in which people made the decision to migrate
and the reasons they needed a smuggler in their migration process.
Chapter five shows how differently smuggling processes can evolve.
From each region, one travel journey is described in detail so as to give
an exemplary overview of how people have travelled. Notable in our re-
search among Iraqi migrants is how their smuggling processes usually
evolve in less linear ways than the literature usually assumes. Very of-
ten, more than one smuggler is needed in order to reach their final
destination, though migrants may also cover certain passages of the
way on their own. How smuggling is organised also differs consider-
ably from region to region. For example, Kurds from North Iraq have
difficulty obtaining an exit visa, a fact that has fuelled the smuggling
industry considerably. Nearly no one we spoke with had left Iraq on his
or her own. This emphasises the need to study the entire smuggling
process, from beginning to end. From the Horn of Africa, most respon-
dents came to Europe by plane, travelling on forged documents. Since
1991, no passports – let alone visas – have been issued in Somalia,
therefore making it impossible to migrate in a legal way from the
country. This has exerted escalating pressure on the smuggling market.
By contrast, in the former Soviet Union, it is relatively easy to obtain a
visa, either by altering one’s background or by making use of the var-
ious ‘bastard’ institutions that arrange documents for those who wish
to travel to Western Europe.
In chapter six, a characterisation of the different smuggling types is
given by analysing how smuggling can be organised. Migrants, how-
ever, are not always aware of such ‘behind-the-scenes’ aspects to the op-
eration; they may have contact with the people working on ‘the floor’,
yet they may not know who is beyond its coordination. But by choosing
to use the life story method and view things from a migrant’s perspec-
tive, we have gotten to know, in greater detail, what migrants experi-
ence in their travels and what choices they have made given their often
constrained options. We also get a picture of how smuggling has af-
fected their migration process as a whole.
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If we look at different interactions between smugglers and migrants,
as well as take the outcome of the smuggling process into account,
three different types of smuggling can be identified. First is the service
type of smuggling: migrants know where they are going and how
much they have to pay for it. This process looks, apart from its risks
and the high costs, quite similar to regular migration processes. Mi-
grant communities often play an active role in this type of smuggling,
as does the infrastructure established by ‘bastard’ institutions. Second
is the directive type of smuggling: the smuggler decides how the pro-
cess will evolve, leaving the migrants with no voice of their own, and
often, in an unexpected destination. Third is the negotiable type: cen-
tral to this process are the interactions between smugglers and mi-
grants. Very often from the start, it may be unclear where the migrants
are going, more than one smuggler is used, and various countries are
passed through. Along the way, the migrant collects as much informa-
tion as possible, constantly trying to become knowledgeable about
‘good’ smugglers, safe routes, and ‘good’ countries of destination. The
data we collected makes visible the existence of a ‘chain of trust’. The
farther away from home one is, the greater the chance of travelling
with an anonymous smuggler and being exploited. Smugglers who de-
pend on a community from which to find their clients are not apt to
deliberately maltreat migrants. On the contrary, smugglers who work
from points of transit, where many prospective clients from various
countries convene, have a more profit-oriented attitude.
Chapter seven spends time looking at how smuggled migrants sur-
vive after having arrived to the Netherlands and being confronted with
the Dutch migration and asylum system. Those forced to survive in ‘il-
legality’ were confronted with all sorts of problems. Finding employ-
ment and housing in the informal economy, for example, is not easy.
The constant fear of being arrested and deported has also led many to
live a daily life fraught with high stress levels. Paradoxically, restrictive
migration policies and high costs involved in migrating with a smug-
gler have made it even more difficult for migrants to return to their
home countries, something which has undoubtedly interfered with the
dynamics of migration processes.
Finally, the last chapter posits an answer to the question of what mi-
gration with the help of a smuggler means for the migration process
as a whole. Smugglers, besides being high-risk and costly, give direc-
tion to migration processes. As our fieldwork has shown, a diverse pic-
ture appears to show how smugglers affect the migration process; it is
hardly always the case that migrants have lost complete control in the
process. They endeavour to orient themselves along the way, while as
much as possible reducing risks. Furthermore, our research made it
apparent that there are consequential differences between travelling
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with an anonymous smuggler and travelling with somebody who re-
mains dependent on the community back home. Also of significance is
the moment in the process a migrant contacts a smuggler; the farther
from home, the more dangerous it usually gets. The advantage of an
inside perspective is that the underlying dynamics of irregular migra-
tion processes can be studied and understood in it’s total complexity.
No doubt when researchers and policymakers in the field of irregular
migration only concentrate on the moment of border crossing they are




Dit boek is een weerslag van een promotieonderzoek naar mensen-
smokkel vanuit Irak, de Hoorn van Afrika en de voormalige Sovjet-
Unie naar Nederland. Centraal staan de vragen wat reizen met een
smokkelaar betekent voor het verloop van het migratieproces en welke
keuzes migranten zelf in dit proces kunnen maken.
In het boek wordt een aantal vooroordelen over mensensmokkel aan-
gestipt en genuanceerd. Ten eerste blijkt de opvatting van mensen-
smokkel als een strafbare aangelegenheid sterk afhankelijk van de con-
text. In Nederland is mensensmokkel sinds 1993 opgenomen in het
Wetboek van Strafrecht. Voor die tijd werd het niet als een delict ge-
zien.
Ten tweede valt op dat er een verband wordt gelegd tussen mensen-
smokkel en ‘illegale’ of ‘ongewenste’ migratie. Motieven van migranten
om gebruik te maken van de diensten van een mensensmokkelaar en
de mogelijke afwezigheid van legale migratiemogelijkheden worden
niet in overweging genomen. In hoofdstuk een wordt aan de hand van
recente migratiewetgeving en beleidsmaatregelen beschreven hoe het
voor sommige mensen uit bepaalde delen van de wereld steeds moeilij-
ker is geworden om op legale wijze naar het Westen te migreren. Men-
sensmokkel wordt in het Nederlandse strafrecht als volgt gedefinieerd:
‘het uit winstbejag illegaal binnenbrengen van, of onderdak verlenen
aan, personen die niet de nationaliteit van het land hebben, noch in
het bezit zijn van een permanente verblijfstitel.’ Als we de recent ver-
minderde legale migratiemogelijkheden in ogenschouw nemen, is het
mogelijk dat migranten die gebruik maken van deze ‘illegale’ diensten
niettemin een legitieme redenen hebben om te migreren.
Ten derde wordt mensensmokkel vaak in verband gebracht met goed
georganiseerde criminele bendes, die de markt beheersen en hun klan-
ten uitbuiten. Op deze opvatting steunen de strenge maatregelen die
worden genomen om mensensmokkel te bestrijden. Andere mogelijk-
heden om mensensmokkel te organiseren blijven daardoor buiten
beeld.
Ten vierde wordt vaak aangenomen dat migranten bij mensensmok-
kel passieve actoren zijn die weinig tot niets te vertellen hebben in het
migratieproces. Het feit dat migranten minder autonomie hebben in ir-
reguliere dan in reguliere migratieprocessen, betekent echter niet dat
ze helemaal geen invloed kunnen uitoefenen op het verloop ervan.
Hoofdstuk twee laat zien dat het dominante discours rondom men-
sensmokkel een crimineel discours is. Het meeste onderzoek naar
mensensmokkel heeft een criminologische invalshoek en houdt zich
bezig met vragen als hoe mensensmokkel georganiseerd is, wie de
smokkelaars zijn en hoe smokkelaars met andere smokkelaars samen-
werken. Meer theoretische perspectieven zijn veelal economisch van
aard. Salt & Stein (1997) beschrijven mensensmokkel als de illegale
kant van de ‘migratiebusiness’. Hun model verklaart alle beslissingen
van zowel migranten als smokkelaars op basis van economisch gewin
en verlies. Het feit dat er mogelijk andere overwegingen een rol spelen
voor migranten om met een smokkelaar in zee te gaan, of voor smok-
kelaars om deze diensten aan te bieden, wordt niet in hun model mee-
genomen. Het model gaat er tevens van uit dat smokkelaars migranten
‘rekruteren’ om zoveel mogelijk winst te maken. Dat migranten ook
zelf op zoek kunnen gaan naar een smokkelaar wordt hier geheel bui-
ten beschouwing gelaten, evenals de gevolgen die interacties tussen
smokkelaar en migrant kunnen hebben voor het verloop van het pro-
ces.
Een alternatief perspectief op mensensmokkel ontstaat als sociale
percepties worden meegewogen. Mensensmokkel kan vanuit het per-
spectief van de staat wel als illegaal of crimineel worden gedefinieerd,
maar als dit niet overeenkomt met hoe migranten het zelf zien en erva-
ren, wat bestuderen we dan? Voor dit onderzoek is gebruikgemaakt
van een brede, sociologische definitie van mensensmokkel om boven-
genoemde vooronderstellingen te vermijden. De definitie luidt als
volgt: alle vormen van hulp van derden bij het overschrijden van inter-
nationale grenzen waarbij tegen de letter en/of de geest van het migra-
tiebeleid (van landen van herkomst, transitie en bestemming) gehan-
deld wordt (Doomernik, 2001: 10-11). Deze definitie maakt duidelijk
onderscheid tussen de werkelijkheid van de staat en die van de mi-
grant, en zij laat ruimte voor andere praktijken naast de goed georgani-
seerde en op winst gerichte mensensmokkel.
In hoofdstuk drie komt de onderzoeksmethode die ten grondslag ligt
aan dit boek aan de orde: de levensverhalenmethode. In de periode van
een jaar (mei 2003 - 2004) zijn met behulp van drie onderzoeksassis-
tenten 56 smokkelverhalen verzameld, veelal onder (voormalige) asiel-
zoekers. Tijdens het veldwerk bleek al snel dat er een sterk contrast no-
dig was met de officiële interviewsetting van de Immigratie en Natura-
lisatie Dienst (IND), die de meeste respondenten zich nog levendig
herinnerden. Velen hadden tijdens hun asielverhoren negatieve erva-
ringen gehad met tolken. Er is daarom besloten, anders dan aanvanke-
lijk het plan was, om niet met tolken te werken. De ideale interviewset-
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ting bleek een informele te zijn waarin de respondent zelf kon bepalen
aan welke onderwerpen de meeste aandacht werd geschonken. Een in-
terviewer die met oprechte interesse luistert, maakt het voor respon-
denten gemakkelijker om over gevoelige onderwerpen te praten. Het
feit dat de onderzoeksassistenten zelf een migratieachtergrond hadden
en veel wisten over mensensmokkel, hielp eveneens om de vertrou-
wensband te versterken. Ook speelde mee dat de meeste mensen die
wij spraken op het moment van het interview al een verblijfsstatus had-
den, of uitgeprocedeerd waren, waardoor zij makkelijker vrijuit konden
praten.
In hoofdstuk vier worden de landen van herkomst van de responden-
ten beschreven om te begrijpen in welke context zij de beslissing heb-
ben genomen om te migreren en waarom zij een smokkelaar nodig
hadden.
In hoofdstuk vijf wordt uit elke van regio één smokkelverhaal verteld
om aan te geven hoe verschillend migratieprocessen met behulp van
een smokkelaar kunnen verlopen. Wat opvalt, met name in het verhaal
van een migrant uit Irak, is dat migratie met behulp van een smokke-
laar minder lineair verloopt dan in de literatuur wordt verondersteld.
Er wordt bijvoorbeeld regelmatig met meerdere smokkelaars gereisd
voordat de eindbestemming bereikt is, en sommige migranten leggen
ook delen van het traject zonder smokkelaar af. De manier waarop
smokkel georganiseerd is, verschilt ook aanzienlijk per regio. Voor
Koerden uit Noord-Irak is het vaak onmogelijk om een uitreisvisum te
krijgen. Zij beginnen hun reis daarom bijna allemaal met behulp van
een smokkelaar. Dit benadrukt nogmaals het belang van het bestude-
ren van de hele migratieketen, omdat migratieprocessen niet alleen be-
ı̈nvloed worden door wat er in het ontvangende land gebeurt. In het
Koerdische deel van Irak bestaat bijvoorbeeld een lange traditie van
smokkelen wat het relatief eenvoudig maakt om in deze contreien een
smokkelaar te vinden. Vanuit de Hoorn van Afrika komen de meeste
respondenten met het vliegtuig naar Europa. Zij maken meestal ge-
bruik van valse papieren. Sinds 1991 worden er in Somalië geen pas-
poorten meer afgegeven waardoor het onmogelijk is om een visum te
krijgen. Hierdoor is de druk op de smokkelmarkt aanzienlijk toegeno-
men. In de voormalige Sovjet-Unie bleek het juist vrij gemakkelijk om
een visum te krijgen, hetzij door je biografie aan te passen aan de eisen
die gesteld worden aan visumgebruikers, hetzij door gebruik te maken
van zogenaamde ‘bastard’-instituties die op relatief eenvoudige wijze
papieren kunnen regelen om naar West-Europa te reizen.
In hoofdstuk zes worden de verschillende mensensmokkelprocessen
getypeerd. Het is moeilijk om op basis van verhalen van gesmokkelde
migranten uitspraken te doen over hoe mensensmokkelprocessen pre-
cies georganiseerd zijn, simpelweg omdat migranten niet altijd inzicht
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hebben in de achterliggende organisatie en alleen contact hebben met
handlangers of individuele smokkelaars. De gekozen onderzoeksme-
thode, het verzamelen van levensverhalen, levert echter wel inzicht op
in de keuzes die gesmokkelde migranten onderweg hebben gemaakt
en hoe het verloop van het smokkelproces de uitkomst van hun migra-
tieproces heeft beı̈nvloed.
Wanneer we naar de interacties tussen smokkelaars en migranten
kijken en de uiteindelijke uitkomst van het proces in overweging ne-
men, kunnen er drie types mensensmokkel onderscheiden worden: het
dienstverlenende type, het sturende type en het onderhandelende type.
In het eerste geval is mensensmokkel puur een dienstverlening. Mi-
granten weten van tevoren waar ze heen gaan en hoeveel ze daarvoor
moeten betalen. Behalve de hoge prijs en het risico tijdens de reis ver-
loopt dit migratieproces hetzelfde als reguliere migratieprocessen. In
veel gevallen speelt de migrantengemeenschap een actieve rol bij deze
vorm van mensensmokkel, maar ook de infrastructuur van ‘bastard’-in-
stituties kunnen onder dit type vallen.
Bij het sturende type mensensmokkel bepaalt de smokkelaar hoe het
migratieproces verloopt. Migranten hebben weinig tot niets te vertellen
en komen vaak op een (voor hen) willekeurige plaats terecht, ook als ze
een specifieke voorkeur hadden.
Bij het onderhandelende type staan de interacties tussen smokkelaar
en migrant centraal. Vaak is van tevoren niet bekend hoe het proces
gaat verlopen, en reist de migrant stap voor stap. Onderweg verzamelt
hij zoveel mogelijk informatie om een weloverwogen keuze te kunnen
maken voor zowel een ‘goede’ smokkelaar, een veilige reisroute als een
‘goede’ eindbestemming. In de verzamelde data valt een patroon op dat
‘de ketting van vertrouwen’ genoemd kan worden. Hoe verder men van
huis is, hoe zwakker de ketting wordt en hoe groter de kans dat men
met een anonieme smokkelaar reist en uitgebuit wordt. Smokkelaars
die dicht bij huis werken en voor hun inkomsten afhankelijk zijn van
verhalen die over hen de ronde doen, zullen minder snel hun klanten
bedriegen. Smokkelaars die daarentegen op transitplekken werken
waar veel migranten uit verschillende landen samenkomen, hebben
vaker een meer winstgerichte houding.
In hoofdstuk zeven wordt besproken hoe het gesmokkelde migran-
ten vergaat als ze eenmaal in Nederland zijn aangekomen en gecon-
fronteerd worden met de Nederlandse migratie- en asielwetgeving.
Degenen die in de illegaliteit moesten overleven, liepen tegen allerlei
problemen aan: zij hadden moeite werk en huisvesting te vinden en
liepen het gevaar opgepakt en uitgezet te worden naar een land waar
ze of nog steeds gevaar liepen, of niet met lege handen naar terug wil-
den keren. Paradoxaal genoeg hebben de restrictieve migratiewetgeving
en de hoge kosten die gepaard gaan met mensensmokkel het voor mi-
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granten moeilijker gemaakt om terug te migreren naar hun land van
herkomst.
In het laatste hoofdstuk wordt antwoord gegeven op de vraag wat de
hulp van een smokkelaar betekent voor het migratieproces. In het al-
gemeen kan gezegd worden dat reizen met een smokkelaar allerlei risi-
co’s met zich meebrengt, en dat smokkelaars steeds meer richting ge-
ven aan de migratiestromen. Uit dit onderzoek blijkt echter dat het zel-
den voorkomt dat migranten helemaal niks te zeggen hebben.
Gesmokkelde migranten oriënteren zich onderweg en proberen risico’s
zo veel mogelijk te beperken. Het onderzoek heeft ook aangetoond dat
het van belang is met welk type smokkelaar er gereisd wordt en niet al-
leen door het verschil in modus operandi, zoals uit criminologisch on-
derzoek naar voren komt. Ook de verhouding tussen de smokkelaar en
zijn cliënten en het moment in het proces waarop de smokkelaar wordt
ingeschakeld, verschillen. Het voordeel van het ‘insiders’-perspectief op
mensensmokkel is dat de dynamiek die ten grondslag ligt aan irregu-
liere migratieprocessen in zijn complexe totaliteit bestudeerd en begre-
pen kan worden. Als onderzoekers en beleidsmakers zich alleen rich-
ten op het moment van grensoverschrijding zien ze een belangrijk
gedeelte van het irreguliere migratieproces over het hoofd.
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